Indoctrination 灌输

 Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 March 2024 剑桥大学出版社在线出版：2024 年 3 月 20 日

Varieties of Indoctrination: The Politicization of Education and the Media around the World 灌输的种类：世界各地教育和媒体的政治化

Abstract

For many decades, scholars assumed voluntary compliance and citizens’ commitment to a regime’s principles and values to be critical for regime stability. A growing literature argues that indoctrination is essential to achieve this congruence. However, the absence of a clear definition and comprehensive comparative measures of indoctrination have hindered systematic research on such issues. In this paper, we fill this gap by synthesizing literature across disciplines to clarify the concept of indoctrination, focusing particularly on the politicization of education and the media. We then outline how the abstract concept can be operationalized, and introduce and validate an original expert-coded dataset on indoctrination that covers 160 countries from 1945 to the present. The dataset should facilitate a new generation of empirical inquiry on the causes and consequences of indoctrination.

摘要

几十年来，学者们一直认为，自愿遵守和公民对政权原则和价值观的承诺对于政权稳定至关重要。越来越多的文献认为，灌输对于实现这种一致性至关重要。然而，灌输缺乏明确的定义和全面的比较措施，阻碍了对此类问题的系统研究。在本文中，我们通过综合跨学科的文献来填补这一空白，以澄清灌输的概念，特别关注教育和媒体的政治化。然后，我们概述了如何将抽象概念付诸实践，并介绍和验证了原始的专家编码灌输数据集，该数据集涵盖了 1945 年至今的 160 个国家。该数据集应有助于新一代对灌输的原因和后果进行实证研究。

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1. Introduction

In recent years, the entrenchment of autocrats, the rise of populist leaders, and increased polarization in established democracies have led to renewed interest in understanding how political regimes—whether democratic or autocratic—can control and influence public support to maintain power (Fitzgerald et al. Reference Fitzgerald, Cohen, Castro and Pope2021; Guriev and Treisman Reference Guriev and Treisman2019; Przeworski Reference Przeworski2022). While studies of political control have primarily focused on coercion and co-optation, this paper joins recent research that highlights indoctrination as an alternative strategy that enables powerholders to induce voluntary compliance and establish support among its citizens (De Juan, Haass, and Pierskalla Reference De Juan, Haass and Pierskalla2021; Hassan, Mattingly, and Nugent Reference Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent2022; Paglayan Reference Paglayan2021; Reference Paglayan2022a; Reference Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin2022b). Yet, indoctrination remains relatively understudied as a tool of political control. Among other problems, conceptual ambiguity and the lack of comparative data have traditionally impeded research in this field. We address these challenges by proposing greater conceptual clarity and by introducing original, expert-coded data to facilitate a new generation of empirical inquiry.

1. 引言

近年来，独裁统治的巩固、民粹主义领袖的崛起以及成熟民主国家的两极分化加剧，重新引起了人们对政治体制（无论是民主体制还是专制体制）如何控制和影响公众支持以维持权力的兴趣（Fitzgerald et al. 参考文献 Fitzgerald, Cohen, Castro and Pope2021；Guriev and Treisman 参考文献 Guriev and Treisman2019；Przeworski 参考文献 Przeworski2022）。 尽管政治控制研究主要集中于强制和拉拢，但本文加入了最近的研究，强调灌输是一种替代策略，使当权者能够诱导自愿遵守并在公民中获得支持（De Juan, Haass, and Pierskalla 参考文献 De Juan, Haass and Pierskalla2021；Hassan, Mattingly, and Nugent 参考文献 Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent2022；Paglayan 参考文献 Paglayan2021；参考文献 Paglayan2022a；参考文献 Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin2022b）。然而，作为一种政治控制工具，灌输仍然研究不足。除其他问题外，概念模糊和缺乏比较数据传统上阻碍了该领域的研究。我们通过提出更大的概念清晰度并引入原始的、专家编码的数据来促进新一代的实证研究来应对这些挑战。

Our work makes numerous contributions to the study of indoctrination. First, we provide a clear and universally applicable definition of indoctrination as a regime-led socialization process that aims to increase congruence between the views and principles of the regime ¹  and those of its citizens. While indoctrination has typically been confined to the study of autocracies, we note that our definition lacks any attachment to specific ideologies or regime types. Instead, we argue that the study of indoctrination is applicable to the study of democracies as well.² We further reason that indoctrination is primarily channeled through education and the media, and we offer a framework to measure indoctrination across both channels. The framework we propose captures two main dimensions: the potential for indoctrination (i.e., the ability of states to inculcate their citizens) and the content of indoctrination.

我们的工作为灌输研究做出了许多贡献。首先，我们提供了一个明确且普遍适用的灌输定义：灌输是一种政权主导的社会化过程，旨在提高政权¹与其公民的观点和原则​​之间的一致性。虽然灌输通常仅限于对独裁政权的研究，但我们注意到，我们的定义与特定的意识形态或政权类型没有任何关联。相反，我们认为灌输研究也适用于民主国家的研究。² 我们进一步推断，灌输主要通过教育和媒体进行，我们提供了一个衡量这两个渠道灌输情况的框架。我们提出的框架涵盖两个主要维度：灌输的潜力（即国家向公民灌输思想的能力）和灌输的内容。

Second, we make an empirical contribution to the study of indoctrination by introducing original data. Comparative studies of indoctrination remain constrained by the absence of comprehensive data that cover different regimes, regions, and time periods. The Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) dataset (Neundorf et al., Reference Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim and Rydén2023a) we present in this paper draws on the information provided by 760 country experts through a survey fielded in collaboration with the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. The dataset offers a wide array of unique and detailed indices and indicators on indoctrination in education and the media. We consider education provided in schools that are controlled, managed, funded (even if only partially), or subsidized by the public sector. Moreover, the dataset provides unrivaled coverage as it includes an almost universal sample of countries in the post-World War II period.³ The V-Indoc dataset should enable richer and more expansive empirical examinations of the causes and consequences of indoctrination around the world and over time.

其次，我们通过引入原始数据为灌输研究做出了实证贡献。由于缺乏涵盖不同政权、地区和时期的全面数据，灌输的比较研究仍然受到限制。我们在本文中介绍的灌输种类 (V-Indoc) 数据集（Neundorf et al.，参考文献 Neundorf、Nazrullaeva、Northmore-Ball、Tertytchnaya、Kim、Benavot、Bromley、Knutsen、Lutscher、Marquardt、Paglayan、Pemstein、Seim 和 Rydén2023a）利用了 760 个国家专家通过与民主种类 (V-Dem) 研究所合作进行的调查提供的信息。该数据集提供了有关教育和媒体灌输的一系列独特而详细的指数和指标。 我们考虑由公共部门控制、管理、资助（即使只是部分资助）或补贴的学校提供​​的教育。此外，该数据集提供了无与伦比的覆盖范围，因为它涵盖了二战后几乎普遍存在的国家样本。³ V-Indoc 数据集应该能够对世界各地和各个时期灌输的成因和后果进行更丰富、更广泛的实证检验。

The dataset should be particularly useful for advancing the understanding of how states use education as a political tool. Whereas existing comparative education data mostly measure the quantity (e.g., Barro and Lee Reference Barro and Lee2013; Lee and Lee Reference Lee and Lee2016) or quality (e.g., Altinok, Angrist, and Patrinos Reference Altinok, Angrist and Patrinos2018; Angrist et al. Reference Angrist, Djankov, Goldberg and Patrinos2021) of education, or code factual (de jure) information based on primary or secondary archival records (Del Río, Knutsen, and Lutscher Reference Del Río, Knutsen and Lutscher2023; Paglayan Reference Paglayan2021), the V-Indoc data captures mostly de facto education practices, covering diverse topics such as school curricula, teachers, and patriotism. This kind of data should allow researchers to directly examine the mechanisms that link education practices to outcomes of interest, which could not be previously tested explicitly due to the absence of requisite data (Ansell Reference Ansell2010; Paglayan Reference Paglayan2021).

该数据集对于增进对国家如何将教育作为政治工具的理解尤为有用。现有的比较教育数据主要衡量教育的数量（例如 Barro 和 Lee 参考文献 Barro 和 Lee2013；Lee 和 Lee 参考文献 Lee 和 Lee2016）或质量（例如 Altinok、Angrist 和 Patrinos 参考文献 Altinok、Angrist 和 Patrinos2018；Angrist 等人参考文献 Angrist、Djankov、Goldberg 和 Patrinos2021），或根据一手或二手档案记录编码事实（法律）信息（Del Río、Knutsen 和 Lutscher 参考文献 Del Río、Knutsen 和 Lutscher2023；Paglayan 参考文献 Paglayan2021），而 V-Indoc 数据主要捕捉事实上的教育实践，涵盖学校课程、教师和爱国主义等不同主题。 这种数据应该允许研究人员直接检查将教育实践与感兴趣的结果联系起来的机制，由于缺乏必要的数据，这些机制以前无法明确测试（Ansell 参考 Ansell2010；Paglayan 参考 Paglayan2021）。

Furthermore, our work answers several recent calls in the authoritarian politics literature to move beyond the study of repression for understanding the longevity of these regimes and their ability to amass popular support. Existing research shows a rise in the share of “informational” autocracies around the world and emphasizes the importance of political communication for sustaining authoritarian rule (Guriev and Treisman Reference Guriev and Treisman2020; Reference Guriev and Treisman2022; Roberts Reference Roberts2018; Reference Roberts2020). Most recent data collection efforts shift the focus to the content of political communication to uncover substantive cross-national variation in the propaganda strategies of autocracies (e.g., Baggott Carter and Carter Reference Baggott Carter and Carter2023). Our conceptualization of indoctrination integrates political communication and our data contribute six new indicators that measure state attempts to control and influence the media. Finally, we demonstrate the application of our data by testing Linz’s (Reference Linz2000) argument that military regimes are less likely to engage in indoctrination than other forms of autocratic regimes. We provide initial evidence of how different authoritarian regimes vary not just in terms of leadership selection, but also in their potential to indoctrinate.

此外，我们的工作响应了威权政治文献中的一些最新呼吁，即超越对镇压的研究，了解这些政权的寿命及其积累民众支持的能力。现有研究表明，世界各地“信息型”专制政权的比例有所上升，强调了政治沟通对于维持威权统治的重要性（Guriev and Treisman 参考文献 Guriev and Treisman2020；参考文献 Guriev and Treisman2022；Roberts 参考文献 Roberts2018；参考文献 Roberts2020）。最近的数据收集工作将重点转移到政治传播的内容上，以揭示威权国家宣传策略的跨国实质性差异（例如，Baggott Carter and Carter 参考文献 Baggott Carter and Carter2023）。我们对灌输的概念整合了政治传播，我们的数据贡献了六个新指标来衡量国家控制和影响媒体的企图。 最后，我们通过检验林茨（参考文献 Linz2000）的论点来证明我们的数据的应用，即军事政权比其他形式的专制政权更不可能进行灌输。我们提供了初步证据，表明不同的威权主义政权不仅在领导人选拔方面存在差异，而且在灌输潜能方面也存在差异。

2. Defining Indoctrination

Although recent scholarship in political science highlights the importance of indoctrination as a tool of political control, indoctrination remains an ambiguous concept to define and measure. For example, Hassan, Mattingly, and Nugent (Reference Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent2022, 160–61) define indoctrination as a nonviolent strategy that the state can use to induce compliance, associated with predominantly immaterial benefits. Paglayan (Reference Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin2022b, 11) focuses on education and conceptualizes indoctrination as a tool of state building used “to promote long-term social order by indoctrinating young children to accept the status quo, behave as ‘good citizens,’ and respect the state and its laws.” Brandenberger (Reference Brandenberger 2012) describes indoctrination as the process of propagating a coherent narrative or regime mission in the form of a set of (ideological) principles or ideas at the expense of other competing worldviews and principles. Lott (Reference Lott 1999, 129) generalizes the concept of indoctrination as “controlling the information received by citizens”: in this sense, the state’s control over education is similar to control of the media.

2. 定义灌输

尽管政治学界最近的研究强调了灌输作为政治控制工具的重要性，但灌输仍然是一个难以定义和衡量的概念。例如，Hassan、Mattingly 和 Nugent（参考 Hassan、Mattingly 和 Nugent 2022，160-61）将灌输定义为国家可以用来诱导服从的一种非暴力策略，主要与非物质利益有关。Paglayan（参考 Paglayan、Jenkins 和 Rubin 2022b，11）专注于教育，并将灌输概念化为国家建设的一种工具，用于“通过灌输幼儿接受现状、表现为‘好公民’并尊重国家及其法律来促进长期社会秩序”。 布兰登伯格（Brandenberger，2012）将灌输描述为以一套（意识形态）原则或思想的形式传播连贯的叙事或政权使命的过程，而牺牲了其他相互竞争的世界观和原则。洛特（Lott，1999，129）将灌输的概念概括为“控制公民所接收的信息”：从这个意义上讲，国家对教育的控制类似于对媒体的控制。

The examples above demonstrate a lack of a clear definition of indoctrination. The reason for this vague conceptualization might lie in the contested history of the term (Woods and Barrow Reference Woods and Barrow 2006). In the late nineteenth century, indoctrination was a synonym for education (Puolimatka Reference Puolimatka1996, 109). According to the 1901 New England Dictionary, indoctrination is “instruction, formal teaching” (Raywid Reference Raywid 1980, 2).⁴ However, after World War I, indoctrination acquired a derogatory connotation similar to propaganda and brainwashing (Gatchel Reference Gatchel 1959, 306)—a trend that continued with the rise of dictatorships in the twentieth century (Moore Reference Moore 1966, 398). We build on this rich historical work on indoctrination and the recent reemergence of the term (e.g., Armstrong Reference Armstrong 2022). The goal of this paper is to present a clear, unifying definition of indoctrination to allow for the operationalization of such an abstract and multidimensional concept. Here we use indoctrination as an umbrella term making two important assumptions: (1) indoctrination is not limited to autocracies, and (2) indoctrination is not restricted to education.

To conceptualize and measure indoctrination in a way that can facilitate future research on causal effects, we need to distinguish inputs (what is the indoctrination process?) from outputs (does it work?) (see figure 1). Indoctrination effectiveness is a different output-related question that has only scarcely been tested empirically, mainly due to the lack of (comparative) data.⁵ Instead, we focus on what the regime can do to shape individuals’ beliefs, values, and (public) behaviors to render society more pliant to state directives, as postulated by Hassan, Mattingly, and Nugent (Reference Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent 2022) and Paglayan (Reference Paglayan 2022a). The regime’s intentions cannot be observed directly but can be inferred from public statements or legislation.⁶ Bromley and colleagues (Reference Bromley, Kijima, Overbey, Furuta, Choi and Santos 2022), Del Río, Knutsen, and Lutscher (Reference Del Río, Knutsen and Lutscher 2023), and Paglayan (Reference Paglayan 2021) code the regime’s intentions from primary (and in some cases, secondary) sources. However, as Bromley and colleagues (Reference Bromley, Kijima, Overbey, Furuta, Choi and Santos 2022, 3) argue, the regime’s “publicly stated goals” do not necessarily become legislation: “All [education] reforms contain a discursive dimension, but only some are implemented in part or in full.” Unlike the recent de jure data collection efforts, our approach allows us to focus on the implementation phase and gets us as close to the door of the classroom as possible—that is, to what is de facto happening on the ground.⁷

上述例子表明，灌输缺乏明确的定义。这种模糊概念化的原因可能在于该术语的争议历史（Woods and Barrow 2006）。在十九世纪后期，灌输是教育的同义词（Puolimatka 1996，109）。根据 1901 年新英格兰词典，灌输是“指导，正式教学”（Raywid 1980，2）。⁴然而，第一次世界大战后，灌输获得了类似于宣传和洗脑的贬义（Gatchel 1959，306）——这一趋势随着二十世纪独裁政权的兴起而持续（Moore 1966，398）。 我们以关于灌输的丰富历史研究和该术语的最近重新出现（例如，Armstrong Reference Armstrong2022）为基础。本文的目的是提出一个清晰、统一的灌输定义，以便将这种抽象和多维的概念付诸实践。在这里，我们使用灌输作为一个总称，并做出两个重要假设：（1）灌输不仅限于独裁统治，（2）灌输不仅限于教育。

为了以一种可以促进未来因果关系研究的方式概念化和衡量灌输，我们需要区分输入（灌输过程是什么？）和输出（它有效吗？）（见图 1）。 灌输的有效性是另一个与产出相关的问题，这个问题很少得到实证检验，主要是因为缺乏（比较）数据。⁵ 相反，我们关注的是政权可以做些什么来塑造个人的信仰、价值观和（公共）行为，从而使社会更顺从国家指令，正如哈桑、马丁利和纽金特（参考文献 Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent 2022）和帕格拉扬（参考文献 Paglayan 2022a）所假设的那样。 政权的意图无法直接观察到，但可以从公开声明或立法中推断出来。⁶ Bromley 及其同事（参考文献 Bromley、Kijima、Overbey、Furuta、Choi and Santos 2022）、Del Río、Knutsen 和 Lutscher（参考文献 Del Río、Knutsen and Lutscher 2023）以及 Paglayan（参考文献 Paglayan 2021）从主要（有时是次要）来源编码政权的意图。然而，正如 Bromley 及其同事（参考文献 Bromley、Kijima、Overbey、Furuta、Choi and Santos 2022, 3）所言，政权的“公开声明的目标”不一定会成为立法：“所有 [教育] 改革都包含话语维度，但只有一些改革得到部分或全部实施。” 与最近的法律数据收集工作不同，我们的方法使我们能够专注于实施阶段，并使我们尽可能接近教室门口 - 即实际发生的情况。⁷

(Regime's intentions) → (Legislation) →

(Implementation) → (On-the-ground indoctrination)  V-Indoc.

Figure 1: The Phases of the Indoctrination Process

（政权意图）→（立法）→

（实施）→（实地灌输）  V-Indoc。

图 1：灌输过程的各个阶段

However, the regime’s indoctrination efforts might not necessarily go through the standard path via legislation. On the ground, teachers can be pressured by school administrations not to deviate from the official curriculum (Rodden Reference Rodden2010). Legislation that is not explicitly about education, such as penalties for criticizing the regime in times of war, can also be used against teachers and schoolchildren.

然而，政权的灌输工作不一定非要通过立法这条标准路径。在实际操作中，学校管理部门可以向教师施压，要求他们不要偏离官方课程（Rodden 参考文献 Rodden2010）。没有明确涉及教育的立法，例如在战争时期对批评政权的惩罚，也可以用于针对教师和学童。

What is the objective of indoctrination then? Through indoctrination, any regime ultimately aims to create an “unshakable commitment” (Woods and Barrow Reference Woods and Barrow2006, 71) to its core principles that is resistant to shocks in regime performance and other counterinfluences.⁸ More specifically, citizens further learn what beliefs and behaviors to display in public, and how to do so. The regime utilizes complementary channels to maximize and maintain its intended impact. Individuals are exposed to political messages and learn acceptable behaviors and values at schools, universities, voluntary associations, and the military (e.g., De Juan, Haass, and Pierskalla Reference De Juan, Haass and Pierskalla2021), and in the workplace, the media, and the arts. Similar to Hassan, Mattingly, and Nugent (Reference Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent2022), we focus on two channels of indoctrination: education and the media.⁹ Through (compulsory) education, entire cohorts of children can be exposed to pro-regime messages and narratives when they are young and most malleable. Indoctrination efforts channeled through the media are often synonymous with propaganda or political communication. While indoctrination through education is a long-term process that takes place through regime-led socialization and habituation early in life (Persson Reference Persson2015), indoctrination through the media mainly targets adult citizens and can serve to reinforce pro-regime messages disseminated through the education system.¹⁰

那么，灌输的目的是什么呢？通过灌输，任何政权的最终目标都是创造对其核心原则的“不可动摇的承诺”（Woods and Barrow 2006，71），这种承诺能够抵御政权表现的冲击和其他反影响。⁸更具体地说，公民进一步了解在公共场合应该展示什么样的信念和行为，以及如何展示。政权利用互补的渠道来最大化和维持其预期的影响。个人在学校、大学、志愿协会和军队（例如，De Juan、Haass 和 Pierskalla 2021），以及在工作场所、媒体和艺术中接触政治信息并学习可接受的行为和价值观。 与 Hassan、Mattingly 和 Nugent（参考 Hassan、Mattingly 和 Nugent2022）类似，我们关注两种灌输渠道：教育和媒体。⁹ 通过（义务）教育，整个儿童群体可以在他们年幼且最易受影响时接触到亲政权的信息和叙述。通过媒体进行的灌输工作通常与宣传或政治传播同义。虽然通过教育进行灌输是一个长期的过程，通过政权主导的社会化和早年习惯化进行（Persson 参考 Persson2015），但通过媒体进行的灌输主要针对成年公民，可以强化通过教育系统传播的亲政权信息。¹⁰

It may be helpful to think of indoctrination as ultimately aiming to shape “ideal-type” citizens (or “good citizens” [Paglayan Reference Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin 2022b, 11]), which will vary by regime type. Broadly defined, “ideal-type” citizens in democracies have “internalized the spirit of democracy” (Diamond Reference Diamond 2008, 294). They have the habit of actively participating in politics through protests and voting. They are also able to run for office if they wish and are equipped with the civic skills, confidence, and competence needed to hold powerholders to account (e.g., Westheimer and Kahne Reference Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Not only do these citizens obey laws, they also participate in making them (Almond and Verba Reference Almond and Verba 1963). “Ideal-type” citizens in democracies also uphold democratic values of tolerance and pluralism (e.g., Westheimer Reference Westheimer 2006, 3). To mold these citizens, education in democracies emphasizes civic competence, democratic norms such as tolerance and pluralism, and the habit of political participation (Finkel and Smith Reference Finkel and Smith 2011).

将灌输视为最终目的在于塑造“理想型”公民（或“好公民” [Paglayan Reference Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin 2022b, 11]）可能会有所帮助，这将因政体类型而异。广义上讲，民主国家的“理想型”公民“内化了民主精神”（Diamond Reference Diamond 2008, 294）。他们习惯通过抗议和投票积极参与政治。如果他们愿意，他们也可以竞选公职，并具备追究当权者责任所需的公民技能、信心和能力（例如 Westheimer and Kahne Reference Westheimer and Kahne 2004）。这些公民不仅遵守法律，还参与制定法律（Almond and Verba Reference Almond and Verba 1963）。 民主国家的“理想型”公民也秉持宽容和多元化的民主价值观（例如 Westheimer Reference Westheimer 2006, 3）。为了塑造这些公民，民主国家的教育强调公民能力、宽容和多元化等民主规范以及政治参与的习惯（Finkel and Smith Reference Finkel and Smith 2011）。

“Ideal-type” citizens can vary across nondemocratic regimes; however, they too are united by their belief in regime norms and principles. As far as participatory norms are concerned, while electoral autocracies have traditionally encouraged participation in elections, military dictatorships, such as Franco’s Spain, have refrained from engaging citizens in the political process altogether. Even in electoral autocracies, however, the main purpose of citizen participation in politics is not co-governance—participation remains “ritualistic” in nature. And, while “ideal-type” citizens in nondemocratic regimes are also equipped with certain civic skills (e.g., Distelhorst and Fu Reference Distelhorst and Fu 2019), these mainly represent habits of loyalty and unity (Koesel Reference Koesel, Koesel, Bunce and Weiss 2020). To mold these citizens, nondemocratic education emphasizes uncritical acceptance and acquiescence.

在不同非民主政体中，“理想型”公民可能有所不同，但他们也都信仰相同的政体规范和原则。就参与规范而言，虽然选举专制国家传统上鼓励公民参与选举，但军事独裁政权，如佛朗哥统治下的西班牙，则完全避免公民参与政治进程。然而，即使在选举专制国家，公民参与政治的主要目的也不是共同治理，参与的本质仍然是“仪式性的”。而且，虽然非民主政体中的“理想型”公民也具备某些公民技能（例如 Distelhorst and Fu Reference Distelhorst and Fu 2019），但这些主要代表了忠诚和团结的习惯（Koesel Reference Koesel, Koesel, Bunce and Weiss 2020）。为了塑造这些公民，非民主教育强调不加批判的接受和默许。

To sum up, we propose defining indoctrination as a deliberate regime-led process of socializing “ideal-type” citizens who support the values, principles, and norms of a given regime—whether democratic or autocratic—and who thus voluntarily comply with regime demands and remain loyal in times of crisis. As a regime-led socialization process, indoctrination intends to leverage both the persistence effects of early life socialization through the use of compulsory education of children and broader channels like media, arts, and culture, which can help to maintain and reinforce the effects of education among adult citizens.

综上所述，我们建议将灌输定义为一种由政权主导的刻意社会化“理想型”公民的过程，这些公民支持既定政权（无论是民主政权还是专制政权）的价值观、原则和规范，因此自愿遵守政权要求并在危机时刻保持忠诚。作为一种由政权主导的社会化过程，灌输旨在利用早期社会化的持久效应，即通过对儿童进行义务教育，以及利用媒体、艺术和文化等更广泛的渠道，帮助维持和加强教育对成年公民的影响。

3. How Indoctrination Works and Its Dimensions

Following our definition of indoctrination introduced above, we next discuss the multidimensional nature of indoctrination and how it works in more detail. We adapt our approach from the philosophy of education (e.g., Woods and Barrow Reference Woods and Barrow2006, 74–75) and focus on the following dimensions: (1) the potential for indoctrination and (2) the (democratic and patriotic) content of indoctrination.

The first dimension relates to the necessary condition for regimes to have the potential or capabilities to shape citizens’ political attitudes and (public) behavior. We assume that political authorities need to take control over the structures and processes of the education system and the media to be able to indoctrinate. The main focus of this dimension is whether there is a potential for indoctrination to be successfully implemented. The second dimension of indoctrination then relates to the content that authorities try to indoctrinate, which can be democratic, authoritarian, and/or patriotic.

3. 灌输的运作方式及其维度

根据我们上面介绍的灌输定义，我们接下来将更详细地讨论灌输的多维性质及其运作方式。我们采用教育哲学的方法（例如，Woods and Barrow 参考 Woods and Barrow2006，74-75），重点关注以下维度：（1）灌输的潜力和（2）灌输的（民主和爱国）内容。

第一个维度涉及政权具有塑造公民政治态度和（公共）行为的潜力或能力的必要条件。我们假设政治当局需要控制教育系统和媒体的结构和流程才能进行灌输。这个维度的主要焦点是灌输是否有成功实施的潜力。 灌输的第二个维度与当局试图灌输的内容有关，这些内容可以是民主的、威权的和/或爱国的。

3.1. Indoctrination Potential

To conceptualize indoctrination potential, the first requirement is coherence of the regime’s doctrine (Linz Reference Linz 2000)—whether democratic or autocratic—and how it is transmitted via education and the media. We could imagine a regime where there is a very coherent single doctrine of political values and model citizenship that is known and promoted by all regime-led agents of socialization, such as schools and state-controlled media. To achieve such coherence, regimes need to centralize the education system (Ansell and Lindvall Reference Ansell and Lindvall 2013; Paglayan Reference Paglayan 2022a) and state control of the media. A centralized system is expected to produce a more coherent message, which leads to a higher potential to indoctrinate.

3.1. 灌输潜力

要概念化灌输潜力，首先需要政权教义的连贯性（Linz 参考文献 Linz 2000）——无论是民主的还是专制的——以及它如何通过教育和媒体传播。我们可以想象一个政权，它有一个非常连贯的政治价值观和模范公民身份的单一教义，所有政权主导的社会化机构，如学校和国家控制的媒体，都了解和推广这一教义。为了实现这种连贯性，政权需要集中教育系统（Ansell and Lindvall 参考文献 Ansell and Lindvall 2013；Paglayan 参考文献 Paglayan 2022a）和国家对媒体的控制。集中式系统有望产生更连贯的信息，从而提高灌输的潜力。

Furthermore, the potential for indoctrination and the ability to deliver a coherent message rests on the premise that values and practices are inculcated by instructional agents who are formally charged with this responsibility (Momanu Reference Momanu 2012). Control over these agents, such as the regime’s control over teachers and teaching practices inside the classroom, is key to bridging the gap between the regime’s intent to indoctrinate and the effectiveness of indoctrination (Paglayan Reference Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin 2022b, 13). We assume that the stricter control is, the stronger (and hence more effective) indoctrination will be.

此外，灌输的潜力和传递连贯信息的能力取决于这样一个前提，即价值观和实践是由正式负有这一责任的教学代理人灌输的 (Momanu 参考文献 Momanu 2012)。对这些代理人的控制，例如政权对教师和课堂内教学实践的控制，是弥合政权灌输意图与灌输有效性之间差距的关键 (Paglayan 参考文献 Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin 2022b, 13)。我们认为控制越严格，灌输就越强大（从而越有效）。

Centralization and standardization of education alone do not indicate the potential to shape children as future citizens. Here it is crucial to look at the degree of effort and time the school curriculum requires teachers to devote to teaching about the regime’s ideology. Thus, as the final dimension of indoctrination potential, we need to include the effort devoted to political education, assuming that emphasizing these topics in the curriculum is a direct attempt by the regime to teach its core political principles and norms.¹¹

仅靠教育的集中化和标准化并不能表明它具有将儿童塑造为未来公民的潜力。在这里，至关重要的是要看学校课程要求教师投入多少精力和时间来教授政权的意识形态。因此，作为灌输潜力的最后一个维度，我们需要包括政治教育方面的努力，假设在课程中强调这些主题是政权教授其核心政治原则和规范的直接尝试。¹¹

Our concept of indoctrination potential bears similarity to the understanding of nation building as a state-driven process of centralization (Wimmer Reference Wimmer 2018), standardization (Lipset and Rokkan Reference Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and the assertion of power over agents and producers of culture (Kyriazi and vom Hau Reference Kyriazi and vom Hau 2020). But unlike nation building, indoctrination has a stronger political, rather than cultural, focus. While the potential of a regime to indoctrinate is facilitated by some of the same state-related processes that enable nation building, we understand indoctrination to be a regime-led process that can be ongoing and occur well after the “age of nation building.”¹² Furthermore, while our understanding of the aims of indoctrination is closer to the more political process of state-building, which seeks to generate obedience and respect for a state’s laws (Paglayan Reference Paglayan, Jenkins and Rubin 2022b), we emphasize the regime-led nature of the indoctrination process, which aims to create loyalty and support for the regime via a set of rules for leadership selection and policy making (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz Reference Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). Regimes may try to leverage nation and state building to aid indoctrination, but the aim is to create support for the regime specifically.¹³

我们对灌输潜力的概念与对国家建设的理解相似，即国家建设是一个国家驱动的集权过程（Wimmer 2018 年）、标准化过程（Lipset 和 Rokkan 1967 年）以及对文化主体和生产者的权力主张过程（Kyriazi 和 vom Hau 2020 年）。但与国家建设不同的是，灌输更注重政治，而非文化。 虽然政权灌输思想的潜力是由一些与国家相关的进程推动的，这些进程与国家建设是相同的，但我们认为灌输思想是一个政权主导的过程，它可以持续进行，并在“国家建设时代”之后很久才会发生。¹² 此外，虽然我们对灌输思想的目的的理解更接近于国家建设的政治进程，后者旨在产生对国家法律的服从和尊重（Paglayan 参考 Paglayan、Jenkins 和 Rubin 2022b），但我们强调灌输思想过程的政权主导性质，其目的是通过一套领导层选拔和政策制定规则来为政权创造忠诚和支持（Geddes、Wright 和 Frantz 参考 Geddes、Wright 和 Frantz 2014）。政权可能会试图利用国家和国家建设来帮助灌输思想，但其目的是专门为政权创造支持。¹³

3.2. Indoctrination Content

The second dimension of indoctrination that we distinguish relates to its content. The question of what is indoctrinated is considerably more political than a regime’s indoctrination potential. More specifically, we distinguish two core elements of this dimension: (1) democratic (versus authoritarian) and (2) patriotic content.

First, the political character of indoctrination is closely linked to model citizenship, introduced above. Pluralism of opinions and critical thinking skills are often used to separate model citizens in democracies from autocracies (Gatchel Reference Gatchel 1959; Westheimer and Kahne Reference Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Our goal is therefore to create a unidimensional scale of indoctrination content ranging from democratic (participatory, critical, pluralist) to autocratic (loyal/obedient, uncritical, single view/ideology). To achieve this, we focus on two facets of indoctrination content: the regime’s ideology (what is taught at school) and the level of contestation (how it is taught). Our definition of ideology encompasses the core principles, values, and norms of a society that are used by the regime to legitimize its existence and actions.¹⁴ In this respect, liberal democracy can be classified as an ideology. The content of the “ideology” is thus a helpful indicator of differences in the content of indoctrination within democracies and autocratic regimes.

3.2. 灌输内容

我们区分的灌输的第二个维度与其内容有关。灌输什么的问题比政权的灌输潜力更具政治性。更具体地说，我们区分了这一维度的两个核心要素：（1）民主（与威权主义相对）和（2）爱国主义内容。

首先，灌输的政治性质与上文介绍的模范公民密切相关。意见多元化和批判性思维技能通常用于区分民主国家的模范公民和专制国家的模范公民（Gatchel 参考文献 Gatchel 1959；Westheimer and Kahne 参考文献 Westheimer and Kahne 2004）。因此，我们的目标是创建一个灌输内容的单维量表，范围从民主（参与性、批判性、多元化）到专制（忠诚/服从、不批判、单一观点/意识形态）。 为了实现这一点，我们关注灌输内容的两个方面：政权的意识形态（学校教授的内容）和争议程度（如何教授）。我们对意识形态的定义涵盖了政权用来使其存在和行动合法化的社会核心原则、价值观和规范。¹⁴在这方面，自由民主可以归类为一种意识形态。因此，“意识形态”的内容有助于表明民主国家和专制政权内部灌输内容的差异。

Another defining characteristic of indoctrination content is the level of contestation. The key difference in the use and definition of indoctrination within autocracies and democracies is the degree to which the “ideology” has to be unequivocally accepted by the population. We expect democracies to allow a higher degree of contestation. Indeed, citizens are encouraged to be critical, which is a key part of democratic accountability. The competition over ideas and best policies is explicitly democratic. Nevertheless, democracies also require an “unshakable commitment” to their core principles (Easton Reference Easton 1965). Unlike autocracies, however, democracies will base their indoctrination efforts on persuasion rather than inculcating their principles “beyond argument” and “beyond reasoning” like in authoritarian regimes (Woods and Barrow Reference Woods and Barrow 2006, 71). In autocracies, therefore, we expect contestation to be very limited and guided by a dominant message—for example, the mission to build a communist society. This is achieved through teaching citizens to accept the regime’s ideology uncritically and always to accept this “truth” regardless of evidence. Indoctrination in autocracies is expected to close alternatives through the promotion of a single view (Sears and Hughes Reference Sears and Hughes 2006) and the censoring of any evidence that can be used to construct alternative narratives.

灌输内容的另一个决定性特征是争议的程度。在独裁国家和民主国家中，灌输的使用和定义的主要区别在于“意识形态”必须在多大程度上被民众毫不含糊地接受。我们期望民主国家允许更高程度的争议。事实上，民主国家鼓励公民进行批判，这是民主问责的重要组成部分。关于思想和最佳政策的竞争显然是民主的。尽管如此，民主国家也要求对其核心原则“坚定不移”（Easton 参考文献 Easton 1965）。然而，与独裁国家不同的是，民主国家的灌输工作以说服为基础，而不是像威权政体那样“超越论证”和“超越推理”地灌输其原则（Woods and Barrow 参考文献 Woods and Barrow 2006, 71）。 因此，在独裁政权下，我们预计争论会非常有限，并受主流信息的引导——例如，建立共产主义社会的使命。这是通过教导公民不加批判地接受政权的意识形态并始终接受这种“真理”而实现的，无论证据如何。独裁政权的灌输预计会通过推广单一观点（Sears and Hughes 参考 Sears and Hughes 2006）和审查任何可用于构建替代叙述的证据来封锁替代方案。

The second element of indoctrination content that we focus on relates to patriotism. By encouraging citizens to identify with the wider political community, both democratic and autocratic regimes hope to benefit by generating loyal, self-sacrificing citizens who might even refrain from criticizing the regime (Koesel Reference Koesel, Koesel, Bunce and Weiss 2020; Norris Reference Norris 2011; Sardoč Reference Sardoč 2020). By emphasizing identification with a politically defined community, patriotism is particularly useful as it avoids the negative connotations of ethnocultural nationalism and the risks of alienating minorities (Shevel Reference Shevel 2011), and it allows for greater choice of generally appealing political symbols (Seixas Reference Seixas and Balfour 2005).¹⁵

我们关注的灌输内容的第二个要素与爱国主义有关。通过鼓励公民认同更广泛的政治共同体，民主和专制政权都希望从中受益，从而产生忠诚、自我牺牲的公民，这些公民甚至可能避免批评政权（Koesel 参考文献 Koesel, Koesel, Bunce and Weiss 2020；Norris 参考文献 Norris 2011；Sardoč 参考文献 Sardoč 2020）。通过强调对政治定义的社区的认同，爱国主义尤其有用，因为它避免了民族文化民族主义的负面含义和疏远少数群体的风险（Shevel 参考文献 Shevel 2011），并且它允许更多地选择普遍有吸引力的政治符号（Seixas 参考文献 Seixas and Balfour 2005）。¹⁵ 

Furthermore, in being defined by both political principles and symbols, such as loyalty to the constitution (Seixas Reference Seixas and Balfour 2005), the boundaries between the regime and the wider political community as objects of loyalty can easily be blurred (Kodelja Reference Kodelja and Sardoč 2020), which means that criticism of the incumbent regime can be conveniently labeled as unpatriotic. The use of patriotic education and political communication to limit political dissent is extensively evidenced in autocracies like Russia and China (Zhao Reference Zhao 1998). However, the promotion of uncritical forms of patriotism is by no means exclusive to more authoritarian regimes. Particularly in the context of perceived threats, such as terrorist attacks (Curren and Dorn Reference Curren and Dorn 2018, 130; Westheimer Reference Westheimer and Ross 2014) or immigration (De Vries Reference De Vries 2018), contemporary democracies display a growing emphasis on patriotism in political discourse and education (Wilson Reference Wilson 2015). It is therefore not surprising that the compatibility of patriotism with liberal democracy is hotly debated (Sardoč Reference Sardoč 2020, 105; Soutphommasane Reference Soutphommasane 2012).

To conclude, the methods of promoting patriotism through rituals and symbols that create a sense of belonging and loyalty are common across regime types. But at the same time, it is unclear whether the promotion of patriotic symbols indicates a shift away from more liberal understandings of patriotism toward more autocratic or nationalistic values. For this reason, we measure patriotic and democratic content separately. We leave this debate open as an empirical question, which our data will be able to explore.

此外，由于既要以政治原则和象征来定义政权，例如忠于宪法 (Seixas and Balfour 2005)，政权与作为忠诚对象的更广泛的政治共同体之间的界限很容易变得模糊 (Kodelja and Sardoč 2020)，这意味着对现任政权的批评很容易被贴上不爱国的标签。在俄罗斯和中国等独裁国家，爱国主义教育和政治交流被用来限制政治异议的情况非常普遍 (Zhao 1998)。然而，提倡不加批判的爱国主义形式绝非专制政权所独有。 特别是在感知到威胁的背景下，例如恐怖袭击（Curren and Dorn 参考文献 Curren and Dorn 2018, 130; Westheimer 参考文献 Westheimer and Ross 2014）或移民（De Vries 参考文献 De Vries 2018），当代民主国家在政治话语和教育中越来越强调爱国主义（Wilson 参考文献 Wilson 2015）。因此，爱国主义与自由民主的兼容性受到热烈争论也就不足为奇了（Sardoč 参考文献 Sardoč 2020, 105; Soutphommasane 参考文献 Soutphommasane 2012）。

总之，通过仪式和符号来促进爱国主义的方法在各种政权类型中都很常见，这些仪式和符号可以创造一种归属感和忠诚感。但与此同时，尚不清楚爱国符号的推广是否表明从更自由的爱国主义理解转向更专制或民族主义的价值观。 因此，我们分别测量爱国主义和民主主义的内容。我们将这一争论留作一个实证问题，以便我们的数据能够进行探索。

4. Measuring Varieties of Indoctrination

In this section, we introduce our novel dataset measuring Varieties of Indoctrination (V-Indoc) (Neundorf et al., Reference Neundorf, Nazrullaeva, Northmore-Ball, Tertytchnaya, Kim, Benavot, Bromley, Knutsen, Lutscher, Marquardt, Paglayan, Pemstein, Seim and Rydén 2023a), which offers unmatched coverage and can facilitate cross-national and cross-temporal studies on the causes and consequences of indoctrination around the world. We first build on our conceptualization of indoctrination to identify 21 indicators of indoctrination in education,¹⁶ which can be aggregated into composite indices that measure the abstract concepts of indoctrination potential and content.¹⁷ These indicators and indices provide novel and detailed insight into aspects of indoctrination in education that are not captured by any other existing dataset on a similar scale.

4. 测量灌输的种类

在本节中，我们介绍了测量灌输种类 (V-Indoc) 的新数据集 (Neundorf 等人，参考 Neundorf、Nazrullaeva、Northmore-Ball、Tertytchnaya、Kim、Benavot、Bromley、Knutsen、Lutscher、Marquardt、Paglayan、Pemstein、Seim 和 Rydén 2023a)，该数据集提供了无与伦比的覆盖范围，可以促进跨国和跨时间研究世界各地灌输的原因和后果。 我们首先在灌输概念的基础上，确定了 21 项教育灌输指标¹⁶，这些指标可以汇总为衡量灌输潜力和内容抽象概念的综合指数。¹⁷  这些指标和指数为教育灌输的各个方面提供了新颖而详细的见解，而现有的任何其他数据集都无法以类似的规模捕捉到这些见解。

We also present six indicators of indoctrination in the media. These are less sweeping than our education indicators, given that existing datasets already and quite comprehensively cover numerous topics related to the state’s control over the media (e.g., Coppedge et al. Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Alizada and Altman 2022; Mechkova et al. Reference Mechkova, Pemstein, Seim and Wilson 2021). Instead of constructing indicators that contain overlapping information with such datasets, we design our media indicators so that they can be completed by or supplemented with existing indicators to produce more complete measures of indoctrination in the media. In particular, and as we discuss, it may be particularly fruitful and straightforward to combine our data with V-Dem data because both datasets are constructed and formatted in the same manner.

我们还提出了六项媒体灌输指标。这些指标不如我们的教育指标那么全面，因为现有的数据集已经相当全面地涵盖了与国家控制媒体相关的众多主题（例如，Coppedge 等人参考 Coppedge、Gerring、Knutsen、Lindberg、Teorell、Alizada 和 Altman 2022；Mechkova 等人参考 Mechkova、Pemstein、Seim 和 Wilson 2021）。我们设计媒体指标时，不是构建包含与此类数据集重叠信息的指标，而是设计它们，以便可以通过现有指标完成或补充现有指标，以产生更完整的媒体灌输指标。特别是，正如我们所讨论的，将我们的数据与 V-Dem 数据相结合可能特别富有成效和直接，因为这两个数据集的构造和格式相同。

We choose to focus on education and the media with the assumption that these two channels are most comparable across time and space—unlike other channels of indoctrination (e.g., mass organizations, the workplace, or the military), which vary considerably between countries. Given that all countries have always had education and media systems, this allows us to create indicators that are applicable across the world and back in time. 

我们选择关注教育和媒体，因为我们认为这两个渠道在时间和空间上最具有可比性——这与其他灌输渠道（例如群众组织、工作场所或军队）不同，这些渠道在各个国家之间存在很大差异。鉴于所有国家都一直拥有教育和媒体系统，这使我们能够创建适用于世界各地和各个时代的指标。

4.1. From Abstract Concepts to Measured Indicators

Our key concepts of indoctrination are (1) indoctrination potential, (2) democratic content, and (3) patriotic content. Each of these concepts and their subcomponents, introduced above, are measured using multi-item indices. Below, we explain the indicators that comprise each index as measured for education and the media. Many of our indicators reflect measures in existing scholarship and cross-national datasets, which can in turn be used to validate our indicators (see section 5.2). See figures 2 and 3 for a visualization of the indices and accompanying indicators. All indicators are based on expert survey questions with most indicators having an ordinal four-point scale. For empirical analysis, these indicators can be used on their own or as part of higher-level indices. 

4.1. 从抽象概念到衡量指标

我们的灌输核心概念是 (1) 灌输潜力、(2) 民主内容和 (3) 爱国内容。上面介绍的每个概念及其子成分都使用多项指数进行衡量。下面，我们将解释教育和媒体衡量的每个指数的指标。我们的许多指标反映了现有学术和跨国数据集中的衡量标准，这些标准反过来又可用于验证我们的指标（见第 5.2 节）。有关指标和随附指标的可视化，请参见图 2 和图 3。所有指标均基于专家调查问题，大多数指标具有四点序数量表。对于实证分析，这些指标可以单独使用，也可以作为更高级别指标的一部分使用。

Indoctrination in education :

⬇

i. Content:    ii. Potential:

⬇                               ⬇ 

i. Democratic¹→  i. Coherence³:➡

ii. Patriotic²⇒        ii. Pol.                                                      education                                              efforts⁴   

➡i³a.Centralization⁵

➡i³b.Control over agents⁶

→i¹ Ideology:

Ideol. character:                        democratic. 

Contestation: 

Critical discussion in classroom. Pluralism in history curriculum.    Political rights.

ii²⇒Patriotism in the curriculum. Celebration of patriotic symbols.

i³a⁵ ⇒ Centralized curriculum. Centralized text- book approval.

i³b⁶ ⇒ Teacher autonomy in classroom. Independent teacher unions.          Political teacher hiring.                    Political teacher firing.  

ii⁴⇒Civics in primary curriculum

Civics in secondary curriculum.

Dominant ideology in

history curriculum.

Figure 2 Mapping Our Concepts: Indoctrination in Education

Note: The rounded boxes indicate V-Indoc indices, and plain boxes indicate measured variables (V-Indoc indicators). See figure E-7 in appendix E for more details (i.e., with labels for the V-Indoc indices and indicators added).

Indoctrination in the Media: 

i. Content → Democratic → Contestation: V-Dem Media critical.

i. Content → Patriotic → Patriotism in the media.

ii. Potential → Coherence → iii. Centralization → State-influence on coverage of state owned outlets V-Dem Government censorship effort V-Dem Print / broadcast media perspectives.

Coherence → iv. Control over agents → State-owned print broadcast media outlets, Control of entertainment content, V-Dem Harassment of journalists V-Dem Media self-censorship.

Figure 3 Mapping Our Concepts: Indoctrination in the Media

Note: The rounded boxes indicate V-Indoc indices and the plain boxes indicate variables (V-Indoc indicators). We do not have indices of the media content (the boxes are grayed out). The democratic and patriotic content are measured as separate indicators. The index of indoctrination potential in the media is equivalent to the index of coherence (the box with potential is grayed out). For the index of indoctrination coherence, we combine the existing V-Dem indicators (highlighted in italics) with the novel V-Indoc indicators. See figure E-8 in appendix E for more details (i.e., with labels for the V-Indoc indices and indicators added).

In education, some of our indicators pertain to the official school curriculum. Conceptually, they are located between the de jure legislation phase of indoctrination and the de facto implementation stage (see figure 1). To capture the tension between the legislation and implementation phases, where possible, we explicitly instructed experts to prioritize de facto practices in their answers. For example, the indicators related to civics in the curriculum explicitly asked experts not to focus on the de jure subject labels but rather on the de facto subject content. The two indicators closest to the de jure phase are the indicators of centralized curriculum and textbook approval.

在教育领域，我们的一些指标与官方学校课程有关。从概念上讲，它们位于灌输的法律立法阶段和事实上的实施阶段之间（见图1）。为了尽可能捕捉立法和实施阶段之间的紧张关系，我们明确指示专家在回答中优先考虑事实上的做法。例如，与课程中的公民教育相关的指标明确要求专家不要关注法律上的科目标签，而是关注事实上的科目内容。最接近法律阶段的两个指标是集中课程和教科书审批的指标。

4.1.1. Indoctrination through Education

We measure indoctrination potential in education as a higher-level index that is composed of two indices: indoctrination coherence and political education efforts. The indoctrination coherence index is composed of two subindices. First, the control over agents index measures the extent of state control over teachers and is based on several indicators highlighted in the literature: (1) the existence of teacher unions independent from the state, (2) teacher autonomy and teachers’ ability to deviate from the curriculum inside the classroom, and indicators of the likelihood that teachers may be (3) hired or (4) fired for political reasons. Second, the centralization index¹⁸ includes the degree to which (1) the curriculum in schools is centralized at the national level, and (2) the degree of centralized textbook approval.

4.1.1. 通过教育进行灌输

我们将教育中的灌输潜力作为一个高级指数来衡量，该指数由两个指数组成：灌输连贯性和政治教育力度。灌输连贯性指数由两个子指数组成。首先，对代理人的控制指数衡量国家对教师的控制程度，该指数基于文献中强调的几个指标：（1）独立于国家的教师工会的存在，（2）教师自主权和教师在课堂内偏离课程的能力，以及教师可能因政治原因被（3）聘用或（4）解雇的可能性指标。其次，集中化指数¹⁸包括（1）学校课程在国家层面的集中程度，以及（2）教科书的集中审批程度。

We also create an index for the political education effort, which combines three indicators: whether there is a mandatory class on political education (predominantly focused on teaching political values) in the curriculum at the (1) primary and (2) secondary levels, and (3) whether there is a dominant ideology promoted through the history curriculum.¹⁹ Unlike Del Río, Knutsen, and Lutscher who collect data on (de jure) mandatory standalone civic-related courses, we leverage education experts’ knowledge of school subjects beyond subject labels in the official curriculum. We follow Galston and explicitly assume that “all education [can be] civic education.”²⁰ 

我们还为政治教育工作创建了一个指数，该指数结合了三个指标：（1）小学和（2）中学的课程中是否有必修的政治教育课（主要侧重于教授政治价值观），以及（3）历史课程中是否推广了主导意识形态。¹⁹ 与 Del Río、Knutsen 和 Lutscher 收集（法律上的）必修独立公民相关课程数据不同，我们利用教育专家对官方课程中学科标签以外的学校学科的了解。我们遵循 Galston 的观点，明确假设“所有教育都可以是公民教育”。²⁰ 

We construct the democratic content index using four indicators that assess the extent to which democratic values are emphasized in the official curriculum. V-Indoc contains one indicator of the regime’s ideology and three proxy indicators for the level of contestation. Conditional on the existence of the dominant societal model or ideology promoted in the history curriculum, we firstly are interested in the ideology of the regime. We use the following classification of ideologies,²¹ which include (1) nationalism, (2) socialism or communism, (3) restorative or conservative ideology, (4) personality cult, (5) religious ideology, (6) ideology related to ethnicity, (7) clan or tribe, as well as (8) democratic ideology based on teaching democratic norms (liberalism, pluralism) and/or (9) emphasizing democratic institutions (e.g., elections).²² The regime’s ideological character is then recoded into a binary variable that indicates whether democratic norms or institutions (8, 9) are the principal ideologies that are promoted.²³

我们用四项指标构建了民主内容指数，以评估官方课程对民主价值观的强调程度。V-Indoc 包含一项政权意识形态指标和三项代表争议程度的代理指标。在历史课程中提倡的主导社会模式或意识形态存在的条件下，我们首先对政权的意识形态感兴趣。 我们对意识形态采用以下分类²¹，包括（1）民族主义，（2）社会主义或共产主义，（3）恢复性或保守性意识形态，（4）个人崇拜，（5）宗教意识形态，（6）与民族相关的意识形态，（7）氏族或部落，以及（8）基于教授民主规范（自由主义、多元主义）和/或（9）强调民主制度（例如选举）的民主意识形态²²。然后将政权的意识形态特征重新编码为二元变量，该变量表明民主规范或制度（8、9）是否是所推崇的主要意识形态²³

Second, the indicator measuring critical discussion in the classroom probes the level of contestation that is promoted in school education. This indicator measures the extent to which students have opportunities to discuss what they are taught in history classes. We model it after similar questions from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study survey (hereafter ICCS; IEA 2018, 36–39) and the Teaching and Learning International Survey (hereafter TALIS; OECD 2018, 23) on how often tasks assigned by teachers require critical and independent thinking, which is part of learner-centered pedagogy in education for democracy. The remaining two indicators are related to contestation indirectly and focus on the curriculum. The pluralism indicator evaluates the extent to which students are exposed to diverse views and/or interpretations of historical events.²⁴ Lastly, the political rights and duties indicator measures whether subjects that teach political values cover topics related to individual political rights and duties.²⁵ If democracy is a dominant societal model, this indicator should capture the extent to which the principles of democracy are promoted in the curriculum. We consider these two indicators as necessary conditions for critical discussion in the classroom.

其次，衡量课堂批判性讨论的指标探究了学校教育中提倡的争论水平。该指标衡量学生在多大程度上有机会讨论他们在历史课上所学的内容。我们仿照国际公民和公民教育研究调查（以下简称 ICCS；IEA 2018，第 36-39 页）和国际教学与学习调查（以下简称 TALIS；OECD 2018，第 23 页）中的类似问题，研究教师分配的任务需要批判性和独立思考的频率，这是民主教育中以学习者为中心的教学法的一部分。其余两个指标与争论间接相关，并侧重于课程。 多元化指标评估学生接触历史事件的不同观点和/或解释的程度。²⁴ 最后，政治权利和义务指标衡量教授政治价值观的科目是否涵盖与个人政治权利和义务相关的主题。²⁵ 如果民主是一种占主导地位的社会模式，那么这一指标应该反映民主原则在课程中的推广程度。我们认为这两个指标是课堂上进行批判性讨论的必要条件。

The patriotic content index is composed of two indicators that measure the extent to which patriotism is inherent in education: (1) patriotic education in language studies (for example, specific narratives can celebrate the country’s military past, national origin stories, or accomplishments in the economic or technological sector);²⁶ and (2) whether patriotic symbols, such as flags or portraits of leaders, are displayed and celebrated through flag-raising ceremonies or singing the national anthem. We focus on patriotic symbols as these represent the norms and principles of a country, and serve as a means for members of a common community to identify themselves. We measure patriotism as a separate dimension to democratic content as in many contexts patriotism can be promoted alongside either democratic or autocratic values.²⁷

爱国主义内容指数由两个指标组成，用于衡量爱国主义在教育中的固有程度：（1）语言研究中的爱国主义教育（例如，特定的叙述可以颂扬该国的军事历史、民族起源故事或经济或技术领域的成就）；²⁶ 和（2）是否通过升旗仪式或唱国歌展示和庆祝爱国象征，如国旗或领导人肖像。我们关注爱国象征，因为它们代表了一个国家的规范和原则，并作为一个共同体成员自我认同的一种方式。我们将爱国主义作为民主内容的一个独立维度来衡量，因为在许多情况下，爱国主义可以与民主或专制价值观一起得到推广。²⁷

4.1.2. Indoctrination through the Media

Figure 3 presents a visualization of the media indices and indicators, which focus on the state’s intention to indoctrinate via print and broadcast media.²⁸ In our approach, we follow Djankov and colleagues and focus on state ownership of the media and state influence over state and nonstate media as the intentions of the state regarding control of the media’s content.²⁹

4.1.2. 通过媒体灌输思想

图 3 展示了媒体指数和指标的可视化，重点关注国家通过印刷和广播媒体灌输思想的意图。²⁸ 在我们的方法中，我们遵循 Djankov 及其同事的观点，重点关注国家对媒体的所有权以及国家对国家和非国家媒体的影响，这是国家控制媒体内容的意图。²⁹ 

The indoctrination potential index in the media is equivalent to the indoctrination coherence index, which consists of the centralization and control over agents subindices in the media. These subindices are supplemented with additional indicators from V-Dem data. The former index captures the ability of the state to influence the coverage of political issues by state and nonstate media outlets, and also includes V-Dem’s indicators of government censorship and diversity of media perspectives. The latter index is made up of indicators that measure the degree of state ownership of print and broadcast media,³⁰ the state’s control over the production of entertainment content,³¹ and two V-Dem indicators that measure the harassment of journalists by the state and media self-censorship.

媒体的灌输潜力指数相当于灌输连贯性指数，后者由媒体的集中化和对代理人的控制子指数组成。这些子指数补充了来自 V-Dem 数据的其他指标。前者指数反映了国家影响国家和非国家媒体对政治问题报道的能力，还包括 V-Dem 的政府审查和媒体观点多样性指标。后一个指数由衡量国家对印刷和广播媒体所有权程度的指标、国家对娱乐内容制作的控制³¹和两个衡量国家对记者的骚扰和媒体自我审查的 V-Dem 指标组成。

We do not have an index that is comparable to the political education effort index in education. The values and ideologies portrayed in the media can be much more heterogeneous than those taught through education, and thus it would be highly demanding to expect education experts to consistently and accurately code indicators related to the substantive nature of diverse media landscapes. For similar reasons, our measures of indoctrination content in the media are limited. We have one indicator for patriotic content in the media, which measures the promotion of patriotic narratives in media outlets.³² While we do not have indicators of democratic content in the media, the V-Dem data contains indicators that can act as a proxy for democratic content such as whether major print and broadcast outlets routinely criticize the government (print/broadcast media critical).

我们没有一个与教育领域的政治教育努力指数相当的指数。媒体所描绘的价值观和意识形态可能比教育中传授的价值观和意识形态更加多样化，因此，期望教育专家能够始终如一地准确地编码与不同媒体环境的实质性相关的指标将是一项艰巨的任务。出于类似的原因，我们对媒体灌输内容的衡量标准有限。我们有一个媒体爱国内容指标，用于衡量媒体对爱国叙事的宣传。³² 虽然我们没有媒体民主内容的指标，但 V-Dem 数据包含可以作为民主内容代理的指标，例如主要印刷和广播媒体是否经常批评政府（印刷/广播媒体批评）。

4.2. Expert Surveys

Our dimensions of indoctrination are latent concepts that cannot be directly observed or measured, but they can be estimated by identifying and drawing on the information contained in observable indicators that reflect these underlying concepts. While factual data (e.g., education statistics) typically capture various outputs related to indoctrination, our focus is instead on measuring the regime’s intentions to indoctrinate (see the earlier discussion of figure 1 in section 2). Primary sources (e.g., official documents) can offer pertinent data on policies related to our concepts, but gathering such data for a global sample of countries over an extended period would be highly resource intensive and perhaps even infeasible, especially for older periods. More problematically, information on de jure policies can often fail to sufficiently or accurately capture de facto practices and behaviors, and thus measures based on the former may share weaker causal links with outcomes related to indoctrination. It may be possible to overcome such limitations by collecting and hand-coding archival records of actual indoctrination practices, but data availability and resource demands would likely constrain such an endeavor to a small subset of countries.

4.2.  专家调查

我们的灌输维度是无法直接观察或测量的潜在概念，但可以通过识别和利用反映这些潜在概念的可观察指标中包含的信息来估计。虽然事实数据（例如教育统计数据）通常会捕捉与灌输相关的各种产出，但我们的重点是衡量政权灌输的意图（参见第 2 节中图 1 的先前讨论）。主要来源（例如官方文件）可以提供与我们的概念相关的政策的相关数据，但在较长时期内为全球样本国家收集此类数据将耗费大量资源，甚至可能不可行，尤其是对于较早的时期。更成问题的是，有关法定政策的信息往往无法充分或准确地捕捉事实上的实践和行为，因此基于前者的措施可能与灌输相关的结果具有较弱的因果关系。 也许可以通过收集和手工编码实际灌输实践的档案记录来克服这些限制，但数据可用性和资源需求可能会将这种努力限制在一小部分国家。

On the other hand, expert surveys offer a viable alternative for developing measures of indoctrination that can be both accurate—and thus useful for testing theoretical propositions—and comprehensive in coverage. Experts can draw on their in-depth knowledge and evaluative judgment of the topics at hand to offer guided insight into our difficult-to-measure concepts³³ and generate data that can be used to construct novel measures of indoctrination practices around the world.

另一方面，专家调查为制定灌输措施提供了一种可行的替代方案，既准确（因此可用于测试理论命题），又覆盖面广。专家可以利用他们对当前主题的深入知识和评估判断，为我们难以衡量的概念提供指导性见解³³，并生成可用于构建全球灌输实践新措施的数据。

To achieve the highest possible quality of expert coding, we collaborated with the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg to take advantage of the institute’s established data-gathering and methodology infrastructure. After conducting two pilot surveys and several rounds of revisions of the expert survey questions, we reached out to 24,000 education experts from around the world in 2021.³⁴ More than 1,400 experts expressed interest in participating in the final survey. We then carried out an expert vetting process and fielded the final survey from January to May 2022. Appendix C provides a more detailed discussion of the pilot surveys, the expert vetting process, and the ethical considerations of this study. In the survey, experts were asked to respond to 27 questions related to our indicators through a set of ordinal responses, providing ratings for their country of expertise for every year between 1945 ³⁵ and 2021.³⁶

为了实现专家编码的最高质量，我们与哥德堡大学的民主多样性 (V-Dem) 研究所合作，利用该研究所现有的数据收集和方法基础设施。在进行了两次试点调查并对专家调查问题进行了多轮修订后，我们在 2021 年联系了来自世界各地的 24,000 名教育专家。³⁴ 超过 1,400 名专家表示有兴趣参与最终调查。然后，我们进行了专家审查流程，并于 2022 年 1 月至 5 月进行了最终调查。附录 C 更详细地讨论了试点调查、专家审查流程以及本研究的伦理考虑。在调查中，专家们被要求通过一组序数响应回答与我们的指标相关的 27 个问题，为他们在 1945 ³⁵ 至 2021 年期间每年的专业国家提供评级。³⁶ 

760 vetted experts completed the survey and provided responses that cover 160 countries. As figure 4 indicates, we have at least three unique coders for many countries across all regions of the world, though coverage is relatively more sparse for Africa and the Middle East. The median number of coders per country-year is five, with a minimum of one coder (e.g., for Angola, Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Gambia, etc.) and a maximum of 20 coders (Brazil, the United States). While democracies tend to have a greater number of coders than autocracies, many autocracies nonetheless draw on multiple coder responses (e.g., the mean number of coders for democracies and autocracies in 2021 is 6.58 and 4.83, respectively).³⁷

760 名经过审查的专家完成了调查，并提供了涵盖 160 个国家的答复。如图 4 所示，我们在世界所有地区的许多国家都至少有三名独特的编码员，但对非洲和中东的覆盖范围相对较小。每个国家/地区的编码员中位数为 5，最少有一名编码员（例如，安哥拉、布基纳法索、玻利维亚、冈比亚等），最多有 20 名编码员（巴西、美国）。虽然民主国家往往比专制国家拥有更多的编码员，但许多专制国家仍然依靠多名编码员的回答（例如，2021 年民主国家和专制国家的平均编码员人数分别为 6.58 和 4.83）。³⁷ 

Figure 4 Number of Unique Coders by Country.

Note: The number of coders may vary across indicators within a country as some experts may not have had the expertise to code all indicators for all years.

In addition, figure 5 plots over-time variation in the number of coders for one education indicator and one media indicator.³⁸ When limiting the sample to countries with at least three expert coders, our data covers around 120 countries for the most recent years, which represents over 60% of countries worldwide. Our full sample (i.e., including countries with fewer than three coders) covers about 90% of countries. The remaining countries that are not covered in our data are predominantly small states with fewer than one million inhabitants. These countries were however not targeted in the expert recruitment process.

此外，图 5 还绘制了一项教育指标和一项媒体指标的编码员数量随时间的变化。³⁸ 当将样本限制为至少有三名专家编码员的国家时，我们的数据涵盖了最近几年的约 120 个国家，占全球 60% 以上。我们的全部样本（即包括编码员少于三名的国家）涵盖了约 90% 的国家。我们数据中未涵盖的其余国家主要是人口不到一百万的小国。然而，这些国家并不是专家招募过程中的目标。

Figure 5 Percentage and Number of Countries Covered in the V-Indoc Dataset

Note: The percentage of countries relative to the total number of countries in the V-Dem dataset (left axis; solid lines) and the number of countries (right axis; dotted lines) are based on two indicators in the V-Indoc dataset: (1) education (the centralization of the school curriculum) and (2) media (state-owned print media).

Because the expert survey relies on human judgment, some responses may reflect coder bias. Coders may also draw on cognitive heuristics when responding to questions.³⁹ To mitigate these concerns, we follow the V-Dem project by designing very specific items that should be less prone to general bias and using ordinal response scales with specific definitions for each category; different categories are aimed to serve as distinct “benchmarks” to reduce ambiguity. While some bias may nonetheless be present in coder responses, V-Dem’s measurement model adjusts for variations in both expert scale perceptions and reliability when constructing estimates to further address such issues.

由于专家调查依赖于人类判断，因此一些回答可能反映出编码员的偏见。编码员在回答问题时也可能利用认知启发法。³⁹ 为了缓解这些担忧，我们遵循 V-Dem 项目，设计出不易出现普遍偏见的非常具体的项目，并使用对每个类别都有具体定义的序数反应量表；不同的类别旨在作为不同的“基准”以减少歧义。尽管编码员的回答中可能存在一些偏见，但 V-Dem 的测量模型在构建估计值以进一步解决这些问题时会根据专家量表感知和可靠性的变化进行调整。 

4.3. Measurement Model

We use V-Dem’s Bayesian item response theory measurement model to convert the expert-coded ordinal responses into a country-year format for each of our indicators. More specifically, these ordinal responses are regarded as subjective ratings of latent (i.e., not directly observable or measurable) concepts of indoctrination, which are mapped to a single continuous variable by the measurement model. When constructing estimates of these variables, the measurement model accounts for cross-coder divergences (i.e., differences across coder responses), disparate coder thresholds (i.e., different interpretations of responses), coder reliability (i.e., systematic or nonsystematic coder mistakes), and coder confidence ratings (i.e., coder confidence in their responses may vary across questions or years). This further reduces potential sources of bias that may be inherent in individual coder responses and strengthens the cross-national comparability of the estimates.⁴⁰

The measurement model then aggregates the indicators to construct our indices of indoctrination. The aggregation method for the indices depends on the number of indicators that comprise each index: indices that have more than two components (e.g., the indoctrination potential and democratic content indices in education) are aggregated using Bayesian factor analysis, while those that have two components are aggregated via averaging.

4.3. 测量模型

我们使用 V-Dem 的贝叶斯项目反应理论测量模型将专家编码的序数反应转换为每个指标的国家-年份格式。更具体地说，这些序数反应被视为对潜在（即不可直接观察或测量）灌输概念的主观评级，这些评级由测量模型映射到单个连续变量。在构建这些变量的估计值时，测量模型考虑了跨编码者差异（即编码者反应之间的差异）、不同的编码者阈值（即对反应的不同解释）、编码者可靠性（即系统性或非系统性编码者错误）和编码者信心评级（即编码者对其反应的信心可能因问题或年份而异）。 这进一步减少了可能存在于个体编码员反应中的潜在偏见来源，并增强了估计值的跨国可比性。⁴⁰

然后，测量模型汇总指标以构建我们的灌输指数。指数的汇总方法取决于组成每个指数的指标数量：具有两个以上成分的指数（例如，教育中的灌输潜力和民主内容指数）使用贝叶斯因子分析进行汇总，而具有两个成分的指数则通过平均进行汇总。

In sum, the measurement model generates posterior distributions that represent the range of probable values for each country-year estimate of the indicators and indices. The medians of these distributions can be treated as point estimates and will typically be the variable of choice for quantitative analysis. The dataset also provides the lower and upper bounds of the 68% credible interval, which captures the interval in which the measurement model places 68% of the probability mass for each estimate. The interval generally approximates bounds that extend one standard deviation from the median and reflects measurement uncertainty—narrower (wider) credible intervals are associated with greater (lower) certainty about our estimates.⁴¹ As a general rule of thumb, one can be reasonably confident that the difference between two point estimates is not due to measurement error if their respective 68% credible intervals do not overlap. In addition, the dataset also presents information about the number of coder responses used to construct each country-year observation for our indicators and indices.⁴² Estimates that draw on one or two coder responses could be less reliable or more susceptible to coding errors. As such, and in general, we suggest using observations that are coded by at least three experts to achieve higher confidence in the results or checking that results remain robust when dropping observations with fewer than three coders.

总之，测量模型生成后验分布，表示每个国家/年份估计的指标和指数的可能值范围。这些分布的中位数可以视为点估计，通常是定量分析的首选变量。数据集还提供了 68% 可信区间的下限和上限，该区间捕获了测量模型为每个估计值放置 68% 概率质量的区间。该区间通常近似于从中位数延伸一个标准差的界限，并反映测量不确定性——较窄（较宽）的可信区间与我们的估计值更大（较低）的确定性相关。⁴¹ 作为一般经验法则，如果两个点估计值各自的 68% 可信区间不重叠，则可以相当有信心，它们之间的差异不是由于测量误差造成的。 此外，该数据集还提供了用于构建我们指标和指数的每个国家/年份观察值的编码员回答数量的信息。⁴² 根据一两个编码员回答得出的估计值可能不太可靠或更容易出现编码错误。因此，一般来说，我们建议使用至少由三位专家编码的观察值，以获得更高的结果可信度，或者检查在删除少于三名编码员的观察值时结果是否仍然可靠。

5. Data Validation

The V-Indoc dataset offers the most expansive measures of indoctrination to date as it covers 160 countries from 1945 to 2021 for a total of 10,923 country-year observations.⁴³ In this section, we explore and validate our measures using tests of face, convergent, and construct validity. 

5. 数据验证

V-Indoc 数据集提供了迄今为止最广泛的灌输指标，因为它涵盖了 1945 年至 2021 年的 160 个国家/地区，总共 10,923 个国家/年份的观察结果。⁴³ 在本节中，我们使用表面效度、收敛效度和结构效度测试来探索和验证我们的指标。

5.1. Face Validity

We first investigate the face validity of our measures by demonstrating that they conform to existing expectations about levels of indoctrination around the world. To this end, we examine the cross-national and cross-temporal variation in our three main indices of indoctrination in education—that is, indoctrination potential, democratic content, and patriotic content. For space reasons, we focus on education in this section. Corresponding plots for the indoctrination potential index in the media are presented in appendix G.⁴⁴

5.1. 表面效度

我们首先通过证明我们的措施符合对世界各地灌输水平的现有预期来调查其表面效度。为此，我们研究了教育灌输的三个主要指标（即灌输潜力、民主内容和爱国内容）的跨国和跨时间变化。由于篇幅原因，我们在本节中重点关注教育。媒体灌输潜力指数的相应图表见附录 G。⁴⁴

5.1.1. Cross-National Variation

Figure 6 shows cross-country scores for the indoctrination potential index in 2021, which range from 0 (low potential) to 1 (high potential). The patterns are consistent with expectations, as more authoritarian countries—notably North Korea (0.932) and China (0.866)—generally possess a higher potential for indoctrination (see figure 7). Furthermore, figure 8 plots levels of democratic and patriotic indoctrination content in 2021. As expected, consolidated democracies generally possess higher levels of democratic indoctrination content and lower levels of patriotic content than other types of regimes. As seen in figure 9, and unsurprisingly, the indoctrination content in North Korea is the least democratic (0.031) and the most patriotic (0.96). China’s indoctrination content is also less democratic (0.295) and more patriotic (0.824) than that of many countries.

5.1.1. 跨国差异

图 6 显示了 2021 年灌输潜力指数的跨国得分，范围从 0（低潜力）到 1（高潜力）。这种模式与预期一致，因为更专制的国家——尤其是朝鲜（0.932）和中国（0.866）——通常具有更高的灌输潜力（见图 7）。此外，图 8 绘制了 2021 年民主和爱国灌输内容的水平。正如预期的那样，与其他类型的政权相比，巩固的民主国家通常具有更高的民主灌输内容水平和更低的爱国内容水平。如图 9 所示，不出所料，朝鲜的灌输内容民主程度最低（0.031），爱国程度最高（0.96）。 中国的灌输内容与许多国家相比，民主程度较低（0.295），爱国主义程度较高（0.824）。

The association between levels of democracy and our indoctrination indices can be observed more systematically in figure 10, which shows the distributions of V-Dem’s liberal democracy index and our three main education indices, along with pairwise correlations and scatterplots. In accordance with the maps, these plots indicate that democratic countries are more likely to score higher on the democratic content index and lower on the indoctrination potential and patriotic content indices.⁴⁵ Figure 11, which shows temporal trends in the indices across democracies and autocracies (as categorized by V-Dem), also corroborates such patterns.⁴⁶ The figure also reveals a noticeable downward and upward trend in the indoctrination potential and democratic content indices from around 1985 to 1990, respectively, which coincides with the rise of competitive authoritarian regimes and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

图 10 可以更系统地观察民主水平与我们的灌输指数之间的关联，该图显示了 V-Dem 的自由民主指数和我们三个主要教育指数的分布，以及成对相关性和散点图。根据地图，这些图表明民主国家更有可能在民主内容指数上得分较高，而在灌输潜力和爱国内容指数上得分较低。⁴⁵ 图 11 显示了民主国家和独裁国家（由 V-Dem 分类）的指数随时间的变化趋势，也证实了这种模式。⁴⁶ 该图还显示，从 1985 年到 1990 年左右，灌输潜力和民主内容指数分别出现了明显的下降和上升趋势，这与竞争性威权主义政权的崛起和苏联解体相吻合。

Nonetheless, these figures also indicate that variations in indoctrination strategies are not fully captured by levels of democracy/autocracy. For example, Norway is one of the most democratic countries but scores 0.566 on the indoctrination potential index in 2021, which is above the mean index score for that year and higher than the scores of a large subset of autocratic countries. Conversely, Benin ranks 95th out of 160 countries on V-Dem’s liberal democracy index in 2021, but its concurrent score on the democratic content index ranks 22nd, which exceeds the scores of many democratic countries such as Cyprus and Japan.

In addition, if a country possesses high potential for indoctrination but is not committed to instilling a specific ideology, or strives to deliver education content that is strongly autocratic/democratic but is handicapped by low potential for indoctrination, then indoctrination in general may have diminished effects. In other words, indoctrination may only have discernible effects when both indoctrination potential and content (whether autocratic or democratic) are high. In appendix K, we demonstrate one method of constructing a composite indoctrination index in education that captures both indoctrination potential and democratic indoctrination content and presents accompanying descriptive figures for this composite index.

不过，这些数字也表明，民主/专制水平并未完全反映出灌输策略的差异。例如，挪威是最民主的国家之一，但 2021 年灌输潜力指数得分为 0.566，高于当年的平均指数得分，也高于很大一部分专制国家的得分。相反，贝宁在 2021 年 V-Dem 的自由民主指数中在 160 个国家中排名第 95 位，但其民主内容指数的同期得分排名第 22 位，超过了塞浦路斯和日本等许多民主国家的得分。

此外，如果一个国家具有很高的灌输潜力，但不致力于灌输特定的意识形态，或者努力提供强烈专制/民主的教育内容，但灌输潜力低，那么灌输总体上可能会产生减弱的效果。 换句话说，只有当灌输潜力和灌输内容（无论是专制的还是民主的）都很高时，灌输才会产生明显的效果。在附录 K 中，我们展示了一种构建教育综合灌输指数的方法，该方法既能捕捉灌输潜力，又能捕捉民主灌输内容，并为该综合指数提供随附的描述性数字。

5.1.2. Case Study: Russia

As we mentioned in the previous conceptual discussion (see section 4), some indicators are included in the aggregate indices of indoctrination potential and content pertaining to the official school curriculum. In this section, we use the case of Russia to explore the tension between the de jure and de facto changes using the V-Indoc data.

Figure 12 plots temporal trends across the three education indices for Russia (the top panel), as well as selected indicators included in these aggregate indices (the bottom panel). We focus on the following de facto indicators: (1) whether teachers can be fired for political reasons (part of indoctrination potential), (2) whether students are allowed to discuss what they are taught in history classes (part of democratic content), and (3) to what extent patriotic symbols are celebrated in schools (part of patriotic content). In addition, we combine our indicators with the data on education reforms (in Russia) from the World Education Reform Database (WERD) by Bromley and colleagues . For Russia, the WERD codes the reforms between 1939 and 2011.

5.1.2. 案例研究：俄罗斯

正如我们在之前的概念讨论中提到的那样（见第 4 节），一些指标被纳入了官方学校课程的灌输潜力和内容的总体指标中。在本节中，我们以俄罗斯为例，使用 V-Indoc 数据探索法律和事实上的变化之间的紧张关系。

图 12 绘制了俄罗斯三个教育指数（上图）以及这些总体指数中包含的选定指标（下图）的时间趋势。我们关注以下事实上的指标：（1）教师是否可以因政治原因被解雇（灌输潜力的一部分），（2）学生是否被允许讨论他们在历史课上学到的内容（民主内容的一部分），以及（3）爱国象征在学校中受到多大程度的推崇（爱国内容的一部分）。此外，我们将我们的指标与 Bromley 及其同事提供的世界教育改革数据库 (WERD) 中有关教育改革（俄罗斯）的数据相结合。 对于俄罗斯，WERD 对 1939 年至 2011 年之间的改革进行编码。 

Figure 12 Indoctrination Potential and Content in Education (Russia).

Note: The figure plots point estimates along with the lower/upper bounds of the 68% credible intervals. The indices vary between 0 (low values) and 1 (high values). The indicators reflect interval measures converted by the measurement model, and vary between roughly −3 (low values) and 3 (high values). Red vertical lines indicate education reforms from the WERD. In the case of Russia, education reforms are coded in the WERD for the period between 1939 and 2011. The top panel plots aggregate indices of indoctrination potential and democratic/patriotic content. The bottom panel plots corresponding indicators for each of the aggregate indices: political teacher firing for the index of indoctrination potential; critical discussion inside the classroom for the index of democratic content; patriotism in the curriculum for the index of patriotic content.

After 1945 and until the late 1980s we do not observe significant variation in these indices: indoctrination potential remains high, and the content is both highly authoritarian and patriotic. This corresponds with the aftermath of the “Great Patriotic War” (World War II), which saw Soviet education ideology shift to being more militaristic and patriotic to cultivate obedient and loyal citizens.

In the late 1980s, with perestroika and glasnost under Gorbachev, we observe a rise in the democratic content index after a series of education reforms were made to promote democratic ideas in the curriculum. At least de jure, Gorbachev promoted a more critical approach to education in the classroom (a dialogue instead of a monologue): “Whereas teachers were previously expected to teach that the Party was infallible, … as a result of glasnost, they [now could] acknowledge to students that the Party can indeed make mistakes”.

1945 年之后直到 1980 年代末，我们都没有观察到这些指数的显著变化：灌输潜力仍然很高，内容既高度专制又充满爱国主义。这与“卫国战争”（第二次世界大战）的后果相呼应，苏联教育意识形态转向更加军国主义和爱国主义，以培养顺从和忠诚的公民。

1980 年代末，随着戈尔巴乔夫的改革和公开化，我们观察到民主内容指数有所上升，此前进行了一系列教育改革以在课程中推广民主思想。至少在法律上，戈尔巴乔夫提倡在课堂上采用一种更具批判性的教育方法（对话而不是独白）：“以前，教师被期望教授党是绝对正确的……由于公开化，他们 [现在可以] 向学生承认党确实会犯错误”。

The first changes in the de facto indicators of political teacher firing (part of indoctrination potential) and critical discussion in the classroom (part of democratic content) precede the de jure changes of the late 1980s. The figure also shows a sharp decline in the indoctrination potential and patriotism indices after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the introduction of the 1992 Law on Education, which in part emphasized freedom and pluralism in education; and the approval of the first post-Soviet textbooks in history by the Ministry of Education in 1992 .

政治教师解雇（灌输潜力的一部分）和课堂批判性讨论（民主内容的一部分）的事实指标的首次变化早于 1980 年代后期的法律变化。该图还显示，在苏联解体后，灌输潜力和爱国主义指数急剧下降；1992 年《教育法》的出台，部分强调教育的自由和多元化；1992 年教育部批准了第一本后苏联历史教科书。

Beginning in the 2000s, these trends started to reverse with Putin’s rise to power. At least as far back as 2003, Putin expressed the hope of further centralizing the education system and strengthening patriotic education. After meeting with history scholars, Putin expressed concerns that diverse narratives in history books should not “become a platform for a new political and ideological struggle” and that textbooks should “inspire, especially among young people, a feeling of pride for their own history and for their country”. Moreover, around the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian government implemented various laws that would penalize “falsifying” history and criticizing Russia’s military glory in a way that is “disrespectful to society.” In 2014, Article 354.1 was added to Russia’s criminal code and used to prosecute the falsification of historical narratives. Teachers also began to face increased pressure to promote a single patriotic narrative in schools, as the standards for history education were revised in 2014 to promote a unified concept of teaching Russian history , and Putin declared patriotism to be the main unifying national ideology in Russia in 2015 (Moscow Times 2016).

进入21世纪，随着普京上台，这些趋势开始逆转。至少早在2003年，普京就表示希望进一步集中教育系统，加强爱国主义教育。在会见历史学者后，普京表示担心历史书籍中的不同叙述不应“成为新的政治和意识形态斗争的平台”，教科书应该“激发人们，尤其是年轻人对自己的历史和国家的自豪感”。此外，在2014年吞并克里米亚前后，俄罗斯政府实施了多项法律，对“伪造”历史和以“不尊重社会”的方式批评俄罗斯军事荣耀的行为进行惩罚。2014年，俄罗斯刑法第354.1条被添加到《刑法》中，用于起诉伪造历史叙述的行为。 由于2014年历史教育标准进行了修订，以提倡统一的俄罗斯历史教学理念，并且普京在2015年宣布爱国主义将成为俄罗斯的主要统一民族意识形态（莫斯科时报，2016年），教师们也开始面临越来越大的压力，需要在学校中推广单一的爱国主义叙事。

Such de jure changes are reflected in our key indices of indoctrination in education. The post-2000 patterns in our indices and indicators (as well as a high frequency of education reforms coded in the WERD during this period) correspond with Putin’s efforts to recentralize the education system and promote a dominant narrative that would resolve the various “contradictions” in the understanding of Russia’s history, and foster a “positive” take on Russia’s history to increase levels of patriotism among the youth. Interestingly, unlike the indicators of political teacher firing and critical discussion in the classroom, the de facto emphasis on patriotic symbols in schools remained high until the late 1980s, and then gradually decreased and stabilized at a lower level from the early 1990s until 2014. During this period, patriotism in the official curriculum—a more de jure component of patriotic content—was the main driver of the observed changes in the aggregate index. Unlike the indicator of patriotic symbols, the emphasis on patriotism in the official curriculum started to increase even prior to 2014. The political pressure on teachers increased and critical discussion in the classroom decreased after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

这种法律上的变化反映在我们教育灌输的关键指标中。2000 年后，我们的指数和指标模式（以及在此期间 WERD 编码的高频率教育改革）与普京的努力相吻合，普京努力重新集中教育系统并推广一种主导叙事，以解决对俄罗斯历史理解中的各种“矛盾”，并培养对俄罗斯历史的“积极”看法，以提高年轻人的爱国主义水平。有趣的是，与政治教师被解雇和课堂上的批判性讨论的指标不同，学校对爱国主义符号的实际重视一直持续到 1980 年代末，然后逐渐下降并从 1990 年代初到 2014 年稳定在较低水平。在此期间，官方课程中的爱国主义——爱国主义内容的更法律上的组成部分——是观察到的总体指数变化的主要驱动力。 与爱国象征的指标不同，官方课程中对爱国主义的强调在 2014 年之前就开始增加。2014 年克里米亚被吞并后，教师面临的政治压力增加，课堂上的批判性讨论减少。

Overall, de jure changes in education policies should be expected to generally correspond with de facto changes in education, though of course, this may not always be the case (e.g., due to ineffective implementation). In addition, not all changes in our indices and indicators are driven by actual reforms. In the case of Russia, for example, changes are driven by conflicts and perceived threats, consistent with the arguments made by Paglayan and Aghion and colleagues.

总体而言，教育政策的法律变化应该与教育的实际变化大致相对应，尽管当然，情况可能并非总是如此（例如，由于执行不力）。此外，我们的指数和指标的变化并非全部由实际改革推动。例如，在俄罗斯，变化是由冲突和感知到的威胁推动的，这与 Paglayan 和 Aghion 及其同事的论点一致。

5.2. Convergent Validity

A measure with convergent validity should share empirical associations with other measures of the same concept. Given the relative dearth of comprehensive comparative data on indoctrination, we focus on the indicators that factor into our indices of indoctrination. We validate our indicators against comparable variables from multiple sources, such as expert-coded variables from V-Dem, factual data from the World Bank, and published academic works. It should be noted that this exercise is not possible or limited for some indicators as alternative measures may not exist, offer restricted coverage, or only partially overlap with the content of our indicators. We identify potential validation variables for 22 of our 27 indicators.⁴⁷

5.2. 聚合效度

具有聚合效度的测量应与同一概念的其他测量具有经验关联。鉴于灌输的全面比较数据相对匮乏，我们重点关注影响我们灌输指数的指标。我们根据来自多个来源的可比变量验证我们的指标，例如来自 V-Dem 的专家编码变量、来自世界银行的事实数据和已发表的学术著作。应该注意的是，对于某些指标，这种做法是不可能的或有限的，因为替代措施可能不存在、覆盖范围有限或仅与我们的指标内容部分重叠。我们确定了 27 个指标中的 22 个的潜在验证变量。⁴⁷ 

In table 1, we report the five highest and lowest correlations (for validation variables that are continuous) and correct classification rates (for validation variables that are categorical)⁴⁸ from this exercise. Appendix L reports the full list with more detailed information about the validation variables. On average, the mean magnitude of the correlations/classifications is 0.57,⁴⁹ which can be considered to be quite strong given the content of many validation variables only partially overlap with those of our indicators. For example, the correlation between the education requirements for primary school teachers indicator and the World Bank’s teacher training variable is the weakest, though this is likely because the former distinguishes between different levels of education requirements while the latter simply measures the percentage of teachers who have received the minimum training requirement.⁵⁰ We also note that our media indicators appear to consistently perform very well in these tests despite being coded by education experts.

在表 1 中，我们报告了本次练习中五个最高和最低相关性（对于连续型验证变量）和正确分类率（对于分类型验证变量）⁴⁸。附录 L 报告了完整列表，其中包含有关验证变量的更详细信息。平均而言，相关性/分类的平均幅度为 0.57，⁴⁹ 这个数字可以被认为是相当强的，因为许多验证变量的内容与我们的指标的内容只有部分重叠。例如，小学教师教育要求指标与世界银行教师培训变量之间的相关性最弱，但这可能是因为前者区分了不同程度的教育要求，而后者仅衡量接受了最低培训要求的教师百分比。⁵⁰ 我们还注意到，尽管我们的媒体指标是由教育专家编码的，但它们在这些测试中的表现似乎始终非常好。

Table 1 Highest and Lowest Correlations/Classifications

Note: Underlined values represent classification matches conducted with ordinal versions of the V-Indoc variables. See appendix L for the complete list and more information about the validation variables.

¹V-Indoc indicator; ²Validation variable;   ³Correlation/ classification.

¹Centralized textbook approval; ²Is there evidence that the textbook has been developed to meet official curriculum requirements?; 0.74

¹Democratic ideology character in the curriculum; ²To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?; 0.72

¹Political influence, state-owned media; ²Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?; ³-0.70

¹Teacher firing for political reasons; ²If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood of that citizen being arrested?; ³-0.68

¹Critical engagement with education content; ²Does the textbook generally assume that the student should develop his/her own point of view, or interpretation, of history or social issues?; ³ 0.67 .

¹Teacher hiring for political reasons; ²To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?; ³ -0.47

¹Political rights and duties in the curriculum; ²To what extent does the textbook discuss rights, freedoms, and liberties?; ³ 0.45

¹Ideology in the curriculum; ² To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model to justify the regime in place? ³ 0.42

¹Political rights and duties in the curriculum; ²To what extent does the textbook discuss duties, responsibilities, and obligations of citizenship?; ³ 0.36

¹Education requirements for primary school teachers; ² Trained teachers in primary education are the percentage of primary school teachers who have received the minimum organized teacher training (pre-service or in-service); ³ 0.34

表 1 最高和最低相关性/分类

注：下划线值表示使用 V-Indoc 变量的序数版本进行的分类匹配。有关完整列表和有关验证变量的更多信息，请参阅附录 L。

¹V-Indoc 指标；²验证变量；³相关性/分类。

¹集中教科书审批；²是否有证据表明该教科书的开发符合官方课程要求？；  0.74

¹课程中的民主意识形态特征；²在多大程度上实现了最充分的选举民主理想？；0.72

¹政治影响，国有媒体；²在主要的印刷和广播媒体中，有多少经常批评政府？；³-0.70

¹教师因政治原因被解雇；²如果公民在网上发布与政府及其政策相悖的政治内容，该公民被捕的可能性有多大？； ³-0.68

¹对教育内容的批判性参与；²教科书是否通常假设学生应该发展自己对历史或社会问题的观点或解释？；³ 0.67 。

¹出于政治原因聘用教师；²国家行政部门的任命决定在多大程度上是基于个人和政治关系，而不是技能和优点？；³ -0.47

¹课程中的政治权利和义务；²教科书在多大程度上讨论了权利、自由和自由？；³ 0.45

¹课程中的意识形态；² 现任政府在多大程度上提倡特定的意识形态或社会模式来为现行政权辩护？³ 0.42

¹课程中的政治权利和义务；²教科书在多大程度上讨论了公民的职责、责任和义务？； ³ 0.36

¹小学教师的教育要求；² 小学教育中受过培训的教师是指接受过最低限度有组织的教师培训（职前或在职培训）的小学教师的百分比；³ 0.34

5.3. Construct Validity

Construct validation is based on the premise that a valid measure of a concept should behave as theoretically expected when used in evaluations of hypotheses that involve the concept. To this end, we test whether our index of indoctrination potential in education corroborates Linz’s argument that military regimes are less likely to engage in indoctrination relative to other types of autocratic regimes. According to Linz, military authoritarian regimes are characterized by vague “mentalities that are more difficult to diffuse among the masses [and] less susceptible to be used in education,” and the military regime’s lack of ideology limits its ability to engage in “political socialization and indoctrination.”

5.3. 结构有效性

结构有效性基于这样一个前提：一个概念的有效衡量标准在用于评估涉及该概念的假设时，应该表现得符合理论预期。为此，我们测试了我们的教育灌输潜力指数是否证实了林茨的论点，即军事政权与其他类型的专制政权相比，不太可能进行灌输。根据林茨的说法，军事独裁政权的特点是模糊的“心态，更难在群众中传播[并且]更不容易用于教育”，而军事政权缺乏意识形态限制了其进行“政治社会化和灌输”的能力。

We first classify autocratic regimes as dominant-party, personalist, military, or monarchy using the Autocratic Regimes dataset. We estimate a country fixed-effects regression model with the indoctrination potential index as the dependent variable and dummy variables for each of the autocratic regime types with military regimes excluded as the reference category. We also include logged GDP per capita as a general control for levels of economic development and state capacity. The analysis covers 103 countries from 1946 to 2010 for a total of 4,018 observations. We also repeat the analysis after constraining our sample to observations for which the mean number of coders for the indoctrination potential index is at least three. This reduces our sample to 72 countries and 2,563 observations. Coefficient plots of the results and corresponding 95% confidence intervals are presented in figure 13, and summaries of the variables and full results are reported in appendix M.

我们首先使用专制政权数据集将专制政权分为一党专制、个人主义、军事或君主制。我们估计了一个国家固定效应回归模型，该模型以灌输潜力指数为因变量，并为每种专制政权类型设置虚拟变量，并将军事政权排除在参考类别之外。我们还将人均 GDP 的对数作为经济发展水平和国家能力的一般控制。该分析涵盖了 1946 年至 2010 年的 103 个国家，共计 4,018 个观测值。我们还在将样本限制为灌输潜力指数的平均编码员人数至少为 3 的观测值后重复了分析。这将我们的样本减少到 72 个国家和 2,563 个观测值。结果的系数图和相应的 95% 置信区间如图 13 所示，变量摘要和完整结果报告在附录 M 中。

Figure 13 Indoctrination Potential in Education across Autocratic Regime Types

Note: Military regimes are excluded as the reference category in the fixed-effects model. The figure plots coefficient estimates along with the lower/upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals. The full results are reported in table M-5 in appendix M.

In accordance with Linz’s prediction, the results indicate that both dominant-party and personalist autocratic regimes exhibit higher levels of indoctrination potential than those ruled by the military.⁵¹ These findings suggest that the centralization of decision-making power in the hands of a single leader in personalist regimes might extend to the centralization of education. For example, Stalin was known to personally edit and approve school textbooks, reflecting his desire to personally control education. On the other hand, and interestingly, the model indicates that the level of indoctrination potential observed in monarchies is far lower than that observed in other types of autocratic regimes, including military regimes.⁵² Moreover, our results remain robust when constraining our sample to observations that rely on at least three coders.

根据林茨的预测，结果表明，一党专制政体和个人主义专制政体都比军人统治的政体表现出更高的灌输潜力。⁵¹ 这些发现表明，个人主义政体中决策权集中在一位领导人手中的情况可能会延伸到教育的集中化。例如，众所周知，斯大林亲自编辑和批准学校教科书，反映了他个人控制教育的愿望。另一方面，有趣的是，该模型表明，君主制政体中观察到的灌输潜力水平远低于其他类型的专制政体，包括军事政体。⁵² 此外，当我们将样本限制在依赖至少三名编码员的观察值时，我们的结果仍然稳健。

These results corroborate Linz’s argument concerning indoctrination and autocratic regime type, which lends positive evidence regarding the validity of the indoctrination potential index.⁵³ Furthermore, the results present some novel insights into how autocratic regimes might differ in their potential capacity to indoctrinate. Without the V-Indoc data, it was unknown that monarchies may be the least likely of all regime types to use indoctrination. This finding could be investigated in more detail in future research.

这些结果证实了林茨关于灌输和专制政权类型的论点，这为灌输潜力指数的有效性提供了积极证据。⁵³ 此外，结果还提供了有关专制政权在灌输潜在能力方面可能存在哪些差异的一些新见解。如果没有 V-Indoc 数据，就无法知道君主制可能是所有政权类型中最不可能使用灌输的。这一发现可以在未来的研究中更详细地调查。

6. Conclusion

What is indoctrination? Why and when do states invest in it? And what are the political consequences of indoctrination? We require a clear concept and comprehensive comparative measures of indoctrination to systematically answer such questions. Synthesizing insights from the literature on education, socialization, and nation building, among others, we have argued that indoctrination is a regime-driven process of socializing “ideal-type” citizens who espouse the values, principles, and norms of a given regime. Indoctrination is a multidimensional process that involves not only content that corresponds to a regime’s ideology but also the institutional potential of inculcating the entire population with a coherent message through control of the creation of the content and the agents who propagate it. Indoctrination targets people throughout different times of their lives: regimes use education to leverage the powerful long-term effects of early life socialization and the media to continue reinforcement in later life.

Unlike existing datasets that focus on the quality and quantity of education, our indicators are tailored to capture the multidimensional nature of indoctrination. The expert-coded data introduced in the paper allow for broad and consistent temporal and geographic coverage of 160 countries between 1945 and 2021. With the help of topic-specific country experts, we have gathered information on mostly de facto indoctrination that cannot be fully observed through de jure indicators. While expert surveys might suffer from certain biases, they are more feasible in terms of coverage. Nevertheless, our dataset is limited temporally as it starts only in 1945, thus missing the initial wave of education expansion in the age of nation and state building, particularly in established democracies. Future data collection can address this gap.

The breadth and depth of our V-Indoc dataset allows the systematic study of comparative questions of how and when regimes invest in indoctrination and the implications of indoctrination on regime survival and political attitudes. Our expert-coded indicators can potentially be compared to similar indicators coded from primary and secondary archival sources. Our education data will allow researchers to explore substantive as well as methodological questions.

We consider that one of the main advantages of our novel V-Indoc dataset is that it allows scholars to test various conceptualizations of indoctrination and measure them empirically. Those who prefer a narrower definition of indoctrination (compared to our broader definition of regime-led socialization) could use the original V-Indoc indicators instead of the constructed indices. For example, following the definition of indoctrination more widely used in the philosophy of education, the indicator for critical thinking can be used as a standalone proxy to represent indoctrination whereby the absence of critical engagement with education content constitutes the presence of indoctrination.

Despite its richness, the V-Indoc data has some limitations. For example, the data focuses on indoctrination in formal public or publicly funded schools and the media only. Future research should further explore how these two central channels relate to other potential indoctrination settings, such as voluntary associations and the workplace.

6. 结论

什么是灌输？国家为何以及何时对其进行投资？灌输的政治后果是什么？我们需要一个清晰的概念和全面的灌输比较措施来系统地回答这些问题。综合教育、社会化和国家建设等方面的文献见解，我们认为灌输是一个政权驱动的过程，旨在社会化拥护特定政权价值观、原则和规范的“理想型”公民。灌输是一个多维过程，不仅涉及与政权意识形态相对应的内容，还涉及通过控制内容的创作和传播它的代理人向全体民众灌输连贯信息的制度潜力。灌输针对人们一生的不同时期：政权利用教育来利用早期社会化的强大长期影响，并利用媒体在以后的生活中继续强化。

 与关注教育质量和数量的现有数据集不同，我们的指标是专门为捕捉灌输的多维性质而定制的。本文介绍的专家编码数据可以广泛且一致地覆盖 1945 年至 2021 年期间的 160 个国家/地区的时间和地理范围。在特定主题国家专家的帮助下，我们收集了大部分事实灌输的信息，而这些信息无法通过法定指标完全观察到。虽然专家调查可能会受到某些偏见的影响，但它们在覆盖范围方面更可行。尽管如此，我们的数据集在时间上是有限的，因为它只始于 1945 年，因此错过了民族和国家建设时代最初的教育扩张浪潮，特别是在成熟的民主国家。未来的数据收集可以弥补这一差距。

我们的 V-Indoc 数据集的广度和深度使我们能够系统地研究政权如何以及何时投资灌输以及灌输对政权生存和政治态度的影响的比较问题。我们的专家编码指标可以与从主要和次要档案来源编码的类似指标进行比较。 我们的教育数据将使研究人员能够探索实质性问题和方法论问题。

我们认为，我们新颖的 V-Indoc 数据集的主要优势之一是它允许学者测试各种灌输概念并对其进行实证测量。那些喜欢灌输的狭义定义（与我们的政权主导的社会化广义定义相比）的人可以使用原始的 V-Indoc 指标而不是构建的指标。例如，按照教育哲学中更广泛使用的灌输定义，批判性思维指标可以用作代表灌输的独立代理，其中缺乏对教育内容的批判性参与构成了灌输的存在。

尽管 V-Indoc 数据丰富，但仍存在一些局限性。例如，数据仅关注正规公立或公立学校和媒体中的灌输。未来的研究应进一步探索这两个中心渠道与其他潜在灌输环境（如自愿协会和工作场所）的关系。

Acknowledgments 致谢

The research for this project is generously funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant “Democracy under Threat: How Education Can Save It” (DEMED) (grant number 865305). 该项目的研究由欧洲研究委员会整合基金“民主受到威胁：教育如何拯救它”（DEMED）（资助编号 865305）慷慨资助。We thank Aaron Benavot, Patricia Bromley, Adrián Del Río Rodríguez, Barbara Geddes, Scott Gehlbach, Jane Gingrich, Lloyd Gruber, Sergey Guriev, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Karrie Koesel, Staffan Lindberg, Philipp Lutscher, Seraphine Maerz, Kyle Marquardt, Pippa Norris, Agustina Paglayan, Jen Pan, Dan Pemstein, Anatoli Rapoport, Ora John Reuter, Michele Schweisfurth, Brigitte Seim, Daniel Treisman, Antoni Verger, and Matthias vom Hau for feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks to Polina Denisova, Isabel Kempner, Anam Kuraishi, Anna Sarasiti, and Yilin Su for their invaluable research assistance in recruiting our education experts.

Supplementary Material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592723002967.

Notes de bas de page

*Data replication sets (Neundorf et al. 2023b) are available in Harvard Dataverse at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UCPZSE

Footnotes : 脚注：

1 The relevant literature on indoctrination and nation building uses a variety of terms to designate who is indoctrinating—e.g., the state, regime, and government. We use the term “regime” to apply in both autocratic and democratic contexts as a shorthand to mean the wider ruling group of elites within either regime type.

2 Indeed, congruence between the views and principles of the regime and those of the citizenry can promote social and political order across different types of regimes (Almond and Verba 1963; Claassen 2020; Easton 1965; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Norris 2011). According to Lipset (1959, 83), for example, legitimacy, or the belief in the appropriateness of political institutions, is a key “requisite” of stable democracy.

3 For more information and comparisons with the existing cross-national datasets, please see appendix A.

4 Perhaps not surprisingly, the existing scholarship has predominantly focused on indoctrination in education. Between 60% and 75% of academic texts in social sciences published between 1900 and 2020 that mention indoctrination also refer to education or schools (see figure B-4 in appendix B). For more discussion of the history of the term “indoctrination,” see appendix B.

5 One exception includes the study by Cantoni and colleagues (2017), where they demonstrate the strength of school indoctrination in the case of China by studying the effects of introducing new pro-regime content in the curriculum. Their results show that a curriculum reform led to higher trust in government officials and a realignment of views on democracy with those promoted by the authorities.

6 One important exception is the study of the regime’s leaked propaganda communication in China by King, Pan, and Roberts (2017).

7 We acknowledge that we do not directly observe what is happening inside the classroom. At the stage of on-the-ground implementation, other actors, especially teachers, can interfere with the regime’s indoctrination efforts. Such cases are tricky to uncover in practice. Gvirtz and Beech (2004, 376–77) examined student notebooks in Argentina in the 1970s and uncovered that “even in this highly centralized model, schools and teachers generally discarded certain themes that were included in official study plans, and included some non-official contents into their lessons,” and that “teachers also resisted the ideological content in curricular documents.” See further discussion in section 4, as well as the discussion of the trade-offs associated with our expert-based approach in section 4.2.

8 Armstrong (2022, 273) notes that the “uncritical implantation of beliefs” (Gatchel 1959, 309, emphasis added) is a common aspect of the definitions of indoctrination in the philosophy of education. Here we explicitly divert from this “pejorative meaning” (Callan and Arena 2009, 105) attached to the term and instead go back to its origin as a synonym for instruction. Our definition of indoctrination makes the enhancement of critical thinking an essential component of regime-led political socialization efforts in democracies. In our view, it is an empirical question of whether and how democracies and autocracies vary in their efforts to enhance critical thinking among their citizens. Our data allows us to answer this question, and results are presented in figure B-5 in appendix B, where we discuss this issue in more detail.

9 “Indoctrination need not end with school” (Hassan, Mattingly and Nugent [2022, 161]). Focusing only on these two channels of indoctrination is a limitation of our study. We would expect that if indoctrination efforts are high through education and the media, the regime will most likely put effort into indoctrinating through other channels such as mass organizations or the workplace, assuming that the state has some influence over these settings. We would expect other channels to have weaker effects, as they firstly have weaker state control and secondly usually only affect a subset of the population (e.g., the military), while the entire population is exposed to education and the media.

10 Similar to education, indoctrination through the media can be used for nation-building purposes—i.e., to strengthen nationalistic and patriotic identification (Blouin and Mukand 2019; DellaVigna et al. 2014). Communication channels are not limited to traditional media outlets. The regime’s intention to indoctrinate can encompass arts and culture (Belodubrovskaya 2017; Esberg 2020; Kenez 1985). For example, the Ministry of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda run by Goebbels consisted of departments handling the press, radio, theater, music, creative arts, and film (Lee 2010, 53).

11 Unfortunately, we do not have similar indicators for the media.

12 Indoctrination attempts after the first wave of literacy expansion might not have the same strength of effects (Darden and Grzymała-Busse 2006). Furthermore, the potential to indoctrinate is not the same as state capacity in general (Hanson and Sigman 2021). States may effectively extract tax revenues, maintain an effective military, and deliver high standards of medical care and education without prioritizing the political socialization of citizens through education or the media.

13 Our distinction is inspired by Easton’s (1965) distinction between political objects and a political system. Citizens’ national identities and patriotic loyalties to the state may not always coincide with support for the regime in situ. Our distinction is important, particularly in the post-1945 context where nation and state building is largely complete, and yet we still have regime change.

14 Many people associate certain ideologies, such as communism or fascism, with indoctrination, which certainly inspired important work in this area (Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956). Figure B-3 in appendix B confirms that the bulk of the earlier academic works about indoctrination (especially between 1930 and 1970) make reference to either of these all-encompassing ideologies. However, recent research that mentions indoctrination increasingly refers to regime legitimacy or weak ideologies such as nationalism, which constitute more than 50% of studies that refer to indoctrination in the past 20–30 years.

15 While there is an agreement in the literature that patriotism signifies a deeply felt attachment or pride and love for one’s country or nation (Sardoč 2020, 3), there is also much agreement that patriotism is not the same as nationalism conceptually, the former being an attachment to the political rather than a more ethnocultural community (Blattberg 2020). In a well-known study, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) empirically distinguish between nationalist and patriotic attitudes. However, Mylonas and Tudor (2023) critique the distinction, arguing that philosophers and political scientists label forms of nationalism they find personally acceptable as “patriotism.” In appendix N we further explore the relationship between patriotism and nationalism, which are only moderately related.

16 We focus on the regime’s indoctrination efforts—i.e., what happens in public, or publicly funded, schools. This is how we define public education for the purposes of the expert survey provided to the experts: “We are interested in formal public or publicly funded education: that is, schools that are controlled, managed, and funded by the public sector (a relevant national/subnational/local public authority), as well as schools that are partially funded or subsidized by the public sector but operated by a private body (for example, schools that charge tuition but also receive some public funds or subsidies). We are not interested in schools fully controlled, managed, and funded by a private body (for example, a nongovernmental organization, a religious body, a special interest group, a foundation, or a business enterprise). This means, for example, that religious schools will be included in our definition only if they are operated by a public authority or publicly funded or subsidized by the public sector” (Coppedge et al. 2022, 87).

17 Note that 15 of the 21 indicators of education are used to construct our indices; some are used as filtering variables while others did not present a sufficient match (either substantively or empirically) with our indices.

18 Ansell and Lindvall (2020) construct a similar index of centralization in primary education in the pre-World War II period.

19 We use history as a proxy to capture whether a dominant ideology is incorporated into teaching, as it can be a highly politicized subject that is almost universally taught across space and time (unlike many other subjects) (Nelson 2015; Wojdon 2018; Zajda 2017).

20 Civic education was a separate subject in the school curriculum only in 11 out of 24 countries in 2016; in most cases it was integrated into other subjects (Schulz et al. 2018, 16).

21 Unlike the existing V-Dem indicator of government ideology (Coppedge et al. 2022; Tannenberg et al. 2021), the V-Indoc indicator of ideology character includes democracy as an ideology.

22 Coders could pick up to two ideology options. If coders pick both or one of democratic options (8) or (9), democratic content is coded as 1. If coders pick any of the remaining ideological options, democratic content is coded as 0.

23 All ideology types are included in the V-Indoc data as indicators and can be explored separately.

24 We use history as a proxy to capture a possible tension between the state-approved historical narratives and alternative interpretations.

25 We model this indicator after the ICCS question on “promoting knowledge of citizens’ rights and responsibilities” (IEA 2018, 36–39).

26 We focus on language studies to capture variation in patriotic education across different contexts and over time. Measuring our concept for a subject that is predominantly political, such as history (e.g., Wang 2008; Zajda 2017), can produce artificially high levels of patriotism in the curriculum. Although even math can be a political subject (e.g., Wojdon 2018), on average, we would expect to see low levels of patriotism promoted via the math curriculum. We expect patriotic education via the language curriculum to be located between the two extremes (e.g., Starkey 2007).

27 Some forms of patriotism promote loyalty to democratic principles—e.g., “civic patriotism” (Seixas 2005)—whereas others might focus on uncritical loyalty and self-sacrifice—e.g., through military service (Bækken 2019).

28 With the rise of the internet and social media (and the loss of monopoly over information dissemination), autocrats’ strategies include internet shutdowns (Vargas-Leon 2016), strategic censorship (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Roberts 2018; 2020), and distraction (King, Pan, and Roberts 2017; Sobolev 2019; Stukal et al. 2019). Existing V-Dem data already include many of these indicators (Coppedge et al. 2022; Mechkova et al. 2021).

29 Djankov and colleagues (2003) find that state ownership of the media leads to state capture and undermines media pluralism.

30 We model our print/broadcast indicators after the cross-sectional media concentration variable from Djankov and colleagues (2003) and Guriev and Treisman (2020) (broadcast only) and extend their coverage over time.

31 Censorship of the arts, such as in films, can be used to impact popular support for the regime (Esberg 2020).

32 The most common topic in modern autocrats’ political communication is nationalism and national pride, while democratic leaders appeal to collective memory (Maerz 2020, 532).

33 While also navigating potential de jure and de facto tensions.

34 Existing data and indicators that tap into aspects of media indoctrination are more widely available. Examples include the media battery of the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2022) and the data of the Digital Societies Project (Mechkova et al. 2021). See appendix A for a more detailed list. As a consequence, our education indicators are more numerous than indicators measuring indoctrination in the media. Given this principal focus on education, we prioritized recruiting education experts for our survey.

35 We selected 1945 as the earliest start year of our data as our pilot study revealed that experts have significantly less confidence in their ratings for earlier time periods.

36 An example of the interface that coders used to record their responses for a given country-year can be seen in appendix D.

37 Using V-Dem’s “Regimes of the World” classifications.

38 Education experts may be less likely to answer all questions related to the media. Although we do see a difference prior to the 1990s (education vs. media with more than five experts per country), the overall coder coverage for education and media questions is comparable.

39 In our case, it is possible that experts may consistently assign democratic/authoritarian countries low/high values on some questions—e.g., some coders may perceive centralization to be an authoritarian trait. However, empirically, we observe within-country and over-time variation in indicators such as the one on centralization, even in cases where the democratic status of the country remains unchanged. Weidmann (2023) also reached generally optimistic conclusions for expert-coded data, showing that the effect of repressive events on expert assessments of democracy is in general too small to meaningfully affect research with expert-coded indicators.

40 Pemstein and colleagues (2020) and Marquardt and Pemstein (2018) offer detailed discussions about these specific features of the measurement model. In particular, the V-Indoc expert survey made extensive use of anchoring vignettes—which present and ask experts to code hypothetical cases—to identify and adjust for potential idiosyncratic interpretations of questions/responses (King and Wand 2007). We provide an overview of some of the key adjustments made by the measurement model in appendix F.

41 These bounds are a function of characteristics such as the number of coders, their confidence in their responses, and discrepancies in responses across coders. In appendix F, we demonstrate how such credible intervals can facilitate more accurate comparisons. We also explore factors that may contribute to coder confidence. In general, users can use the bounds of the credible intervals, which directly account for numerous potential coding issues, to make more accurate inferences.

42 For the indices, we provide the mean number of coder responses across the indicators used to construct each index.

43 The coverage is reduced to 122 countries and 8,458 country-year observations when dropping countries that have fewer than three unique coders. In this validation section, we use the entire sample to be more conservative but note that results remain largely the same when constraining the sample to observations that have at least three coders.

44 The correlation between the indoctrination potential in education and media indices is 0.52 (0.62 when filtering observations with fewer than three coders on average in each index), which indicates that indoctrination through different channels is a coordinated effort.

45 Interestingly, while the correlation between the liberal democracy index and the patriotic content index is −0.53—which suggests that democratic countries are less likely to engage in patriotic indoctrination—much of this correlation is driven by a subset of highly democratic countries that have almost no patriotic indoctrination content in their education. When excluding these cases, the relationship between democracy and patriotic indoctrination is less clear. Furthermore, there are democracies like Israel, Latvia, and the US that score highly on patriotic content. We show a more detailed scatterplot of this relationship in appendix I.

46 Additional figures that plot temporal trends for all the education indicators by regime type are included in appendix J. Democracies and autocracies mostly differ in the coherence of education, the ideological character of the curriculum, political control over education agents, and, to a lesser extent, in terms of promoting pluralism and the centralization of the curriculum. Future research should further explore these more nuanced differences between regime types.

47 The indicators for which we found no adequate matches are teacher autonomy in the classroom, extracurricular activities, teacher inspection, state-owned print media, and patriotism in the media.

48 The measurement model produces supplementary variables that translate our continuous indicators back to their original ordinal scales (suffixed by _ord). We use these versions of the indicators when matching with categorical variables from other sources.

49 This increases to 0.59 when limiting the sample to observations that were coded by at least three coders.

50 This indicator is not included in any of our main indoctrination indices.

51 The substantive magnitude of these differences is also significant given that within-country standard deviation of the indoctrination potential index in the entire sample is around 0.0894.

52 Linz (2000) considers monarchies to be premodern forms of authority and thus does not include this regime type in his argument.

53 In appendix M, we show that the results hold when adding year fixed effects. We also iteratively repeat the analysis using the lower and upper bounds of the indoctrination potential index and other education and media indices as the dependent variable. The observed patterns remain robust.

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