Sunday, October 22, 2023

Israel and Singapore Armed Forces

 Why did Israel go out of it’s way to help Singapore build it’s armed forces in the 1960s?

When Singapore became independent, it needed to build a military defence force quickly. Singapore asked several nations for help. Three of them were Egypt, India and Israel. It was Israel that responded. Another event that influenced Singapore’s decision was the IDF’s performance during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six-Day War. Prior to this conflict, Egypt had a formidable military, especially one of the largest air forces in the region. After this conflict, Egypt’s military was taken apart on the field, and strategically.


Singapore’s situation in the 1960s was not dissimilar to Israel’s. We were a secular state surrounded by two larger Muslim-majority neighbours who were less than friendly. Indonesia was actively involved in a low-intensity conflict with Singapore and Malaysia, called the Konfrontasi. Sukarno wanted to annex both nations and Brunei into Nusantara. Malaysia was run by a cadre of Malay nationalist who wanted to expunge the Chinese island. Ironically, it was the Konfrontasi which kept Malaysia on our side for the moment. The lesson is that Singapore could not trust its neighbours. This changed when Suharto replaced Sukarno, and the spectre of a Communist victory throughout Southeast Asia forced SEATO to evolve into ASEAN.


●I wanted to add to your excellent answer that Israel did so without formal diplomatic ties between itself and Singapore. Diplomatic ties between the two countries only started in 1969, and to this day Singapore has yet to open an Embassy in Israel (it was announced earlier this year Singapore is about to do so, but Singapore is still represented in Israel by an honorary consul who is an Israeli businessman).


□ Singapore and Israel have had formal diplomatic relations since 1965. There is an Israeli embassy in Singapore. I have been there several times for events and programmes. There has not been a Singapore embassy in Israel yet though, as you correctly pointed out.

Interesting fact: Indonesia was the first country in Southeast Asia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, albeit informally, and they have close security relations, which are kept very discreet. This was in 1960. They cannot make it formal for obvious reasons.

●Contrary to what it says on Wikipedia in English, Israel and Singapore did not establish full diplomatic relationship in 1965. Initially the relationship was kept in secret, until in October 1968 Israel was allowed to open a trade mission in Singapore, and in May 1969 formal relationship was created when it was elevated to an embassy. Let me know if you wish to get sources for this info - I’d be happy to provide those.

What you’re writing regarding Indonesia is a bit weird for me - to the best of my knowledge while Israel and Indonesia have extensive trade and other ties, there is no diplomatic relationship between the countries (i.e. no embassies). Further, you write it was the first, but the Philippines established full diplomatic relationship with Israel in 1957, with Thailand in 1954, etc.

□ I think we can agree Wikipedia never has the full story. Things are a bit more complicated when it comes to Israel.

●Wikipedia is still CRAP

●Wikipedia relies on human input. You can edit it and add sources of information.

●We are forever grateful to the Israelis. They could have ignored our request, but they didn’t. Israel should be proud of what they helped created.

□Not only did they help , they didn't help solely to take advantage of us. And made recommendations based on our needs.

●My eldest brother-in-law was in the first NS batch. I have also met former regulars who remember how the ‘Mexicans’ shaped Singapore’s military doctrine and force structure, as well as training methods. The concept of a small country under permanent siege by large and hostile neighbours lives on.

□Right on spot , I read the LKY memoir thoroughly, and He had a feeling that Singapore doesn't have the luxury of geopolitics in determining who is a friend in need. Therefore he breached the standard diplomatic etiquette by teaming up with a Israel, the fellow bad guy in islamic neighbourhood like SG. Meanwhile the powerful nations were siding with Big boys Indonesia and Malaysia and shunning off mediocre SG. Bravo to underdogs solidarity!

●This is interesting. I didn’t know Singapore reached out to Egypt and India as well. I’ve always thought they reached out to Israel owing to the geopolitical similarities.

□Singapore actually reached out to Egypt and India first, being fellow members of the non-aligned movement. But in an early example of ghosting, after both countries congratulated Singapore on her independence with nary a word on her request for assistance, LKY gave the go-ahead to Goh Keng Swee to reach out to Israel for help, but keep it on the down-low.

□It was good luck for Singapore that Egypt and India refused to help.

□I really don’t know if India had resources.

●Love how you provided the historical context for SG, it’s something lost in the modern narrative of our relationship with our neighbours. But I want to point out that the question is “why did Israel go out of its way”, not “why did SG sought help to build her armed forces”.

□Paragraph 3. That is all we know since Israelis are notoriously succinct on the reasons for their deliberations and actions.

□Why did Israel go out of it’s way to help Singapore build it’s armed forces in the 1960s?

When Singapore became independent, it needed to build a military defence force quickly. Singapore asked several nations for help. Three of them were Egypt, India and Israel. It was Israel that responded. Another event that influenced Singapore’s decision was the IDF’s performance during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six-Day War. Prior to this conflict, Egypt had a formidable military, especially one of the largest air forces in the region. After this conflict, Egypt’s military was taken apart on the field, and strategically.


Singapore’s situation in the 1960s was not dissimilar to Israel’s. We were a secular state surrounded by two larger Muslim-majority neighbours who were less than friendly. Indonesia was actively involved in a low-intensity conflict with Singapore and Malaysia, called the Konfrontasi. Sukarno wanted to annex both nations and Brunei into Nusantara. Malaysia was run by a cadre of Malay nationalist who wanted to expunge the Chinese island. Ironically, it was the Konfrontasi which kept Malaysia on our side for the moment. The lesson is that Singapore could not trust its neighbours. This changed when Suharto replaced Sukarno, and the spectre of a Communist victory throughout Southeast Asia forced SEATO to evolve into ASEAN.


From an Israeli perspective, perhaps the only thing they had to gain was another nation to establish diplomatic relations in Asia. Singapore had nothing to offer Israel then. It was a poor nation, with one of the largest slums in the world. It had no resources, no prospects. What it did have was a well-developed port and airport, courtesy of the British, and a strategic position in Southeast Asia. None of this had any immediate strategic value to a nation surrounded by unfriendly Arab nations in the Middle East. Perhaps they invested in us, and that investment paid off.


Singapore’s military and doctrine is modelled after Israel’s, including our National Service. Whatever lessons the IDF paid for in blood, the SAF took and implemented. Today, Singapore is a net importer of equipment and services from Israel, and invests in military projects in Israel which we then import once they have been tested in battle.


Singapore is non-aligned. Policy-wise, Singapore does not agree with everything the Israeli government does. It is against the expansion into the West Bank, it disapproves of the situation in Gaza, it is concerned about the security in that region. But Singapore is not going to forget that when the Egyptians, the Indians and the rest declined to help, Israel started by sending seven military advisers. Until today, security and business ties remain strong.


I wanted to add to your excellent answer that Israel did so without formal diplomatic ties between itself and Singapore. Diplomatic ties between the two countries only started in 1969, and to this day Singapore has yet to open an Embassy in Israel (it was announced earlier this year Singapore is about to do so, but Singapore is still represented in Israel by an honorary consul who is an Israeli businessman).


Singapore and Israel have had formal diplomatic relations since 1965. There is an Israeli embassy in Singapore. I have been there several times for events and programmes. There has not been a Singapore embassy in Israel yet though, as you correctly pointed out.


Interesting fact: Indonesia was the first country in Southeast Asia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, albeit informally, and they have close security relations, which are kept very discreet. This was in 1960. They cannot make it formal for obvious reasons.


Contrary to what it says on Wikipedia in English, Israel and Singapore did not establish full diplomatic relationship in 1965. Initially the relationship was kept in secret, until in October 1968 Israel was allowed to open a trade mission in Singapore, and in May 1969 formal relationship was created when it was elevated to an embassy. Let me know if you wish to get sources for this info - I’d be happy to provide those.


What you’re writing regarding Indonesia is a bit weird for me - to the best of my knowledge while Israel and Indonesia have extensive trade and other ties, there is no diplomatic relationship between the countries (i.e. no embassies). Further, you write it was the first, but the Philippines established full diplomatic relationship with Israel in 1957, with Thailand in 1954, etc.


I think we can agree Wikipedia never has the full story. Things are a bit more complicated when it comes to Israel.


Wiki is still CRAP


Wiki relies on human input. You can edit it and add sources of information.


We are forever grateful to the Israelis. They could have ignored our request, but they didn’t. Israel should be proud of what they helped created.


Not only did they help , they didn't help solely to take advantage of us. And made recommendations based on our needs


My eldest brother-in-law was in the first NS batch. I have also met former regulars who remember how the ‘Mexicans’ shaped Singapore’s military doctrine and force structure, as well as training methods. The concept of a small country under permanent siege by large and hostile neighbours lives on.


Right on spot Clive, I read the LKY memoir thoroughly, and He had a feeling that Singapore doesn't have the luxury of geopolitics in determining who is a friend in need. Therefore he breached the standard diplomatic etiquette by teaming up with a Israel, the fellow bad guy in islamic neighbourhood like SG. Meanwhile the powerful nations were siding with Big boys Indonesia and Malaysia and shunning off mediocre SG. Bravo to underdogs solidarity!


This is interesting. I didn’t know Singapore reached out to Egypt and India as well. I’ve always thought they reached out to Israel owing to the geopolitical similarities.


Singapore actually reached out to Egypt and India first, being fellow members of the non-aligned movement. But in an early example of ghosting, after both countries congratulated Singapore on her independence with nary a word on her request for assistance, LKY gave the go-ahead to Goh Keng Swee to reach out to Israel for help, but keep it on the down-low.


It was good luck for Singapore that Egypt and India refused to help.


I really don’t know if India had resources.


Love how you provided the historical context for SG, it’s something lost in the modern narrative of our relationship with our neighbours. But I want to point out that the question is “why did Israel go out of its way”, not “why did SG sought help to build her armed forces”.


Paragraph 3. That is all we know since Israelis are notoriously succinct on the reasons for their deliberations and actions.


Reread your answer - yes you did answer the question. The only thing I can add on is a tidbit from Peter Ho’s essay “A Mexican Fandango with a Poisonous Shrimp”.

Goh (Keng Swee) contacted Mordecai Kidron, the former Israeli Ambassador to Thailand. Kidron then flew to Singapore, with a Mossad representative, Hezi Carmel, with instructions to offer military assistance… Kidron would have reported his visit to his boss, Golda Meir, who was then Israel’s Foreign Minister. Meir had already met Lee (Kuan Yew) at various international conferences, and admired him as an outstanding Asian leader. She wanted to be helpful.

A lot of the help hinged on a few personal decisions from chance meetings that influenced the rest of the Israeli govt on their stance.

□So we've the charisma of our old guards that Israel gave a helping hand and I think the meeting create a sense that Israel had a similiar situation. Isreal don't like to be bullied and by helping Singapore also telling others, not to take advantage of small nation.

●I am grateful for the sympathy shown to me by the Jewish people 🙏


●In Israel too, many don’t agree with what Singapore is not agreeing. But, as the say is, “What you see from HERE you can’t see from THERE”. The situation in Israel is very very complicated so it’s impossible to judge if one don’t live here. Which is true for anywhere else IMHO.


□No country in the world agrees wholly with another nation’s policies in every issue. That is why we have diplomacy, and work on commonalities.

□I very much loved your reply on this question and the gratitude to us from Singapore vs the hate we get all over. I admit, I didn’t know any of what you have written in your essay. So, it’s never too late to learn :-) Thanks.

●If I’m not mistaken, the Taiwanese helped us too.

□That was a bit later.

□Thanks.

□Taiwan under Chiang Ching Kuo assisted Singapore in building the RSAF if I remember correctly.

●The nation of Singapore owes Isreal debt of Gratitude that cannot be illustrated with words.


●Well said The clever Israel knows how to pass kwowledge and skills to next promised land Singapore -See the left over -a disciplined men and women -they Called Soldier -Singapore


●Unfortunately, Singapore and Israel have no commercial flight links. Israel has very close commercial flights with Thailand and CCP China instead.

You need to have enough passengers to create a flight to the country, not many people travel between this two country


●Office had a grad student from Singapore. Said his basic training class had lots of sons of influential people, the drill instructors (DIs) were afraid of career ramifications. Lee Kuan Yew, the PM, didn’t want any coddling. The basic training class got DIs … from the IDF. Problem solved!


●Israel will ‘help’ anybody in defense and arms matters.

If not money, they will gain influence, which they can use one day for money.

Israel trained Idi Amin’s army too.

●I remembered one of my senior encik who were trained by the Israelites say that they are crazy and inhumane..

Lol, I want to reply more sweat less blood but luckily I digress.. It’s my senior encik after all..

I personally had a chance to train in Israel but that is another story.

●Well India had its own security problems in the 60s and 70s. 1962 war, 1965 war, 1971 war. It was a relatively new and a poor nation with large population to be taken care of. It could be one of the prime reasons India didn't participate in forming Singapore's military doctrine.

Also, while India saved President Sukarno from the Dutch in 1947, Indonesia's military doctrine always supported Pakistan instead of India; even when Sukaro was at the helm. This could be another reason for India to not help Singapore during that period.

●Ah - the ‘Mexicans’…….

●You got right support from right people as you all know Israel’s technologies are always tested and upgraded.

Egypts army was shattered during the 6 day war.

India was facing wars with China and Pakistan.

So the situations at that time evolved into a better solution for you. So no blaming as everything worked well for Singapore.

●I can bet SG got iron dome now 😁🫢 it’s proven effective in intercepting in coming short range crude missile, beside SAMs, CIWS…patriot missile, AC 130 would be a nice addition


●Why exactly are you against “the expansions” into the “West Bank”?

Do you understand the history of the conflict? Do you know why certain lands changed hands? Do you understand the security concerns of Israel? Or is it all just about mindless herd mentality just to seem you’re on the side of the “good guys”?

□If you want to know why, then ask it as a separate question, because it does not benefit me to answer in the comments. I get paid for my answers. If you want to rant because it hurts your feelings when people have different opinions, go elsewhere. You are not against “herd mentality”. You simply want everyone to agree with you - that is herd mentality.

□I am asking you because I’m curious why a person who has benefitted from Israel’s help at exactly those times you say it has “expanded” into the “West Bank” would take a position that harms its security and viability.

This is not a rant, it’s curiosity mixed with frustration, nor do I expect everyone to agree with me. I didn’t mean this to be a personal attack, nor is it one.

If you want, I can post a question that requests your answer… just tell me what phrasing of such a question you would agree with.

□Not a personal attack? You just said this is “herd mentality”. And you assume that I believe there are “good guys” and “bad guys”. I have spent enough time in the business to know nobody is good. We are all devils, paid to justify whatever policy serves the national interest. There is only “our interests” and “their interests”. When I say that Singapore disagrees with certain things its allies do, it is based on the national interest. In the same vein, Israel disagrees with some things its allies do. It is national interest.

As a Singaporean, I do not buy into the idea that Israel has a special manifest destiny. It is merely another country. The Bible, the Qur’an or any scripture is not a basis for national policy. It is something we use to justify things to the masses. And there will always be people who want to believe. It is our national interest that Israel survives and prospers. Israel is a strategic partner. In the same vein, it is in Israel’s national interest that Singapore does so, because many of our interests align or converge in the region of East Asia.

Israel is not the hero of this story. It is in violation of many UN resolutions, and guilty of war crimes. The Palestinians are not the heroes of this story either. They are another oppressed people lead by corrupt opportunists. It is in the interests of Palestinian leadership that there be conflict with Israel, so that they maintain their power over the Palestinians. It is in the interest of certain factions within Likud, Shas and others that the Palestinians are antagonised to a state of insurgency to detract from a failed economic policy, and kleptocracy. Israel does not need the West Bank. It needs the Golan Heights, yes. But the West bank is an excuse for both parties to maintain a state of insurgency at the expense of the citizens of both sides. If the argument is that the Bible or Tanakh says so, then that is mythology used to justify policy, which is idiotic.

□And again, coming from “pure national interest”, you say it’s in your interest that Israel survives, but how can it if it had to give up a large chunk of land to a political entity that will use that land offensively?

I mean, saying Israel “doesn’t need” the land is all fine and dandy, but how do you even make such a determination? There are around 500k Israelis living there (East Jerusalem not included), which only by attempting to evict them you’d bring about massive ruin to Israel and I’m not even talking about the war and terror that can be waged on the heartland of Israel from all that evicted space.

I don’t see the Palestinians as oppressed by anyone other than themselves and their rulers. If it wasn’t for their enmity (and their predecessor’s enmity - the Jordanians, Egyptians, Syrians, etc.) there wouldn’t have been a problem giving them co-sovereignty while everyone is just living in peace side by side.

The entire Middle East could have been a free travel zone where people of different nations and cultures could live wherever they want and this conflict would have been redundant.

Finally, talking about UN resolutions is nothing but simply an argument from authority. Yes, my original point is people take the opinion that’s most in consensus because it’s the safest opinion to have, regardless if it’s warranted, or fair or viable.

I don’t even want to address the “guilty of war crimes” bit, as that’s just complete nonsense. War causes a lot suffering and pain to innocent people, but Israel never as a policy, nor in practice engaged in harming innocent civilians and in fact takes extreme measures to avoid harming noncombatants.

Anyway, I appreciate your reply, despite the disagreements.

□We will agree to disagree. I am not an invested in either side’s nationalistic narrative. At the current rate, Israel will eventually decline precipitously. The economic indicators are already not good. And then you have the demographic time bomb which means Jews will be a minority in Israel. Short-sighted policies have long-term consequences.

●Why not the British or Australians? Five power defence agreements should be good enough to persuade Britain to help.

□In 1967, James Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, announced the British withdrawal of forces East of Suez. After their involvement in the 2nd Word War, the UK was bankrupt, and shorn of her colonies, especially India. The British were in no position to do anything in that period, and this perceived abandonment coloured our political view of them.

Australia was involved in the early days of the Vietnam War. They were also involved in the Korean War. Their military was stretched, and in no position to help us.

The Five Powers Defence Arrangement was signed on the 16th April 1971, when Singapore already had an established military. Neither the UK nor Australia would have signed it if they thought we could not defend ourselves, which precluded any sort of arrangement in the nascent days of the SAF.

Putting all that aside, neither the British nor the Australians had the sort of doctrinal experience we sought in setting up a national conscription force. India, Egypt and Israel did.

□The Australian military was also very conflicted about conscription during the Vietnam War and has progressively hardened that stance against conscription in the years since.

While it pops up occasionally in the more fringe political discussions there is no appetite in military circles for anything other than volunteer enlistment - the more selective the better.

□Plus, UK was coming out if it NS days anyway back then!. Naturally, Ozzie still had a presence at Butterworth…with a rotation, which still happens today of a Rifle Company. Brunei was also utilised more as aJingke Warfare Cadre, so IKs ability to assist Singapore , especially as. UK was pulling out due to de colonisation in those days..was overall not quite viable..and as u have stated, would not have been able to fit the requirements of LKY wanted gif Singapore. UK was also “unofficially” involved in Vietnam..again all very secret squirrel.

□The Far East Strategic Reserve established in the mid 1950s to fight during the Malayan Emergency and later Indonesian Confrontation consisted of equal numbers of Australian, NZ and British forces. Australia and NZ were there under the Forward Defence strategy that prevailed at the time

Harold Wilson announced the policy to withdraw from East of Suez in 1968 which was not well received in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. The FESR was wound up and replaced by the non-binding FPDA in 1971. The Singapore naval base was handed back to Singapore.

Some forces continued to be based in Singapore under the short lived ANZUK agreement. In 1973 the new Australian government announced the end of Forward Defence and the withdrawal of their forces from Singapore. The UK also withdrew their remaining forces around about the same time.

The NZ contingent remained in Singapore until the end of the 1980s.

□The British empire was in its waning days - WW2 essentially bankrupted the UK. It was Britain’s need to reduce her military footprint in the region that prompted the approval for the formation of the Malaysian Federation. Initially, Brunei was also to join Malaysia together with Sabah and Sarawak, but Konfrontasi put paid to that notion. By 1967 the UK would withdraw all troops east of the Suez, ending the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA).

Australia did not have the military might it enjoys today and what troops they had were committed to Vietnam as part of the 2nd IndoChina War (aka Vietnam War) at that point in time.

It would only be in 1971 that Australia and UK would sign the FPDA, together with Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand.

□Australian forces (initially RAAF, later army) were there throughout the Malayan Emergency and later Confrontation(against Indonesia Surkano) which is known as Australia’s secret war. So were the New Zealanders.

□Malayan Emergency was in the 50s. Konfrontasi officially ended in 1966, but the conflict was pretty quiet for most of 1965, particularly after the Oct 1st coup in Indonesia.


□The point is that Australia and NZ provided two thirds of the forces under British command in Malaysia and Singapore in the form of the Far East Strategic Reserve from the mid 50s until the mid 60s when the commitment was made to Vietnam under SEATO and the US alliance.

Conscription was actually introduced in 1965 to address the Indonesian threat to New Guinea, Sabah and Sarawak not because of Vietnam.

Australia withdrew from SE Asia in the 70s with the end of the Forward Defence strategy. Australia was also reluctant to take over British obligations to the defence of Singapore after East of Suez bearing in mind the help already provided to the British in the 50s and 60s and in numerous other earlier wars.

●The India of that time was itself a have not nation, which went to USSR and UK with a begging bowl, to buy weapons. Obviously, what can one beggar give or lend to another, other than a begging bowl ?

Today India is resurgent and has both fledgling arms industry and powerful military. Today it has many a few somethings to offer Singapore.

My relatives fought China in 1962. The few who came back narrated the type of pain and suffering that they endured, outgunned and outmaneuvered by the Communist Chinese forces.

As an Indian, I feel bad that we couldn’t help Singapore when it needed our help. But fact is, we too were with a begging bowl at that time.

●Sorry but one thing isn’t clear to me:

On the one hand - you thank Israel and appreciate it, and point out that it is surrounded by unfair and aggressive enemies.

On the other hand, you side with Israel’s enemies when it comes to politics and international relationships (“against the expansion into the West Bank, disapproves of the situation in Gaza”).

Is that how you thank a friend?

□That is a very American thinking. This is not best friends in playschool. Your enemies are not necessarily our enemies, and your friends are not necessarily our friends, and vice verse. Having a good relationship does not mean we have to support everything the government of the day does.

□I absolutely agree with you.

which I think even strengthens my point:

Why would you adopt the position of any party in a conflict that takes place on the other side of the world, that you have no interests in, and both parties are neither your ally nor enemy?

□Standing for “Principles”. Else when faced in similar situations, there will be no one else to stand for you.

Abiding by / Advocating the rule of Law helps to protect smaller nation.

●Singapore is non-aligned policy wise? But in on-going Russia—Ukraine war, Singapore chose to take a side.

□Did we? Singapore has always condemned military adventurism when able. This is regardless of who is involved. This may involve a diplomatic note, a statement from PMO or otherwise.

Singapore is one of the countries to sanction Russian and Belarusian entities. We have no choice in that matter, unless we want to get locked out of the global banking system by the Federal Reserve. These are the realities of global politics.

●We too are Forever Grateful to Our Israeli Brothers and Sisters. We also Love our Brothers and Sisters in Singapore. India & Israel have been Friends since Time Immemorial. Indian and Singapore has been friends since the Beginning. We love our Brothers and Sisters in India, Israel & Singapore who have set up and unparalleled Example of Progress, Success and Wonderful in Human History. We hope and pray that by God’s Blessings may our Friendship and Brotherhood last Forever.

We Love India, Israel & Singapore. We Pray for the Peace, Progress, Success, Stability, Longevity, Safety, High Positive Development, Fabulous Success, High Prosperity & High Fabulous Victory of India,Israel & Singapore. Hindustan Zindabaad, Long Live Israel & Long Live Singapore. Long Live Israel India Singapore Friendship and Brotherhood.

We also Wish the Same for all other Great Nations in this World. Thank You Very Much for Your Response it was really very Nice and Informative. May God Bless You My Friend. Thank You.

●Please let us have the source that Singapore tried to reach Egypt and India for help.

●Lot of new information has shared however India didn't help bcos of deep mistrust of Chinese & singaporeans are ethnic Chinese, it's a general understanding in India that Pakistan & China can't be ever trusted & this suspicion must be the reason India refused to help or sending few military advisors would have been an easy task for India, i have been to Singapore 30 years ago & have felt different attitude of local public towards Indians even though we are second largest majority over there.

□Indians are not the 2nd largest majority in Singapore for your information. Get your facts right please.

●1967 war of aggression just like Russia and Ukraine

●The Israeli advisors to Singapore were disguised as “Mexican”.

I wonder why Government of Singapore back then did not request assistance from western countries? Singapore sure had good ties with UK back then, or probably Australia which much closer to the region.

□The UK withdrew from affairs “East of Suez” due to various political and economic reasons. Singapore had no relationship with other Western nations then, and they were not inclined to be involved with us.

●pleasure to read this. THANKS

●Haaretz , Amnon Barzilai, Jul 16, 2004

https://www.haaretz.com/2004–07–16/ty-article/a-deep-dark-secret-love-affair/0000017f-ecb8–d639-af7f-edff88920000

A Deep, Dark secret love affair.

●The first military advisors sent from Israel to S'pore were called 'Mexicans' in order to be discreet

Soft truths to keep Singapore from stalling.

Mothership |  January 04, 2020, 06:11 PM


The first military advisors sent from Israel to S'pore were called 'Mexicans' in order to be discreet

Soft truths to keep Singapore from stalling.

Beating the Odds Together, edited by Mattia Tomba, is a collection of essays which commemorates the 50 years of diplomatic relations between Singapore and Israel. Click here for source.


Here, we reproduce an excerpt from an essay contributed by Peter Ho, titled "A Mexican Fandango with a Poisonous Shrimp", where he described Israel's military contributions in developing Singapore as a poisonous shrimp during a time of great uncertainty.


Ho headed Singapore's civil service from 2005 to 2010, and was also Permanent Secretary (Defence) from 2000 to 2004. He is currently the Senior Advisor to the Centre for Strategic Futures. 

Bilateral relations between the two nations had to be discreet

The defence ties between Singapore and Israel are almost as old as independent Singapore. Arguably, this unusual partnership was the foundation upon which the larger bilateral relationship has been built.


But for many years, it was shrouded in secrecy.


To this day, little has been written about the Singapore–Israel defence relationship despite its significance. This reticence is derived from the reality of Singapore’s neighbourhood.


The state visit of then-Israeli President Chaim Herzog to Singapore in 1986 sparked demonstrations — and political remonstrations — in both Malaysia and Indonesia.


This experience would have reinforced in the minds of policymakers in Singapore that the bilateral relationship with Israel — above all, the sensitive defence relationship — had to be managed discreetly in order to preserve and protect the substance.


The Israelis were referred to as "Mexicans"

So all these years, while Singapore has not denied that it has close defence links with Israel, at the same time, it has eschewed speaking openly about them and revealed few details.


Indeed, this low-key approach was adopted when the first team of military advisers from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) visited Singapore in 1965, soon after Singapore’s separation from Malaysia. To disguise their presence, they were famously described as “Mexicans”.


In his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew remarked that they looked “swarthy enough”, presumably because of their tough life in training and operations under the hot Levantine sun.


Since then, Singapore’s links with the Israeli defence establishment have grown in breadth and depth. A close relationship between two very different systems emerged.


If the Israelis were “Mexicans”, then perhaps the active and lively way that Singapore engaged Israel on the defence front could be described as a Mexican fandango.


The newly independent Singapore faced an existential crisis

To understand the roots of this Mexican fandango, we need to go back to 1965, when Singapore separated from Malaysia. Few then gave Singapore much chance of surviving on its own, let alone succeeding.


With the unexpected and unwanted divorce, Singapore lost its economic hinterland in Malaysia. A communist insurgency was barely over.


President Soekarno’s Indonesia was still waging an armed confrontation — Konfrontasi— against the “neo- colonialist” creation of Malaysia, and Singapore was not spared. The Vietnam War was growing in intensity.


These were not propitious beginnings for the newly independent state of Singapore. It was a very parlous situation that convinced the Singaporean leadership of the imperative to rapidly build up a credible — and independent — defence capability.


It was an existential priority from day one.


Singapore had to become a poisonous shrimp

It did not take rocket science to figure out that Singapore’s defences were in a bad state. At independence, Singapore had only two under-strength infantry battalions, with more than half of the soldiers Malaysians.


There was an ageing wooden gunboat, and not a single aircraft — nothing that could pass for either a navy or an air force.


Although the British maintained a large military presence in Singapore and Malaysia, political pressure was growing back in London to cut its military presence east of the Suez. Singapore had to assume that the British military presence would be withdrawn at some point in time.


Singapore had to be able to defend itself.


Reflecting this determination, Lee said in 1966 that in a world where the big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimp, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp.


It may have been bravado then, but the poisonous shrimp metaphor staked out the beginnings of a defence strategy of deterrence that would eventually be embraced by Singapore. So, the task was clear-cut, yet overwhelming — to build an army virtually from scratch, and quickly.


Goh Keng Swee was tasked to build the SAF from scratch

Dr Goh Keng Swee, then Finance Minister, volunteered to lead the effort, although Lee wryly noted that all Goh knew of military matters had been learnt as a corporal in the British-led Singapore Volunteer Corps until it surrendered to the Japanese in February 1942.


A small team under the leadership of Goh was hastily assembled to form the new Ministry of Interior and Defence, combining into one ministry what is today divided into the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Home Affairs.


With a small population and limited resources, Singapore could not afford a large professional army. Initially, the government tried to get round the problem of cost by establishing a part-time volunteer “territorial” army.


It created the People’s Defence Force (PDF) soon after independence.


But, truth be told, the government was not confident of getting enough volunteers,especially as the majority Chinese population had a cultural aversion to service in the military. It was not a sustainable model.


The Brown Book

Goh had already been impressed by Israel’s defence system during his first visit to the country in January 1959, when he was Minister for Finance.


Israel is a small country like Singapore, but located in a hostile region. It had been among the first to recognise Singapore.


Ze’evi was then the IDF’s Deputy Head of the Operations Directorate. He had the intriguing nickname “Gandhi”. Ze’evi was despatched to Singapore in October 1965 to meet Goh under conditions of great secrecy.


During his visit to Singapore, ever the military professional, Ze’evi travelled incognito by taxi around Singapore to familiarise himself with the terrain and the ground conditions.


Upon his return to Tel Aviv, he assembled his team, which included Meir Amit, then director of Mossad. They developed a masterplan for the build-up of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).


This masterplan was called The Brown Book. Ze’evi had it ready within a month, and translated it into English two months later.


The Brown Book was broad in scope. It covered strategy and doctrine. But at its core was the fundamental assessment that the only viable solution for Singapore was to build a citizen army of conscripts, trained and led by a small regular force.


To this end, it proposed the establishment of an “Officer Training School” to produce this corps of professional leaders. Citizen-soldiers would form the backbone of the citizen army, so that in an emergency, the entire nation could be mobilised under arms.


Israeli advisors were here to advise, not to command

The Brown Book detailed a masterplan to put this concept into effect. It envisaged, among other things,the army’s expansion to 12 battalions within a decade, an objective that could only be achieved through conscription


Soon after, the Singapore and Israeli governments signed a one-page agreement, which stated simply that Israel would provide defence advisers to Singapore. They would be given their equivalent Israeli salaries, plus board and lodging.


Indeed, these terms proved to be very generous on Israel’s part, as Singapore benefited enormously from the priceless advice of the Israelis.


A small group of seven Israeli advisers — or “Mexicans”, if you will — led by Colonel Yaakov “Jack” Elazari arrived in Singapore in November 1965. Prior to their departure, they had met Rabin, who told the team:


“I want you to remember several things. One, we are not going to turn Singapore into an Israeli colony. Your task is to teach them the military profession, to put them on their legs so they can run their own army. Your success will be if at a certain stage they will be able to take the wheel and run the army by themselves. Second, you are not going there in order to command them but to advise them. And third, you are not arms merchants. When you recommend items to procure, use the purest professional military judgment. I want total disregard of their decision as to whether to buy here or elsewhere.”


Pasir Laba was selected as the site for the first Officer Training School

When Elazari landed in Singapore, like Ze’evi before him, he too familiarised himself with the terrain. Driving himself around the island, he kept an eye out for potential sites for the Officer Training School that had been proposed in The Brown Book.


He eventually selected Pasir Laba, having earlier ruled out two islands north-east of the main island: Pulau Ubin and Pulau Tekong.


Elazari made his recommendations to Goh. They were accepted, and led to the establishment of the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute, or SAFTI.


The bulldozers quickly moved into Pasir Laba. Within a year, the construction of SAFTI was completed, based on plans from the Israeli Engineering Corps. It was an impressive feat, even if SAFTI was very basic in design and facilities, driven by the urgency to get the SAF up and running.


With SAFTI, the Israeli advisers were truly ready for business. Their first priority was to build up a pool of Singaporean instructors and commanders. In the parlance, they “trained the trainers”.


They insisted from the very start that the Singaporean officers were to learn from them so that they could take over as instructors as soon as possible.


Every job they did was understudied by a Singaporean counterpart, from platoon commanders to company commanders, right up to the top position of director general staff. They even had the officer cadets write the instructional material.


Lee observed that while the Americans had sent about 3,000 to 6,000 men in the first batch of military advisers to help President Ngo Dinh Diem build up the South Vietnamese army, the Israelis sent only 18 officers.


First batch of cadets completed their training in July 1967

On 16 July 1967, Ze’evi, together with the other Israeli advisers, was invited by Goh to the commissioning parade of the first batch of 117 Singapore officer cadets who had completed their training at SAFTI.


On Goh’s instruction, they came in their IDF military uniforms. Goh then explained their presence. He said:


“You have heard of the Six Day War, which commenced on 5 June. Seated here with me today are part of the Israeli mission which has been advising us on how to build an army.”


The “Mexicans” had been unmasked as Israelis. This revelation signalled that Singapore was now ready to deal with any military threat.


With this disclosure coming after the Six Day War in June 1967, the deterrence message was clear: that since the SAF had been designed and trained by the Israelis, it would be a force to be reckoned with.


Goh was staking out the parameters of the poisonous shrimp strategy.


S'pore's first tanks were unveiled on National Day in 1969

However, it was not only through training that Singapore’s poisonous shrimp strategy was being realised with the assistance of Israel. In great secrecy, Singapore purchased 72 AMX-13 light tanks from IDF surplus.


To support this acquisition, the IDF trained the pioneer team of 36 SAF armour officers in its own armour school back in Israel, just as it had also begun training other military vocationalists from Singapore.

Then the bombshell was dropped. On Singapore’s National Day on 9 August 1969, 30 of these AMX-13 tanks rolled past the reviewing stand at the Padang. With understatement, Lee wrote: “it had a dramatic effect ...”

While some may have had reservations over the relevance of Israel’s military experience to Singapore’s tropical environment, there is no doubt that the IDF has been one of the most important influences on the development of the SAF.


The “Mexicans” played a key role in the early years of the SAF, helping to establish its National Service system, its training system and its military organisation.

●t's interesting to know Singapore and Israel historical relationship. Bravo Israel, thank you for coming to set up our army. We are indeed very grateful.

□(deleted)

□That is not true. India was focused on its immediate frontiers in that period, and declined military adventures abroad. In fact, Singapore had better relations with Pakistan in that period. It was Pakistanis who helped Singapore develop NOL and its shipping capacity, when India declined.


To be fair, India had just fought a war with Pakistan in 1965, and was still reorganising itself. India was involved in another border war with China in 1967 itself. India was also in a difficult situation since along with Indonesia, she was a founder of the non-Aligned Movement, in 1961. Any Indian moves to help the SAF would have broken the movement because it would have been perceived by Sukarno as interference in Indonesian affairs, due to the ongoing Konfrontasi.

Relations with Singapore only improved decades later, when the Indians realised they were losing influence to China, and the needs of their changing economy.

□What were the likely reasons for Egypt for not helping then?

□Egypt, preparing for possible war with Israel, involved in the North Yemen Civil War, trying to establish its leadership position in the Arab world post the breakup of the United Arab Republic - providing help to a newly established tiny nation in remote Asia with its immediate opponents being Muslim nations.

I’m guessing Egypt saw very little potential for any sort of upside with this type of assistance.


□It is likely because Egypt was going through a power struggle between factions of the Harakat adh-Dhubbath al-Ahrar. Jamal ‘Abd an-Naswr al-Husayn was also preparing for war with Israel. He was so involved in Pan-Arabism, he was not concerned a Chinese island on the other end of the world.


□India was asked in the late 60s. They declined, because as a founding member of the Non-Aligned movement India did not want to get caught up in the west-vs-communist struggle in SEA (aka the “communist dominos”).

India-SG relations won’t warm till the 90s when India started their Look East policy. You can read more about the dynamics here: https://web.archive.org/web/20070611050126/http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-41.pdf

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