"THE BACKSTORY TO ONE OF THE WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS-THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA." --NPR'S Morning Edition .
James Bradley, Author of FLAGS OF OUR FATHERS and FLYBOYS.
THE CHINA MIRAGE.
THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISASTER IN ASIA.
“世界上最重要的关系之一——美国和中国的背景故事。” ——NPR 早间版。
“Shìjiè shàng zuì zhòngyào de guānxì zhī yī——měiguó hé zhōngguó de bèijǐng gùshì.” ——NPR zǎo jiān bǎn.
詹姆斯布拉德利，我们父亲和飞行男孩的旗帜的作者。
Zhānmǔsī bù lā dé lì, wǒmen fùqīn hé fēixíng nánhái de qízhì de zuòzhě.
THE CHINA MIRAGE.
中国海市蜃楼。
Zhōngguó hǎishìshènlóu.
亚洲美国灾难的隐藏历史。
Yàzhōu měiguó zāinàn de yǐn zàng lìshǐ.
INTRODUCTION
The future policy of Japan towards Asiatic countries should be similar to that of the United States towards their neighbors....A "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" in Asia will remove the temptation to European encroachment, and Japan will be recognized as the leader of the Asiatic nations. —President Theodore Roosevelt.
The people of China well over a century have been, in thought and in objective, closer to us Americans than almost any other peoples in the world-the same great ideals. China, in the last-less than half a century has become one of the great democracies of the world. — President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
Two American presidents from the first half of the twentieth century blazed the path into Asia still followed by the United States today. These two presidents were cousins, and, although they lived a generation apart, both followed similar paths to power: from New York State legislator to assistant secretary of the Navy to New York governor and, finally, to president of the United States. Both Presidents Roosevelt conducted their Asian diplomacy in similar style, personally taking the reins to deal directly and secretly with Asian affairs, often circumventing their own State Departments. Neither Roosevelt traveled to Asia or knew many Asians, but both were supremely confident that they had special insights. The parallels are not exact. Theodore was enamored of Japan and allowed himself to be taken in by a propaganda campaign directed from Tokyo and led by a Harvand-edacated Japanese friend. In contrast, Franklin favored China and was influenced by his own Harvard-educated Chinese friend.
Theodore Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for bringing the combatants in the Russian-Japanese War to the peace table. Almost unknown in the United States, though, are the president's backdoor negotiations with Emperor Meiji of Japan over the fate of an independent country, the empire of Korea. During these secret talks, brokered by Meiji's Harvard-educated envoy, Roosevelt agreed to stand aside and allow Japan to subjugate Korea as a colony, becoming the first world leader to sanction Japan's expansion onto the Asian continent.
Sumner Welles, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's friend and the assistant secretary of state, observed, "No one close to the President could have failed to recognize the deep feeling of friendship for China that he had inherited from his mother's side of his family." After a meeting to discuss China policy with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, one administration official recalled,
"We might as well have saved our breath. Roosevelt put an end to the discussion by looking up and recalling that his ancestors used to trade with China."
Indeed they had. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's grandfather Warren Delano was one of the first Americans to travel to what was seen by Americans as "Old China," where he made a dynastic fortune in the illegal opium trade. As a U.S. consul, Delano oversaw the first American military incursion into China. It was from his Delano line that Rooseveit inherited his love of the sea, his princely fortune, and his confidence that he knew how to handle China. Roosevelt later observed, "What vitality I have is not inherited from Roosevelts...mine, such as it is, comes from the Delanos."
Dealing drugs was only part of Warren Delano's mission. Much as his European ancestors had carved "New England" territory from Indian lands on America's Atlantic coast, he helped carve "New
介绍
日本未来对亚洲国家的政策应该类似于美国对邻国的政策......亚洲的“日本门罗主义”将消除欧洲侵占的诱惑，日本将被公认为亚洲的领导者 亚洲国家。 ——西奥多·罗斯福总统。
一个多世纪以来，中国人民在思想上和客观上比世界上几乎任何其他民族都更接近我们美国人——同样伟大的理想。 中国，在过去不到半个世纪里，已经成为世界上最伟大的民主国家之一。 — 富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福总统。
20 世纪上半叶的两位美国总统开辟了进入亚洲的道路，今天的美国仍然效仿。 这两位总统是堂兄弟，虽然他们相隔了一代人，但都走上了相似的权力之路：从纽约州立法者到助理海军部长，再到纽约州州长，最后到美国总统。 两位罗斯福总统都以类似的方式进行亚洲外交，亲自直接和秘密处理亚洲事务，经常绕过他们自己的国务院。 罗斯福既没有去过亚洲，也没有认识很多亚洲人，但他们都非常自信自己有特殊的见解。 相似之处并不准确。 西奥多迷恋日本，并允许自己参与了一场以东京为指导、由一位在哈佛受过教育的日本朋友领导的宣传活动。 相比之下，富兰克林偏爱中国，却被自己在哈佛受过教育的中国朋友惹恼了。
西奥多·罗斯福 (Theodore Roosevelt) 因将日俄战争中的战斗人员带上和平谈判桌而获得诺贝尔和平奖。 然而，在美国几乎不为人知的是，总统与日本明治天皇就独立国家朝鲜帝国的命运进行的秘密谈判。 在这些秘密会谈中，在明治哈佛受过教育的特使的斡旋下，罗斯福同意袖手旁观，允许日本将韩国征服为殖民地，成为第一个批准日本向亚洲大陆扩张的世界领导人。
富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福的朋友、马特的助理国务卿萨姆纳·威尔斯说：“总统身边的任何人都不会不承认他从他母亲那边继承的对中国的深厚友谊。” 在与罗斯福讨论中国政策的会议后，一位政府官员回忆说，
“我们还不如保住了呼吸。罗斯福抬起头来，回忆起他的祖先曾经与中国进行贸易，从而结束了讨论。”
他们确实有。 富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福 (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) 的祖父沃伦·德拉诺 (Warren Delano) 是第一批前往被美国人视为“旧中国”的美国人之一，在那里他通过非法鸦片贸易发了大财。 作为美国领事，德拉诺监督了美国对中国的第一次军事入侵。 Rooseveit 正是从他的 Delano 家族继承了他对海洋的热爱、他的王室财富以及他知道如何处理中国的自信。 罗斯福后来观察到：“我所拥有的活力并不是从罗斯福那里继承来的……我的，就这样，来自德拉诺斯。
贩毒只是沃伦·德拉诺 (Warren Delano) 使命的一部分。 就像他的欧洲殖民者在美洲大西洋沿岸的印度土地上雕刻出“新英格兰”领土一样，他帮助雕刻了“新英格兰”。
Jièshào
rìběn wèilái duì yàzhōu guójiā de zhèngcè yìng gāi lèisì yú měiguó duì lín guó de zhèngcè...... Yàzhōu de “rìběn mén luó zhǔyì” jiāng xiāochú ōuzhōu qīnzhàn de yòuhuò, rìběn jiāng bèi gōngrèn wéi yàzhōu de lǐngdǎo zhě yàzhōu guójiā. ——Xī ào duō·luósīfú zǒngtǒng.
Yīgè duō shìjì yǐlái, zhōngguó rénmín zài sīxiǎng shàng hé kèguān shàng bǐ shìjiè shàng jīhū rènhé qítā mínzú dōu gèng jiējìn wǒmen měiguó rén——tóngyàng wěidà de lǐxiǎng. Zhōngguó, zài guòqù bù dào bàn gè shìjì lǐ, yǐjīng chéngwéi shìjiè shàng zuì wěidà de mínzhǔ guójiā zhī yī. — Fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú zǒngtǒng.
20 Shìjì shàng bàn yè de liǎng wèi měiguó zǒngtǒng kāipìle jìnrù yàzhōu de dàolù, jīntiān dì měiguó réngrán xiàofǎng. Zhè liǎng wèi zǒngtǒng shì táng xiōngdì, suīrán tāmen xiānggéle yīdài rén, dàn dōu zǒu shàngle xiāngsì de quánlì zhī lù: Cóng niǔyuē zhōu lìfǎ zhě dào zhùlǐ hǎijūn bùzhǎng, zài dào niǔyuē zhōuzhōuzhǎng, zuìhòu dào měiguó zǒngtǒng. Liǎng wèi luósīfú zǒngtǒng dōu yǐ lèisì de fāngshì jìnxíng yàzhōu wàijiāo, qīnzì zhíjiē hé mìmì chǔlǐ yàzhōu shìwù, jīngcháng ràoguò tāmen zìjǐ de guówùyuàn. Luósīfú jì méiyǒu qùguò yàzhōu, yě méiyǒu rènshí hěnduō yàzhōu rén, dàn tāmen dōu fēicháng zìxìn zìjǐ yǒu tèshū de jiànjiě. Xiāngsì zhī chù bìng bù zhǔnquè. Xī ào duō míliàn rìběn, bìng yǔnxǔ zìjǐ cānyùle yī chǎng yǐ dōngjīng wèi zhǐdǎo, yóu yī wèi zài hāfó shòuguò jiàoyù de rìběn péngyǒu lǐngdǎo de xuānchuán huódòng. Xiāng bǐ zhī xià, fùlánkèlín piān'ài zhōngguó, què bèi zìjǐ zài hāfó shòuguò jiàoyù de zhōngguó péngyǒu rěnǎole.
Xī ào duō·luósīfú (Theodore Roosevelt) yīn jiāng rì é zhànzhēng zhōng de zhàndòu rényuán dài shàng hépíng tánpàn zhuō ér huòdé nuò bèi'ěr hépíng jiǎng. Rán'ér, zài měiguó jīhū bù wéi rénzhī de shì, zǒngtǒng yǔ rìběn míngzhì tiānhuáng jiù dúlì guójiā cháoxiǎn dìguó de mìngyùn jìnxíng de mìmì tánpàn. Zài zhèxiē mìmì huìtán zhōng, zài míngzhì hāfó shòuguò jiàoyù de tèshǐ de wòxuán xià, luósīfú tóngyì xiùshǒupángguān, yǔnxǔ rìběn jiāng hánguó zhēngfú wèi zhímíndì, chéngwéi dì yī gè pīzhǔn rìběn xiàng yàzhōu dàlù kuòzhāng de shìjiè lǐngdǎo rén.
Fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú de péngyǒu, mǎ tè de zhùlǐ guówùqīng sà mǔ nà·wēi ěr sī shuō:“Zǒngtǒng shēnbiān de rènhé rén dōu bù huì bù chéngrèn tā cóng tā mǔqīn nà biān jìchéng de duì zhōngguó de shēnhòu yǒuyì.” Zài yǔ luósīfú tǎolùn zhōngguó zhèngcè de huìyì hòu, yī wèi zhèngfǔ guānyuán huíyì shuō,
“wǒmen hái bùrú bǎozhùle hūxī. Luósīfú tái qǐtóu lái, huíyì qǐ tā de zǔxiān céngjīng yǔ zhōngguó jìnxíng màoyì, cóng'ér jiéshùle tǎolùn.”
Tāmen quèshí yǒu. Fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) de zǔfù wò lún·dé lā nuò (Warren Delano) shì dì yī pī qiánwǎng bèi měiguó rén shì wéi “jiù zhōngguó” dì měiguó rén zhī yī, zài nàlǐ tā tōngguò fēifǎ yāpiàn màoyì fāle dà cái. Zuòwéi měiguó lǐngshì, dé lā nuò jiāndūle měiguó duì zhōngguó de dì yī cì jūnshì rùqīn. Rooseveit zhèng shì cóng tā de Delano jiāzú jìchéngle tā duì hǎiyáng de rè'ài, tā de wángshì cáifù yǐjí tā zhīdào rúhé chǔlǐ zhōngguó de zìxìn. Luósīfú hòulái guānchá dào:“Wǒ suǒ yǒngyǒu de huólì bìng bùshì cóng luósīfú nàlǐ jìchéng lái de……wǒ de, jiù zhèyàng, láizì dé lā nuò sī.
Fàndú zhǐshì wò lún·dé lā nuò (Warren Delano) shǐmìng de yībùfèn. Jiù xiàng tā de ōu zhōu zhímín zhě zài měizhōu dàxīyáng yán'àn de yìndù tǔdì shàng diāokè chū “xīn yīnggélán” lǐngtǔ yīyàng, tā bāngzhù diāokèle “xīn yīnggélán”.
China" enclaves —westernized and Christianized areas — like Hong Kong on China's Pacific coast. Delano, like many Americans, believed that this was only the beginning, that just as they were sweeping across North America, someday Christian and American values would change China.
Like most Americans, the Roosevelts had only a meager understanding of Asia. Waves of immigration had brought people from all over the world to the United States, but after the Transcontinental Railroad was completed, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 made it illegal for a Chinese person to enter the country. True, some westernized Chinese were exempted and allowed in as students, businessmen, and diplomats, but they were few and far between. Almost no Chinese could be found in the halls of the White House or the offices of Wall Street.
Likewise, very few Americans had ever traveled to China. Yes, some American missionaries, businessmen, and diplomats made it across the Pacific, but they clung mostly to the westernized New China settlements on the coast. These Americans wrote home about a cultural and spiritual blossoming of the Chinese under their care, decades of hopeful hogwash foisted on unknowing readers. Both Presidents Roosevelt were thus constantly well informed about New China, that place that was always going to be.
This book examines the American perception of Asia and the gap between that perception and reality. The wide gulf of the Pacific Ocean has prevented Americans and Chinese from knowing each other. Generations of accumulated misunderstanding between these two continental giants has so far led to three major Asian wars that have left millions dead and has distorted U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy.
My father, John Bradley, was one of the six men photographed raising the American flag on the island of Iwo Jima during World War II. When I was forty six years old I published Flags of Our Fathers , a book about my dad's experiences. Now I am sixty years old and I continue to honor the young men who fought in that horrible war, but I increasingly doubt my father's elders, the men in power who allowed Americans to be sucked into a world war at a time when the U.S. military was preparing for war in Europe and was not ready to fight in distant Asia.
Japan surprised the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7. 1941. On December 8, the U.S. Congress declared war against Japan, but not well remembered is what Americans on that day thought they were fighting for. One of the millions who served in America's Asian war was John F. Kennedy, who later recalled.
"It was clearly enunciated that the independence of China... was the fundamental object of our Far Eastern policy...that this and other statements of our policies on the Far East led directly to the attack on Peard Harbor is well known. And it might be said that we almost knowingly entered into combat with Japan to preserve the independence of China."
For generations, American hearts had been warmed by the missionary dream of a New China peopled by Americanized Christians. Then, beginning slowly in the early 1930s, a foreign-funded China Lobby sprouted in the United States and gained powerful adherents in the U.S. government, in the media, and in pulpits across the country. By 1941, nearly a decade of China Lobby propaganda had been pumped into American churches, homes, and heads, convincing the vast majority of Americans that a Christianized and Americanized New China would blossom as their best friend in Asia if the United Stales drove the Japanese military out of China.
The China Lobby's premise was that the Japanese military would be forced to withdraw from China if the United States embargoed Japan's oil. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought the opposite. Japan — with little domestic production — had only two major sources of oil: California and the Dutch East Indies (today's Indonesia). Roosevelt had a "Europe first" policy in case of war: the United States would defeat Hitler, and then, if necessary, confront the Japanese. Since the United States was supplying over 80 percent of Japan's oil,
中国”飞地——西方化和基督教化的地区——比如中国太平洋沿岸的香港。德拉诺和许多美国人一样，相信这只是开始，就像他们席卷北美一样，有一天基督教和美国的价值观会改变中国。
像大多数美国人一样，罗斯福对亚洲的了解也很有限。 一波又一波的移民潮把世界各地的人们带到了美国，但在横贯大陆铁路建成后，1882 年的《排华法案》规定中国人进入美国是非法的。 的确，一些西化的中国人被豁免并被允许以学生、商人和外交官的身份进入，但他们寥寥无几。 在白宫的大厅或华尔街的办公室里几乎找不到中国人。
同样，很少有美国人去过中国。 是的，一些美国传教士、商人和外交官横渡了太平洋，但他们大多紧紧抓住沿海西化的新中国定居点。 这些美国人写信回家，讲述了他们照料下的中国人在文化和精神上的蓬勃发展，几十年来充满希望的废话强加给了不知情的读者。 罗斯福两位总统因此不断地了解新中国，那个地方永远都是。
本书探讨了 Anerican 对亚洲的看法以及这种看法与现实之间的差距。 太平洋的广阔海湾阻碍了美国人和中国人相互了解。 迄今为止，这两个大陆巨人之间几代人积累的误解导致了三场重大的亚洲战争，造成数百万人死亡，并扭曲了美国的国内政治和外交政策。
我的父亲约翰布拉德利是二战期间在硫磺岛举起美国国旗的六个人之一。 我四十六岁的时候
出版了_我们父亲的旗帜_，一本关于我父亲经历的书。 现在我已经 60 岁了，我继续向在这场可怕战争中战斗的年轻人致敬，但我越来越怀疑我父亲的长辈，他们允许美国人在美军被卷入世界大战的时候 正在准备在欧洲开战，并没有准备好在遥远的亚洲作战。
1941 年 12 月 7 日，日本在珍珠港出其不意地袭击了美国。12 月 8 日，美国。 国会对日本宣战，但人们不记得那天美国人认为他们是为了什么而战。 在美国亚洲战争中服役的数百万人之一是约翰·肯尼迪，他后来回忆说。
“它清楚地阐明，中国的独立……是我们远东政策的根本目标……我们对远东政策的这一声明和其他声明直接导致了对皮尔港的袭击，这是众所周知的。而且 可以说，我们几乎是故意和日本打仗，以维护中国的独立。”
几代人以来，美国人的心一直被美国化基督徒居住的新中国的传教梦想所温暖。 然后，从 1930 年代初期开始，一个外资中国游说团在美国萌芽，并在美国政府、媒体和全国各地的讲坛上获得了强大的支持者。 到 1941 年，近十年的中国游说宣传已深入美国教堂、家庭和领袖，让绝大多数美国人相信，如果美国驱逐日本人，基督教化和美国化的新中国将成为他们在亚洲最好的朋友。 军队撤出中国。
中国游说团的前提是，如果美国禁运日本的石油，日本军队将被迫撤出中国。 富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福总统的想法正好相反。 日本——国内产量很少——只有两个主要的石油来源：加利福尼亚和荷属东印度群岛（今天的印度尼西亚）。 罗斯福在发生战争时有“欧洲优先”的政策：美国将击败希特勒，然后在必要时对抗日本。 由于美国供应了日本 80% 以上的石油，
Zhōngguó” fēi dì——xīfāng huà hé jīdūjiào huà dì dìqū——bǐrú zhōngguó tàipíngyáng yán'àn de xiānggǎng. Dé lā nuò hé xǔduō měiguó rén yīyàng, xiāngxìn zhè zhǐshì kāishǐ, jiù xiàng tāmen xíjuǎn běiměi yì yàng, yǒu yītiān jīdūjiào hé měiguó de jiàzhíguān huì gǎibiàn zhōngguó.
Xiàng dàduōshù měiguó rén yīyàng, luósīfú duì yàzhōu de liǎojiě yě hěn yǒuxiàn. Yī bō yòu yī bō de yímín cháo bǎ shìjiè gèdì de rénmen dài dàole měiguó, dàn zài héngguàn dàlù tiělù jiànchéng hòu,1882 nián de “pái huá fǎ'àn” guīdìng zhōngguó rén jìnrù měiguó shì fēifǎ de. Díquè, yīxiē xīhuà de zhōngguó rén bèi huòmiǎn bìng bèi yǔnxǔ yǐ xuéshēng, shāngrén hé wàijiāo guān de shēnfèn jìnrù, dàn tāmen liáoliáo wújǐ. Zài báigōng de dàtīng huò huá'ěrjiē de bàngōngshì lǐ jīhū zhǎo bù dào zhōngguó rén.
Tóngyàng, hěn shǎo yǒu měiguó rén qùguò zhōngguó. Shì de, yīxiē měiguó chuánjiào shì, shāngrén hé wàijiāo guān héngdùle tàipíngyáng, dàn tāmen dà duō jǐn jǐn zhuā zhù yánhǎi xīhuà de xīn zhōngguó dìngjū diǎn. Zhèxiē měiguó rén xiě xìn huí jiā, jiǎngshùle tāmen zhàoliào xià de zhōngguó rén zài wénhuà hé jīngshén shàng de péngbó fāzhǎn, jǐ shí niánlái chōngmǎn xīwàng de fèihuà qiángjiā gěi liǎo bùzhī qíng de dúzhě. Luósīfú liǎng wèi zǒngtǒng yīncǐ bùduàn de liǎojiě xīn zhōngguó, nàgèdìfāng yǒngyuǎn dōu shì.
Běn shū tàntǎole Anerican duì yàzhōu de kànfǎ yǐjí zhè zhǒng kànfǎ yǔ xiànshí zhī jiān de chājù. Tàipíngyáng de guǎngkuò hǎiwān zǔ'àile měiguó rén hé zhōngguó rén xiānghù liǎojiě. Qìjīn wéizhǐ, zhè liǎng gè dàlù jùrén zhī jiān jǐ dài rén jīlěi de wùjiě dǎozhìle sān chǎng zhòngdà de yàzhōu zhànzhēng, zàochéng shù bǎi wàn rén sǐwáng, bìng niǔqūle měiguó de guónèi zhèngzhì hé wàijiāo zhèngcè.
Wǒ de fùqīn yuēhàn bù lā dé lì shì èrzhàn qíjiān zài liúhuáng dǎo jǔ qǐ měiguó guóqí de liù gèrén zhī yī. Wǒ sìshíliù suì de shíhòu
chūbǎnle_wǒmen fùqīn de qízhì_, yī běn guānyú wǒ fùqīn jīnglì de shū. Xiànzài wǒ yǐjīng 60 suìle, wǒ jìxù xiàng zài zhè chǎng kěpà zhànzhēng zhōng zhàndòu de niánqīng rén zhìjìng, dàn wǒ yuè lái yuè huáiyí wǒ fùqīn de cháng bèi, tāmen yǔnxǔ měiguó rén zài měijūn bèi juàn rù shìjiè dàzhàn de shíhòu zhèngzài zhǔnbèi zài ōuzhōu kāizhàn, bìng méiyǒu zhǔnbèi hǎo zài yáoyuǎn de yàzhōu zuòzhàn.
1941 Nián 12 yuè 7 rì, rìběn zài zhēnzhū gǎng chūqíbùyì dì xíjíle měiguó.12 Yuè 8 rì, měiguó. Guóhuì duì rìběn xuānzhàn, dàn rénmen bù jìdé nèitiān měiguó rén rènwéi tāmen shì wèile shénme ér zhàn. Zài měiguó yàzhōu zhànzhēng zhōng fúyì de shù bǎi wàn rén zhī yī shì yuēhàn·kěnnídí, tā hòulái huíyì shuō.
“Tā qīngchǔ dì chǎnmíng, zhōngguó de dúlì……shì wǒmen yuǎndōng zhèngcè de gēnběn mùbiāo……wǒmen duì yuǎndōng zhèngcè de zhè yī shēngmíng hé qítā shēngmíng zhíjiē dǎozhìle duì pí'ěr gǎng de xíjí, zhè shì zhòngsuǒzhōuzhī de. Érqiě kěyǐ shuō, wǒmen jīhū shì gùyì hé rìběn dǎzhàng, yǐ wéihù zhōngguó de dúlì.”
Jǐ dài rén yǐlái, měiguó rén de xīn yīzhí bèi měiguó huà jīdū tú jūzhù de xīn zhōngguó de chuánjiào mèngxiǎng suǒ wēnnuǎn. Ránhòu, cóng 1930 niándài chūqí kāishǐ, yīgè wàizī zhōngguó yóushuì tuán zài měiguó méngyá, bìng zài měiguó zhèngfǔ, méitǐ hé quánguó gè dì de jiǎngtán shàng huòdéle qiángdà de zhīchí zhě. Dào 1941 nián, jìn shí nián de zhōngguó yóushuì xuānchuán yǐ shēnrù měiguó jiàotáng, jiātíng hé lǐngxiù, ràng jué dà duōshù měiguó rén xiāngxìn, rúguǒ měiguó qūzhú rìběn rén, jīdūjiào huà hé měiguó huà de xīn zhōngguó jiāng chéngwéi tāmen zài yàzhōu zuì hǎo de péngyǒu. Jūnduì chè chū zhōngguó.
Zhōngguó yóushuì tuán de qiántí shì, rúguǒ měiguó jìn yùn rìběn de shíyóu, rìběn jūnduì jiāng bèi pò chè chū zhōngguó. Fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú zǒngtǒng de xiǎngfǎ zhènghǎo xiāngfǎn. Rìběn——guónèi chǎnliàng hěn shǎo——zhǐyǒu liǎng gè zhǔyào de shíyóu láiyuán: Jiālìfúníyǎ hé hé shǔ dōng yìndù qúndǎo (jīntiān de yìndùníxīyà). Luósīfú zài fāshēng zhànzhēng shí yǒu “ōuzhōu yōuxiān” de zhèngcè: Měiguó jiāng jíbài xītèlēi, ránhòu zài bìyào shí duìkàng rìběn. Yóuyú měiguó gōngyìngle rìběn 80% yǐshàng de shíyóu,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt thought that if he cut off the California pump, the Japanese military would thrust south toward the Dutch East Indies, and the United States would be drawn into an unwanted Asian war.
Many administration officials were outraged by what they considered to be Roosevelt's appeasement of Japan. They — like the majority of Americans— had swallowed the China Lobby line that an oil embargo would force Japan out of China and that there would be no danger of the United States getting involved militarily. And with the Japanese no longer a threat, the great Chiang Kai-shek would ascend to undiluted command—and a Christian and democratic China would follow. (British prime minister Winston Churchill called the New China dream the "Great American illusion.")
This is the story of how a few of these officials surreptitiously out maneuvered and undermined the president of the United States and thrust America into an unwanted Asian war. My father and millions of others fought in a conflict that didn't have to happen, a war that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was trying to avoid, one that could have been prevented or delayed if some overconfident administration officials had heeded their president instead of the China Lobby.
Today, seventy years after World War II, many imagine America went to war against Hitler to save England. History books and a recent television series on the Roosevelts recall the fierce tussle between American isolationists and internationalists in the lead-up to World War II, showing a fiery Charles Lindbergh and other public figures debating what the United States should do across the Atlantic. These stories feature a bold Franklin Delano Roosevelt reaching out to Winston Churchill via secret private emissaries like Harry Hupkins, Averell Harriman, and Wild Bill Donovan.
Little noted is that the debate about America's helping Britain was never decided. The U.S. did not enter World War Il to defend Britain or oppose Hitler. On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war on Japan and only Japan. Three long days passed, and the United States did not declare war on Germany to defend England. It was only when Adolf Hitler rashly declared war on the U.S. that Americans went to war in Europe.
World War II burst upon America from Asia. Charles Lindbergh's Atlantic focus is better remembered, but it was the China Lobby's arguments about peoples across the Pacifie that changed American history.
When Mao Zedong rose to power in 1949, the U.S. government and media portrayed him as an angry. anti-American Soviet pawn, going so far as to paint Mao as not a "real Chinese," an idea believable because Americans had for decades been propagandized by the China Lobby that authentic Chinese yearned to be Christianized and Americanized. The American public did not realize that five years earlier, Mao had repeatedly extended his hand in friendship, enthusiastically describing to his State Department interlocutors a symbiotic relationship combining U.S. industrial know-how with China's limitless workforce. Mao—who had never flown in an airplane—reached out to President Roosevelt in 1945, saying he was eager to fly to the United States to discuss his vision, a historic opportunity that New China— believing Americans tragically nipped in the bud.
When the US—spurned Mao turned to the USSR, Americans imagined they had lost China, and the United States replanted its New China dream on the island of Taiwan. Senator Joseph McCarthy asked, "Who lost China and launched a witch hunt—supported by the China Lobby—that drove the State Department specialists who had dealt with Mao out of the government. Having made itself blind on Asia, Washington then stumbled into the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
The who-lost-China hysteria helped topple the administration of President Harry Truman, distorted U.S. domestic politics, and haunted Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon as these presidents tried not to lose again in Asia.
The China Lobby also warped U.S. foreign policy. From 1949 to 1979. the world's most powerful country refused to have official state-to-state relations with the world's most populous country. But consider your smartphone, which was probably manufactured in China, and you can see that Mao's vision of the relationship— not America's New China dream — is the one that triumphed. Like World...
富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福认为，如果他切断加利福尼亚的水泵。 日本军队将向南推进到荷属东印度群岛，美国将卷入一场不受欢迎的亚洲战争。
许多政府官员对他们认为是罗斯福对日本的绥靖政策感到愤怒。 他们——像大多数美国人一样——已经接受了中国游说界的说法，即石油禁运将迫使日本离开中国，而且美国不会有军事介入的危险。 随着日本不再是一个威胁，伟大的蒋介石将升至完全的指挥权——一个基督教和民主的中国将随之而来。 （英国首相温斯顿·丘吉尔称新中国梦为“伟大的美国幻想”。）
这是关于这些官员中的一些如何暗中操纵和破坏美国总统并将美国推入一场不受欢迎的亚洲战争的故事。 我父亲和其他数百万人参加了一场本不必发生的冲突，一场富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福试图避免的战争，如果一些过于自信的政府官员听从他们的总统而不是中国，这场战争本可以避免或推迟 大堂。
二战结束 70 年后的今天，许多人想象美国为了拯救英国而与希特勒开战。 历史书籍和最近关于罗斯福的电视连续剧回忆起二战前美国孤立主义者和国际主义者之间的激烈争斗，展示了火热的查尔斯林德伯格和其他公众人物争论美国应该在大西洋彼岸做什么。 这些故事讲述了勇敢的富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福通过哈里·赫普金斯、阿弗瑞尔·哈里曼和狂野的比尔·多诺万等秘密私人特使联系温斯顿·丘吉尔的故事。
鲜为人知的是，关于美国帮助英国的辩论从未有过决定。 美国。 参加第二次世界大战不是为了保卫英国或反对希特勒。 1941 年 12 月 8 日，美国仅对日本宣战。 漫长的三天过去了，美国没有向德国宣战以保卫英国。 只有当阿道夫·希特勒轻率地向美国宣战时，美国人才在欧洲开战。
第二次世界大战从亚洲席卷美国。 查尔斯·林德伯格 (Charles Lindbergh) 的大西洋焦点更容易被记住，但改变美国历史的是中国游说团关于太平洋两岸人民的争论。
1949年毛泽东上台时，美国政府和媒体把他描绘成一个愤怒的人。 反美苏联棋子，甚至将毛泽东描绘成不是“真正的中国人”，这个想法是可信的，因为几十年来，美国人一直在中国游说团的宣传下，真正的中国人渴望被基督教化和美国化。 美国公众没有意识到，五年前，毛泽东一再伸出友谊之手，热情地向他的国务院对话者描述了一种将美国工业知识与中国无限劳动力相结合的共生关系。 从未坐过飞机的毛在 1945 年与罗斯福总统取得联系，说他渴望飞往美国讨论他的愿景，这是新中国的历史性机遇——相信美国人悲惨地扼杀在萌芽状态。
当被美国唾弃的毛泽东转向苏联时，美国人以为他们已经失去了中国，而美国在台湾岛上重新种植了新中国梦。 参议员约瑟夫麦卡锡问道：“谁失去了中国并发起了一场由中国游说支持的猎巫行动，将与毛泽东打交道的国务院专家赶出了政府。华盛顿对亚洲视而不见，然后偶然发现了朝鲜 和越南战争。
谁失去了中国的歇斯底里帮助推翻了杜鲁门总统的政府，扭曲了美国的国内政治，并困扰着德怀特·艾森豪威尔、约翰·肯尼迪、林登·约翰逊和理查德·尼克松，因为这些总统试图不要在亚洲再次失败。
中国游说团也扭曲了美国的外交政策。 从 1949 年到 1979 年，世界上最强大的国家拒绝与世界上人口最多的国家建立正式的国家间关系。 但是想想你的智能手机，它很可能是在中国制造的，你会发现毛泽东对两国关系的愿景——而不是美国的新中国梦——是成功的。 就像世界...
Fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú rènwéi, rúguǒ tā qiēduàn jiālìfúníyǎ de shuǐbèng. Rìběn jūnduì jiāng xiàng nán tuījìn dào hé shǔ dōng yìndù qúndǎo, měiguójiāng juàn rù yī chǎng bù shòu huānyíng de yàzhōu zhànzhēng.
Xǔduō zhèngfǔ guānyuán duì tāmen rènwéi shì luósīfú duì rìběn de suíjìng zhèngcè gǎndào fènnù. Tāmen——xiàng dà duōshù měiguó rén yīyàng——yǐjīng jiēshòule zhōngguó yóushuì jiè de shuōfǎ, jí shíyóu jìn yùn jiāng pòshǐ rìběn líkāi zhōngguó, érqiě měiguó bù huì yǒu jūnshìjièrù de wéixiǎn. Suízhe rìběn bù zài shì yīgè wēixié, wěidà de jiǎngjièshí jiāng shēng zhì wánquán de zhǐhuī quán——yīgè jīdūjiào hé mínzhǔ de zhōngguójiāng suí zhī ér lái. (Yīngguó shǒuxiàng wēn sī dùn·qiūjí'ěr chēng xīn zhōngguó mèng wèi “wěidà dì měiguó huànxiǎng”.)
Zhè shì guānyú zhèxiē guānyuán zhōng de yīxiē rúhé ànzhōng cāozòng hé pòhuài měiguó zǒngtǒng bìng jiāng měiguó tuī rù yī chǎng bù shòu huānyíng de yàzhōu zhànzhēng de gùshì. Wǒ fùqīn hé qítā shù bǎi wàn rén shēn jiā le yī chǎng běn bùbì fāshēng de chōngtú, yī chǎng fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú shìtú bìmiǎn de zhànzhēng, rúguǒ yīxiē guòyú zìxìn de zhèngfǔ guānyuán tīngcóng tāmen de zǒngtǒng ér bùshì zhōngguó, zhè chǎng zhànzhēng běn kěyǐ bìmiǎn huò tuīchí dàtáng.
Èrzhàn jiéshù 70 nián hòu de jīntiān, xǔduō rén xiǎngxiàng měiguó wèile zhěngjiù yīngguó ér yǔ xītèlēi kāizhàn. Lìshǐ shūjí hé zuìjìn guānyú luósīfú de diànshì liánxùjù huíyì qǐ èrzhàn qián měiguó gūlì zhǔyì zhě hé guójì zhǔyì zhě zhī jiān de jīliè zhēngdòu, zhǎnshìle huǒrè de chá'ěrsī líndébó gé hé qítā gōngzhòng rénwù zhēnglùn měiguó yīnggāi zài dàxīyáng bǐ'àn zuò shénme. Zhèxiē gùshì jiǎngshùle yǒnggǎn de fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú tōngguò hālǐ·hè pǔ jīn sī, ā fú ruì ěr·hālǐ màn hé kuáng yě de bǐ'ěr·duō nuò wàn děng mìmì sīrén tèshǐ liánxì wēn sī dùn·qiūjí'ěr de gùshì.
Xiǎn wéi rénzhī de shì, guānyú měiguó bāngzhù yīngguó de biànlùn cóng wèi yǒuguò juédìng. Měiguó. Cānjiā dì èr cì shìjiè dàzhàn bùshì wèile bǎowèi yīngguó huò fǎnduì xītèlēi. 1941 Nián 12 yuè 8 rì, měiguó jǐn duì rìběn xuānzhàn. Màncháng de sān tiān guòqùle, měiguó méiyǒu xiàng déguó xuānzhàn yǐ bǎowèi yīngguó. Zhǐyǒu dāng ādàofū·xītèlēi qīngshuài dì xiàng měiguó xuānzhàn shí, měiguó réncái zài ōuzhōu kāizhàn.
Dì èr cì shìjiè dàzhàn cóng yàzhōu xíjuǎn měiguó. Chá'ěrsī·líndébó gé (Charles Lindbergh) de dàxīyáng jiāodiǎn gèng róngyì bèi jì zhù, dàn gǎibiàn měiguó lìshǐ de shì zhōngguó yóushuì tuán guānyú tàipíngyáng liǎng'àn rénmín de zhēnglùn.
1949 Nián máozédōng shàngtái shí, měiguó zhèngfǔ hé méitǐ bǎ tā miáohuì chéng yīgè fènnù de rén. Fǎn měi sūlián qízǐ, shènzhì jiāng máozédōng miáohuì chéng bùshì “zhēnzhèng de zhōngguó rén”, zhège xiǎngfǎ shì kě xìn de, yīnwèi jǐ shí niánlái, měiguó rén yīzhí zài zhōngguó yóushuì tuán de xuānchuán xià, zhēnzhèng de zhōngguó rén kěwàng bèi jīdūjiào huà hé měiguó huà. Měiguó gōngzhòng méiyǒuyìshí dào, wǔ nián qián, máozédōng yīzài shēn chū yǒu yì zhī shǒu, rèqíng dì xiàng tā de guówùyuàn duìhuà zhě miáoshùle yī zhǒng jiāng měiguó gōngyè zhīshì yǔ zhōngguó wúxiàn láodònglì xiāng jiéhé de gòngshēng guānxì. Cóng wèi zuòguò fēijī de máo zài 1945 nián yǔ luósīfú zǒngtǒng qǔdé liánxì, shuō tā kěwàng fēi wǎng měiguó tǎolùn tā de yuànjǐng, zhè shì xīn zhōngguó de lìshǐ xìng jīyù——xiāngxìn měiguó rén bēicǎn de èshā zài méngyá zhuàngtài.
Dāng bèi měiguó tuòqì de máozédōng zhuǎnxiàng sūlián shí, měiguó rén yǐwéi tāmen yǐjīng shīqùle zhōngguó, ér měiguó zài táiwān dǎo shàng chóngxīn zhòngzhíle xīn zhōngguó mèng. Cān yìyuán yuēsèfū màikǎxí wèn dào:“Shéi shīqùle zhōngguó bìng fāqǐle yī chǎng yóu zhōngguó yóushuì zhīchí de liè wū xíngdòng, jiāng yǔ máozédōng dǎjiāodào de guówùyuàn zhuānjiā gǎn chūle zhèngfǔ. Huáshèngdùn duì yàzhōu shì'érbùjiàn, ránhòu ǒurán fāxiànle cháoxiǎn hé yuènán zhànzhēng.
Shéi shīqùle zhōngguó de xiēsīdǐlǐ bāngzhù tuīfānle dùlǔmén zǒngtǒng de zhèngfǔ, niǔqūle měiguó de guónèi zhèngzhì, bìng kùnrǎozhe dé huáitè·àisēnháowēi'ěr, yuēhàn·kěnnídí, lín dēng·yuēhànxùn hé lǐ chá dé·níkèsōng, yīnwèi zhèxiē zǒngtǒng shìtú bùyào zài yàzhōu zàicì shībài.
Zhōngguó yóushuì tuán yě niǔqūle měiguó de wàijiāo zhèngcè. Cóng 1949 nián dào 1979 nián, shìjiè shàng zuì qiáng dà de guójiā jùjué yǔ shìjiè shàng rénkǒu zuìduō de guó jiā jiànlì zhèngshì de guó jiā jiān guānxì. Dànshì xiǎng xiǎng nǐ de zhìnéng shǒujī, tā hěn kěnéng shì zài zhōngguó zhìzào de, nǐ huì fāxiàn máozédōng duì liǎng guó guānxì de yuànjǐng——ér bùshì měiguó de xīn zhōngguó mèng——shì chénggōng de. Jiù xiàng shì jiè...
War II in the Pacific, the destructive thirty years of estrangement berween Mao's China and the United States did not have to happen.
The Roosevelts' actions in Asia are relatively unknown to Americans, even though the results are clear.
Go to New York City's Chinatown and you'll see the only two states that Chinese Americans have erected there: one for the revered Confucius and the other for the Chinese government official who asked Warren Delano to stop smuggling opium into China.
Stroll through Seoul, South Korea, and you will come across a memorial honoring an American civilian, the only such statue in downtown Seoul In 1905, the emperor of Korea had felt the Japanese military's hands tightening around his country's neck. He dispatched an American friend from Seoul to Washington to plead with President Theodore Roosevelt for Korea's continued independence. Roosevelt refused to help. Korea then fell under Japan's control for forty years. Today Koreans honor the American who begged Theodore Roosevelt for Korea's freedom.
Go to South Asia today, look up at the Pakistani sky, and you might see an American drone. The American president controls this lethal program within the executive branch; it's a private air force that's operated with litle congressional oversight. Franklin Delano Roosevelt created this secret executive air force one year _before_ Pearl Harbor in an attempt to keep the New China dream alive.
Today the United States is the world's largest developed country and China is the largest developing country. Like two huge balloons in a closed room, they will inevitably bump up against each other. The reactions will depend on each side's understanding of and empathy for the other. This is a book about the American disaster in Asia as a result of a mirage in the American mind. The stakes in understanding these past missteps are enormous and, to me, personal. My father was severely wounded in 1945, and in 1968 my brother almost died, both fighting in Asian wars that didn't have to happen. I don't want my son in boot camp like his grandfather and uncle simply because of more misunderstandings between the Pacific's two great powers.
Today, the United States and China–while cooperating to build wealth—are once again massively uninformed about each other. There was a time when everyone in the United States knew that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were China's top leaders and everyone in China recognized President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. A measure of the current relationship is that almost no Americans can name the top Two Chinese leaders today and ninety-year-old Henry Kissinger remains China's most recognizable American friend.
With only a narrow, rickety bridge of fellowship crossing the Pacific, misunderstandings are fourishing and both countries employ heated rhetoric. On the American side, generations of missionary dreams about New China created an assumption in the United States about a reality that never existed in Asia. The China mirage took hold in the nineteenth century, affected US. foreign policy and domestic politics the twentieth century, and contiues to misguide America. Perhaps the cautionary tale revealed in this book will motivate people in both countries to strengthen that bridge across the Pacific before too late. Again.
太平洋的第二次战争，毛的中国和美国之间三十年的破坏性隔阂并没有发生。
罗斯福在亚洲的行动对美国人来说相对不为人知，尽管结果很明显。
去纽约市的唐人街，你会看到华裔美国人在那里建立的仅有的两个州：一个是为受人尊敬的孔子设立的，另一个是为要求沃伦·德拉诺停止向中国走私鸦片的中国政府官员设立的。
漫步在韩国首尔，您会看到一座纪念美国平民的纪念碑，这是首尔市中心唯一一座这样的雕像 1905 年，韩国天皇感觉到日本军队的双手在他国家的脖子上收紧。 他从首尔派了一个美国朋友到华盛顿恳求西奥多·罗斯福总统让朝鲜继续独立。 罗斯福拒绝提供帮助。 朝鲜随后落入日本控制之下四十年。 今天，韩国人向向西奥多·罗斯福乞求韩国自由的美国人致敬。
今天去南亚，仰望巴基斯坦的天空，你可能会看到一架美国无人机。 美国总统在行政部门内控制着这个致命的计划； 这是一支私人空军，在国会的监督下运作。 富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福（Franklin Delano Roosevelt）在珍珠港事件发生前一年创建了这支秘密执行空军，以期保持新中国梦的活力。
今天，美国是世界上最大的发达国家，中国是最大的发展中国家。 就像封闭房间里的两个巨大气球，难免会撞到一起。 反应将取决于每一方对另一方的理解和同情。 这是一本关于美国在亚洲的灾难是美国人头脑中的海市蜃楼的结果的书。 理解这些过去的失误的利害关系是巨大的，对我来说，是个人的。 我父亲在 1945 年受了重伤，1968 年我弟弟差点死了，两人都参加了本不必发生的亚洲战争。 我不希望我的儿子像他的祖父和叔叔一样进入新兵训练营，因为太平洋两个大国之间有更多的误解。
今天，美国和中国——在合作创造财富的同时——又一次在很大程度上彼此不知情。 曾几何时，美国人人都知道毛泽东和周恩来是中国的最高领导人，中国人人都认可尼克松总统和亨利·基辛格。 衡量当前关系的一个指标是，当今几乎没有美国人能说出两位中国最高领导人的名字，而 90 岁的亨利·基辛格仍然是中国最知名的美国朋友。
只有一座狭窄、摇摇欲坠的友谊桥梁横跨太平洋，误解正在加剧，两国都使用激烈的言辞。 在美国方面，几代人关于新中国的传教梦想在美国创造了一种在亚洲从未存在过的现实的假设。 中国海市蜃楼在 19 世纪盛行，影响了美国。 二十世纪的外交政策和国内政治，并继续误导美国。 也许本书中揭示的警示故事会激励两国人民尽早加强跨越太平洋的桥梁。 再次。
Tàipíngyáng de dì èr cì zhànzhēng, máo de zhōngguó hé měiguó zhī jiān sānshí nián de pòhuài xìng géhé bìng méiyǒu fāshēng.
Luósīfú zài yàzhōu de xíngdòng duì měiguó rén lái shuō xiāngduì bù wéi rénzhī, jǐnguǎn jiéguǒ hěn míngxiǎn.
Qù niǔyuē shì de tángrénjiē, nǐ huì kàn dào huáyì měiguó rén zài nàlǐ jiànlì de jǐn yǒu de liǎng gè zhōu: Yīgè shì wèi shòu rén zūnjìng de kǒngzǐ shèlì de, lìng yīgè shì wèi yāoqiú wò lún·dé lā nuò tíngzhǐ xiàng zhōngguó zǒusī yāpiàn de zhōngguó zhèngfǔ guānyuán shèlì de.
Mànbù zài hánguó shǒu'ěr, nín huì kàn dào yīzuò jìniàn měiguó píngmín de jìniànbēi, zhè shì shǒu'ěr shì zhōngxīn wéiyī yīzuò zhèyàng de diāoxiàng 1905 nián, hánguó tiānhuáng gǎnjué dào rìběn jūnduì de shuāngshǒu zài tā guójiā de bózi shàng shōu jǐn. Tā cóng shǒu'ěr pàile yīgè měiguó péngyǒu dào huáshèngdùn kěnqiú xī ào duō·luósīfú zǒngtǒng ràng cháoxiǎn jìxù dúlì. Luósīfú jùjué tígōng bāngzhù. Cháoxiǎn suíhòu luò rù rìběn kòngzhì zhī xià sìshí nián. Jīntiān, hánguó rén xiàng xiàng xī ào duō·luósīfú qǐqiú hánguó zìyóu dì měiguó rén zhìjìng.
Jīntiān qù nányà, yǎngwàng bājīsītǎn de tiānkōng, nǐ kěnéng huì kàn dào yī jià měiguó wú rén jī. Měiguó zǒngtǒng zài háng zhèng bùmén nèi kòngzhìzhe zhège zhìmìng de jìhuà; zhè shì yī zhī sīrén kōngjūn, zài guóhuì de jiāndū xià yùnzuò. Fùlánkèlín·dé lā nuò·luósīfú (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) zài zhēnzhū gǎng shìjiàn fāshēng qián yī nián chuàngjiànle zhè zhī mìmì zhíxíng kōngjūn, yǐ qí bǎochí xīn zhōngguó mèng de huólì.
Jīntiān, měiguó shì shìjiè shàng zuìdà de fǎ dá guójiā, zhōngguó shì zuìdà de fǎ zhǎn zhōngguójiā. Jiù xiàng fēngbì fángjiān lǐ de liǎng gè jùdà qìqiú, nánmiǎn huì zhuàng dào yīqǐ. Fǎnyìng jiāng qǔjué yú měi yīfāng duì lìng yīfāng de lǐjiě hé tóngqíng. Zhè shì yī běn guānyú měiguó zài yàzhōu de zāinàn shì měiguó rén tóunǎo zhōng dì hǎishìshènlóu de jiéguǒ de shū. Lǐjiě zhèxiē guòqù de shīwù de lìhài guānxì shì jùdà de, duì wǒ lái shuō, shì gèrén de. Wǒ fùqīn zài 1945 nián shòule zhòngshāng,1968 nián wǒ dìdì chàdiǎn sǐle, liǎng rén dōu cānjiāle běn bùbì fāshēng de yàzhōu zhànzhēng. Wǒ bù xīwàng wǒ de érzi xiàng tā de zǔfù hé shūshu yīyàng jìnrù xīnbīng xùnliàn yíng, yīnwèi tàipíngyáng liǎng gè dàguó zhī jiān yǒu gèng duō de wùjiě.
Jīntiān, měiguó hé zhōngguó——zài hézuò chuàngzào cáifù de tóngshí——yòu yīcì zài hěn dà chéngdù shàng bǐcǐ bùzhī qíng. Céngjǐhéshí, měiguó rén rén dōu zhīdào máozédōng hé zhōu'ēnlái shì zhōngguó de zuìgāo lǐngdǎo rén, zhōngguó rén rén dōu rènkě níkèsōng zǒngtǒng hé hēnglì·jī xīn gé. Héngliáng dāngqián guānxì de yīgè zhǐbiāo shì, dāngjīn jīhū méiyǒu měiguó rén néng shuō chū liǎng wèi zhōngguó zuìgāo lǐngdǎo rén de míngzì, ér 90 suì de hēnglì·jī xīn gé réngrán shì zhōngguó zuì zhīmíng dì měiguó péngyǒu.
Zhǐyǒu yīzuò xiázhǎi, yáoyáoyùzhuì de yǒuyì qiáoliáng héng kuà tàipíngyáng, wùjiě zhèngzài jiājù, liǎng guódū shǐyòng jīliè de yáncí. Zài měiguó fāngmiàn, jǐ dài rén guānyú xīn zhōngguó de chuánjiào mèngxiǎng zài měiguó chuàngzàole yī zhǒng zài yàzhōu cóng wèi cúnzàiguò de xiànshí de jiǎshè. Zhōng guó hǎishìshènlóu zài 19 shìjì shèngxíng, yǐngxiǎngle měiguó. Èrshí shìjì de wàijiāo zhèngcè hé guónèi zhèngzhì, bìng jìxù wùdǎo měiguó. Yěxǔ běn shū zhōng jiēshì de jǐngshì gùshì huì jīlì liǎng guó rénmín jǐnzǎo jiāqiáng kuàyuè tàipíngyáng de qiáoliáng. Zàicì.
Continue to Chapter 1, Old China, New China
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