英国外交大臣詹姆斯·克莱弗利阐述了英国政府对华立场。Yīngguó wàijiāo dàchén zhānmǔsī·kè lái fú lì chǎnshùle yīngguó zhèngfǔ duì huá lìchǎng. [向下滚动以阅读中文]
Our position on China: Foreign Secretary's 2023 Mansion House speech
Speaking at Mansion House in the City of London, the Foreign Secretary James Cleverly outlined the UK government's position on China.
From:
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rightly Honorary James Cleverly MP
Published date : 25 April 2023.
Location: Mansion House, London
Delivered on: 25 April 2023 (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered):
My Lord Mayor, Your Excellencies, Mr Speaker, lords, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak with you this evening and whilst it is traditional in this speech to cover the full breadth of world affairs.
You will, I hope forgive me for focusing on a smaller number of issues which confront us because it would be remiss of me not to begin with the current crisis in Sudan.
As you would expect I’ve been in COBR* meetings and other meetings on our response to the situation today. I can inform you that a Royal Air Force flight has now left Sudan, carrying British nationals to safety this evening, and more will follow.
From the onset of this crisis, we’ve been planning how to get our people out. And now that our and international calls for a ceasefire in Khartoum have been heeded, we are putting those plans into effect, giving priority to those in greatest need: family groups, the sick, and the elderly.
I’m encouraged that both factions have called a 72-hour ceasefire, though of course we cannot be sure for how long it will hold, and any evacuation from a battle-scarred city is inherently dangerous.
Britain is working hand-in-glove with our partners across the world. And after this operation, we will do everything possible – alongside our friends in the region – to secure a lasting settlement for this tragic conflict.
And of course the situation in Sudan does not distract us from our work to support Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression, and I know that my G7 colleagues and other colleagues around the world will agree on our focus on that.
Even when the emergencies of the day are seemingly all-consuming, it is vital never to lose sight of the biggest long-term questions. So tonight I propose to focus on a subject that will define our epoch, and that is China and the UK’s policy towards it.
I’m often asked to express that policy in a single phrase, or to sum up China itself in one word, whether ‘threat’, or ‘partner’, or ‘adversary’. And I want to start by explaining why that is impossible, impractical and – most importantly – unwise.
China is one of the few countries which can trace its existence back over 2 millennia, to 221BC, when it was united by the Qin Dynasty.
Time and time again down the centuries, civil war or foreign invasions fractured China into rival kingdoms, but after every period of turmoil, China has always re-emerged. The opening line of the Chinese epic ‘Romance of the Three Kingdoms’ describes this cycle:
Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce. (帝国兴衰； 国家分裂和合并。Dìguó xīngshuāi; guójiā fēnliè hé hébìng. )
And long before they coalesced into one polity, the Chinese people created their language and their civilisation. Their written characters appeared in the Shang Dynasty in the second millennium BC.
Their inventions – paper, printing, gunpowder, the compass – these things transformed the fortunes of the whole of humanity. These innovations are the key to understanding why China’s economy was among the biggest in the world for 20 of the last 22 centuries, and why China, in 1820, comprised a third of global GDP – more than America, the UK and Europe combined.
Then calamities struck, one after another; some caused by foreign aggression; others coming from within China itself. The deadliest of which was Mao’s famine, which claimed tens of millions of lives, more than any other famine in human history.
Yet the last 45 years have seen another astonishing reversal. By releasing the enterprising genius of its people, China has achieved the biggest and fastest economic expansion the world has ever known. No less than 800 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty, in a nation that encompasses a fifth of all humanity, and a vast area almost as large as continental Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
So forgive me when I say that no punchy catchphrase or plausible adjective can do justice to such a country or to any sensible approach towards it. If you are looking for British foreign policy by soundbite, I’m afraid you will be disappointed.
My starting point is a recognition of the depth and complexity of Chinese history and civilisation, and therefore, by extension, of our own policy.
And I rest that policy on a series of premises, the first of which is that whatever our differences with China’s leaders, I rejoice in the fact that so many Chinese people have escaped poverty. We do not live in a miserable zero-sum world: their gain is our gain. A stable, prosperous and peaceful China is good for Britain and good for the world.
Looking ahead, I reject any notion of inevitability. No-one predicted China’s rapid rise from mass starvation to relative prosperity, and today no-one can be sure that China’s economic juggernaut will roll on indefinitely.
Last year, for the first time since Mao’s death in 1976, China’s economy grew no faster than the world economy, meaning that China’s share of global GDP stayed constant in 2022. And even if China does become the world’s largest economy in the coming decade, it may not hold that place for long, as a declining and ageing population weighs ever more heavily on future growth.
Nor do I see anything inevitable about conflict between China and the United States and the wider West. We are not compelled to be prisoners of what Graham Allison called the ‘Thucydides trap’, whereby a rising power follows the trajectory of ancient Athens, and collides head-on with an established superpower.
We have agency; we have choices; and so do our Chinese counterparts.
Our task is to shape the course of future events, not succumb to fatalism. And we must face the inescapable reality that no significant global problem – from climate change to pandemic prevention, from economic instability to nuclear proliferation – can be solved without China.
To give up on dialogue with China would be to give up on addressing humanity’s greatest problems. Even worse, we would be ignoring salient facts, vital to our safety and our prosperity.
As I speak, the biggest repository of health data in the world is in China. The biggest source of active ingredients for the world’s pharmaceuticals is in China. And the biggest source of carbon emissions is also in China. Indeed, China has pumped more carbon into the atmosphere in the last 10 years than this country has since the dawn of the industrial revolution in the 18th century.
How China regulates its data, how China develops its pharmaceuticals, how China conducts medical research, will be of seminal importance to the whole of humanity. And whether or not China cuts its carbon emissions will probably make the difference between our planet avoiding the worst ravages of climate change, or suffering catastrophe.
We have already learned to our cost how China’s handling of a pandemic can affect the entire world. So have no doubt: decisions taken in Beijing are going to affect our lives.
Do we not owe it to ourselves to strive to influence those decisions in our own interests? It would be clear and easy – and perhaps even satisfying – for me to declare some kind of new Cold War and say that our goal is to isolate China. It would be clear, it would be easy, it would be satisfying – and it would be wrong, because it would be a betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world.
Indeed, this government will advance British interests directly with China, alongside our allies, while steadfastly defending our national security and our values. And we can expect profound disagreements; dealing with China I can assure you, is not for the fainthearted; they represent a ruthless authoritarian tradition utterly at odds with our own.
But we have an obligation to future generations to engage because otherwise we would be failing in our duty to sustain – and shape – the international order. Shirking that challenge would be a sign not of strength but of weakness.
Vladimir Putin never intended to demonstrate the power of a united West when he launched his onslaught against Ukraine. But our response shows that when Britain and America and Europe and our other partners across the world stand united, we are a match for anything.
We should have every confidence in our collective ability to engage robustly and also constructively with China, not as an end in itself, but to manage risks and produce results. And we have achieved results.
Let me give you some examples. In 2017 research, British research, convinced the Chinese agriculture ministry to act against the danger of antibiotic resistance by restricting colistin, an antibiotic used in animal feed. Sales fell by 90%, making everyone in the world safer.
Last year, our diplomats in China helped to persuade the authorities to amend a draft procurement law, improving the chances of UK companies bidding for contracts from state-owned enterprises. This year, they secured licences worth £600 million for UK institutions to launch fund management companies in China.
Britain’s position as a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has also allowed us to influence China’s approach towards this new institution, preventing it from becoming a politicised extension of the Belt and Road Initiative. China is the biggest shareholder of this Bank, the Bank is headquartered in Beijing, and yet within a week of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it froze every single project in Russia.
But even though engagement can succeed, the truth is that a country like ours, devoted to liberty and democracy, will always be torn between our national interest in dealing with China and our abhorrence of Beijing’s abuses. When we see how authoritarian states treat their own people, we wonder what they would do to us if they had the chance. And history teaches us that repression at home often translates into aggression abroad.
So our policy has to combine two currents: we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism.
And that means never wavering from one clear principle. We do not expect our disagreements with China to be swiftly overcome, but we do expect China to observe the laws and obligations that it has freely entered in to.
So, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has shouldered a special responsibility to uphold the UN Charter. As a party to the Joint Declaration, China has agreed to preserve Hong Kong’s freedom. As a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Convention Against Torture and many other instruments of international law, China has accepted an array of obligations.
And if China breaks them, we are entitled to say so, and we are entitled to act – and we will – as we did when China dismantled the freedoms of Hong Kong, violating its own pledge, which is why we gave nearly 3 million of Hong Kong’s people a path to British citizenship.
Peaceful co-existence has to begin with respecting fundamental laws and institutions, including the UN Charter, which protects every country against invasion. And that means every country: a Chinese diplomat in Paris cannot, and must not, and will not, decide the legal status of sovereign countries.
By attacking Ukraine, Russia has provided an object lesson in how a UN member state should not behave. And Putin has also trampled upon China’s own stated principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty.
A powerful and responsible nation cannot simply abstain when this happens, or draw closer to the aggressor, or aid and abet that aggression. A country that wants a respected place at the apex of the world order should stand up for its own principles, and keep its solemn obligations, obligations to defend the laws at the very foundation of that order.
This responsibility goes hand-in-hand with China’s right to play a global role commensurate with its size and its history. And the rights of a sovereign nation like Ukraine cannot be eradicated just because the eradicator enjoys a ‘strategic partnership’ with China.
So, British policy towards China has 3 pillars.
First, we will strengthen our national security protections wherever Beijing’s actions pose a threat to our people or our prosperity.
We are not going to be silent about interference in our political system, or technology theft, or industrial sabotage. We will do more to safeguard academic freedom and research.
And when there are tensions with other objectives, we will always put our national security first. Hence we are building our 5G network in the most secure way, not the fastest or the cheapest way.
China’s leaders define their core interests – and it’s natural that they do. But we have core interests too, and one of them is to promote the kind of world that we want to live in, where people everywhere have a universal human right to be treated with dignity, free from torture, free from slavery, free from arbitrary detention.
And there is nothing uniquely ‘Western’ about these values: torture hurts just as much whoever it is inflicted upon.
So when Britain condemns the mass incarceration of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, I hope our Chinese counterparts do not believe their own rhetoric that we are merely seeking to interfere in their domestic affairs. Just as we should try harder to understand China, I hope that Chinese officials will understand that when their government builds a 21st century version of the gulag archipelago, locking up over a million people at the height of this campaign, often for doing nothing more than observing their religion, this stirs something deep within us.
When the United Nations finds that China’s repression in Xinjiang may – and I quote – “constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”, our revulsion is heartfelt and shared unanimously across our country and beyond. We are not going to let what is happened in Xinjiang drop or be brushed aside. We cannot ignore this simply because this is happening on the other side of a frontier, or that to raise it might be considered unharmonious or impolite.
Second, the UK will deepen our cooperation and strengthen our alignment with our friends and partners in the Indo-Pacific and across the world.
Our aim will be to bolster collective security, deepen commercial links, uphold international law, and balance and compete where necessary. So I’m delighted that Britain will soon be the 12th member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, reinforcing our trading ties with rapidly growing economies.
Already we are the only European country to be a Dialogue Partner of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. We are deepening our long-term partnership with India. And we are developing the next generation of our aircraft alongside Japan. And we’ve joined the United States to help Australia to build nuclear-powered conventionally-armed submarines under the AUKUS partnership.
Together with our friends, the UK will strive for openness and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. At this moment, China is carrying out the biggest military build-up in peacetime history. In a period of just 4 years – between 2014 and 2018 – China launched new warships exceeding the combined tonnage of the Royal Navy’s entire active fleet.
And as we see this happening; as we watch new bases appearing in the South China Sea and beyond, we are bound to ask ourselves: what is it all for? Why is China making this colossal military investment?
And if we are left to draw our own conclusions, prudence dictates that we must assume the worst. And yet of course we could be wrong: it is possible that we will be too cautious and too pessimistic.
The UK and our allies are prepared to be open about our presence in the Indo-Pacific. And I urge China to be equally open about the doctrine and intent behind its military expansion, because transparency is surely in everyone’s interests and secrecy can only increase the risk of tragic miscalculation.
Which brings me to Taiwan. Britain’s longstanding position is that we want to see a peaceful settlement of the differences across the Strait. Because about half of the world’s container ships pass through these vital waters every year, laden with goods bound for Europe and the far corners of the world. Taiwan is a thriving democracy and a crucial link in global supply chains, particularly for advanced semi-conductors.
A war across the Strait would not only be a human tragedy, it would destroy world trade worth $2.6 trillion, according to Nikkei Asia. No country could shield itself from the repercussions. Distance would offer no protection from this catastrophic blow to the global economy – and least China’s most of all. I shudder to contemplate the human and financial ruin that would follow. So it’s essential that no party takes unilateral action to change the status quo.
And the third pillar of our policy is to engage directly with China, bilaterally and multilaterally, to preserve and create open, constructive and stable relations, reflecting China’s global importance.
We believe in a positive trade and investment relationship, whilst avoiding dependencies in critical supply chains. We want British companies to do business with China – just as American, ASEAN, Australian and EU companies currently do – and we will support their efforts to make the terms work for both sides, pushing for a level playing field and fairer competition.
We have an interest in continuing to benefit from Chinese investment, but we don’t want the long arm of the Chinese Communist Party reaching towards the central nervous system of our country. And in the past, we haven’t always struck the perfect balance between openness and security. Now we are gaining the right legal powers to safeguard what we must and be open where we can.
Above all, we need to be properly skilled for the challenge, so we are doubling our funding for China capabilities across government; we’ve allocated the resources to build a new British Embassy in Beijing, I’m determined to reach agreement with China’s government so this can proceed.
So our approach to China must combine all of these currents, protecting our national security, aligning with our friends, engaging and trading with China where our interests converge, avoiding policy by soundbite, and always standing up for the universal values which Britain holds dear.
I fervently believe there are no inevitabilities: the future is ours to shape, in the humble knowledge that how we respond to this challenge now will help define the modern world.
Thank you.
(Published 25 April 2023)
我们对中国的立场：外交大臣 2023 年的豪宅演讲
英国外交大臣詹姆斯·克莱弗利在伦敦金融城大厦发表讲话，概述了英国政府对中国的立场。
从：
外交、联邦及发展办公室和正当荣誉的 James Cleverly 议员
发布日期：2023 年 4 月 25 日。
地点：伦敦大厦
发表时间：2023 年 4 月 25 日（演讲稿，与发表时完全一致）：
我的市长大人、阁下、议长先生、各位勋爵、女士们、先生们，感谢你们邀请我今晚与你们交谈，而按照传统，这次演讲涵盖了世界事务的全部范围。
我希望你会原谅我只关注我们面临的少数问题，因为如果我不从苏丹当前的危机开始，那将是我的疏忽。
正如您所期望的那样，我参加了 COBR* 会议和其他会议，讨论我们对今天的情况的回应。 我可以通知你，皇家空军的一架飞机今晚已经离开苏丹，载着英国国民前往安全的地方，随后还会有更多人离开。
从这场危机一开始，我们就一直在计划如何让我们的人员撤离。 既然我们和国际社会要求在喀土穆停火的呼吁得到响应，我们正在实施这些计划，优先考虑最需要帮助的人：家庭、病人和老人。
令我感到鼓舞的是，两个派系都要求停火 72 小时，尽管我们当然不能确定停火会持续多久，而且从战火纷飞的城市撤离本质上是危险的。
英国正与我们在世界各地的伙伴密切合作。 在这次行动之后，我们将尽一切可能——与我们在该地区的朋友一起——确保这场悲惨冲突的持久解决。
当然，苏丹的局势不会分散我们支持乌克兰抗击俄罗斯侵略的工作的注意力，我知道我的 G7 同事和世界各地的其他同事会同意我们对此的关注。
即使当一天的紧急情况看似耗费一切时，也永远不要忽视最大的长期问题，这一点至关重要。 所以今晚我建议把重点放在一个将定义我们时代的主题上，那就是中国和英国的政策。
我经常被要求用一个词组来表达这一政策，或者用一个词来概括中国本身，无论是“威胁”、“伙伴”还是“对手”。 我想首先解释为什么这是不可能的、不切实际的，而且——最重要的是——不明智。
中国是少数几个可以追溯到两千年前的国家之一，公元前 221 年被秦朝统一。
几个世纪以来，一次又一次的内战或外国入侵将中国分裂成敌对的王国，但在每一次动荡之后，中国总是重新崛起。 中国史诗《三国演义》的开篇描述了这个循环：
帝国兴衰； 国家分裂和合并。 Dìguó xīngshuāi; guójiā fēnliè hé hébìng.
早在他们合并为一个政体之前，中国人民就创造了他们的语言和文明。 他们的文字出现在公元前二千年的商代。
他们的发明——纸张、印刷术、火药、指南针——这些东西改变了全人类的命运。 这些创新是理解为什么中国经济在过去 22 世纪中有 20 年是世界最大经济体之一，以及为什么中国在 1820 年占全球 GDP 的三分之一——超过美国、英国和欧洲的总和的关键。
然后灾难接二连三地袭来； 有的是外来侵略造成的； 其他来自中国本土。 其中最致命的是毛泽东的饥荒，它夺去了数千万人的生命，比人类历史上任何一次饥荒都多。
然而，在过去的 45 年里，又发生了一次惊人的逆转。 通过释放人民的进取精神，中国实现了世界上规模最大、速度最快的经济扩张。 不少于 8 亿人已经摆脱了贫困，这个国家占全人类的五分之一，而且幅员辽阔，从大西洋到乌拉尔山脉几乎与欧洲大陆一样大。
因此，当我说没有任何有力的标语或似是而非的形容词可以公正地对待这样一个国家或对它采取任何明智的做法时，请原谅我。 如果你是通过录音来寻找英国的外交政策，恐怕你会失望的。
我的出发点是承认中国历史和文明的深度和复杂性，因此，推而广之，承认我们自己的政策。
我将这项政策建立在一系列前提之上，首先是无论我们与中国领导人有何分歧，我都为这么多中国人摆脱了贫困而感到高兴。 我们并不生活在悲惨的零和世界中：他们的收益就是我们的收益。 一个稳定、繁荣、和平的中国有利于英国，也有利于世界。
展望未来，我反对任何必然性的概念。 没有人预料到中国会从大规模饥饿迅速崛起为相对繁荣，今天也没有人可以确定中国的经济主宰将无限期地延续下去。
去年，自 1976 年毛泽东逝世以来，中国经济增长首次没有超过世界经济，这意味着中国在全球 GDP 中所占的份额在 2022 年保持不变。即使中国在未来十年内成为世界上最大的经济体， 它可能不会长期占据这个位置，因为人口减少和老龄化对未来增长的影响越来越大。
我也不认为中国和美国以及更广泛的西方国家之间的冲突是不可避免的。 我们不必成为格雷厄姆·艾利森所说的“修昔底德陷阱”的囚徒，即一个崛起的大国沿着古雅典的轨迹与一个既定的超级大国正面碰撞。
我们有代理； 我们有选择； 我们的中国同行也是如此。
我们的任务是塑造未来事件的进程，而不是屈服于宿命论。 我们必须面对一个不可避免的现实，即没有中国就无法解决任何重大的全球问题——从气候变化到流行病预防，从经济不稳定到核扩散。
我们已经付出代价了解到中国对大流行病的处理如何影响整个世界。 所以毫无疑问：在北京做出的决定将影响我们的生活。
难道我们不应该为了自己的利益而努力影响这些决定吗？ 对我来说，宣布某种新冷战并说我们的目标是孤立中国将是清楚而容易的——甚至可能是令人满意的。 这将是明确的、容易的、令人满意的——但这将是错误的，因为这将是对我们国家利益的背叛和对现代世界的故意误解。
事实上，本届政府将与我们的盟友一起，直接与中国一起推进英国的利益，同时坚定不移地捍卫我们的国家安全和我们的价值观。 我们可以预料到深刻的分歧； 我可以向你保证，与中国打交道，胆小者不宜； 他们代表了一种与我们的传统截然不同的无情的专制传统。
但我们有义务让子孙后代参与进来，否则我们将无法履行维持和塑造国际秩序的职责。 回避这一挑战将不是实力的标志，而是软弱的标志。
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